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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff / Petitioner,
vs.

Sup. Ct. Case No: 20180487-SC

ROBERT PERAZA,

Ct. App. Case No: 20160302-CA

Defendant / Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
This case is a mess. The trial court admitted expert testimony without
requiring the State to meet the threshold for expert witness evidence over
Peraza’s objection. When Peraza moved for a continuance, because it now had to
respond to that expert testimony, the details of which had not been disclosed, the
court denied that motion too. The Court of Appeals saw the obvious problem with
these rulings, and in light of the nature of the allegations, the role the expert
testimony played in bolstering the complaining witness, and the importance a
defense expert would have played, the court reversed and remanded. The parties
are now before the Court to litigate whether the Court of Appeals made its
conclusions about the expert witness by incorrectly considering the deficiency of
the State’s expert notice, and to litigate whether the Court of Appeals’
presumption of prejudice from the trial court’s erroneous denial of the motion to
continue was the wrong standard.
In theory, these issues are important, and should be resolved, but no
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matter how the Court rules on these questions it won’t change the merits, the
meat and potatoes, of the errors below. Regardless of whether the Court of
Appeals incorrectly incorporated a notice requirement into the 702 analysis, the
fact still remains, the State did not meet its burden to demonstrate its expert
could testify. The trial court was wrong, and the conviction must be overturned.
And regardless of whether the burden fell on the defense or on the State, the facts
were clear that denying the continuance had a significant impact on the defense
and there is no question that it prejudiced Peraza.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted review on the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in vacating Respondent’s convictions
based on its construction and application of Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence
and Section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code. This issue is copied verbatim from the
Court’s order granting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in assigning Petitioner the burden of
demonstrating that Respondent was not prejudiced by the district court’s denial
of his motion for a continuance. This issue is copied verbatim from the Court’s
order granting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
In addition, Respondent now raises two claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel which were raised but not reached by the Utah Court of Appeals below.
3. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to investigate and present expert testimony related to the State’s evidence about
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the complaining witness’s multiple statements, her therapy records, and the
State’s expert witness testimony. “The standard of review for [a defendant’s]
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal is
correctness.” State v. Griffin, 2016 UT 33, ¶16, 384 P.3d 186 (citing State v. Ott,
2010 UT 1, ¶16, 247 P.3d 344).2 This issue is not preserved but is subject to an
exception to the preservation requirement for ineffective assistance of counsel.
4. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to investigate and consult with a medical expert related to the complaining
witness’s physical examination following disclosure of alleged sexual abuse. “The
standard of review for [a defendant’s] ineffective assistance of counsel claims
raised for the first time on appeal is correctness.” Griffin, 2016 UT 33, ¶16 (citing
Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶16). This issue is not preserved but is subject to an exception to
the preservation requirement for ineffective assistance of counsel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Facts of the Case
Testimony of George Scott –
K.C. (the complaining witness) is George Scott’s granddaughter. R.782.

Scott’s daughter, Nina Peraza, is K.C.s mother. R.783. Robert and Nina Peraza

Because the facts supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims
are not currently within the record on appeal, Peraza has simultaneously filed a
Motion for Remand Pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to supplement the record with facts in support these claims. If, and
when, the remand takes place Peraza will seek to file a supplemental brief with
the additional evidence and argument.
2
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“lived a number of years in [his] home.” R.785. One day in August of 2013 Scott
was in his yard when Nina and K.C. drove into the driveway. R.786. Scott spoke
with Nina after K.C. ran into the house. R.786. After speaking with Nina, Scott
went in the house to speak with K.C. who appeared upset. R.789. The police were
then called, who provided Scott and Nina with some forms to write statements.
R.791-92.
After Peraza was arrested, Scott “started perceiving quite a noticeable
change in” Nina. R.1034. Nina told Scott she had invested eight years in her
marriage, and she was going to lose those years. R.1035. Scott believed Nina “was
very concerned about the impact of it on her family, on her becoming a single
mother.” R.1041.
Scott’s opinion of K.C.’s reputation for truthfulness is that she “lied at
times to protect herself” but, as a “general rule”, “she was an honest child.” R.793.
Testimony of Carly Echols Carly Echols works for the Division of Child and Family Services at the
Children’s Justice Center (CJC). R.812. Echols conducted an interview with K.C.
on August 9, 2013 at the CJC, which was audio and video recorded. R.813-17,
State’s Exhibit 1.
Echols interviewed K.C. a second time at K.C.’s school September 18, 2013.
R.826, 832. The second interview was conducted “to investigate whether [K.C.]
had been tampered with”. R833. K.C. told Echols that “the attorney had told her
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that her mom couldn’t talk to her about it, and that hadn’t talked about it.”
R.833.
Testimony of K.C. At the time of trial K.C. was 12 years old and in 6th grade. R.835-36. K.C.
lived with Peraza for “a couple of years” but “stayed with [her] grandpa most of
[her] whole life.” R.840. Peraza and her mother, Nina, have been together most
of her life but she is not sure whether they were married. R.840-41.
On more than one occasion something happened between K.C. and Peraza
that “made [K.C.] feel uncomfortable.” R.842. “He -- he made me do things that I
didn’t like, and he’d get -- he got mad at me a lot, and he used to hurt me.” R.842.
The first instance K.C. recalled was when Peraza woke her up late at night,
began comforting her, began taking his clothes off, and then “started taking off
[her] clothes”. R.846. Peraza showed K.C. “his body parts and touch[ed]” her.
R.846.
This “happened a couple of nights” and “it started going where he made me
touch him.” R.846. He made K.C. touch him “[o]n his penis.” R.846. “He made
me do an up and down gesture on his penis.” R.847. Peraza’s penis “got hard”
and “then white stuff started coming out.” R.848. K.C. “felt violated and grossed
out.” R.848.
K.C. remembered that her mother “could’ve been at work or asleep” while
this was happening because she worked for “old people” during the day and
night. R.848. Peraza would watch K.C. while Nina was away. R.849. Her younger
5

brother, R.P., who would have been three or four at the time “would’ve been
playing his Xbox or playing outside with the dog.” R.849.
This happened “every week” until K.C. was seven, then “it started to
change.” R.849-50. Then Peraza made K.C. “do it longer, and put my mouth on
his penis”. R.850. “He would grab my hair and make me go up and down, like, it
felt like he was ripping my hair up”. R.850. The “white stuff” would go “[i]n my
mouth or on my face” and Peraza would say, “do you want some milk?” R.850.
Once, when K.C. was seven, it occurred in the car while Nina and K.C.’s brothers
were in a Denny’s restaurant. R.851. One time while K.C.’s mouth was on Peraza’s
penis her “little brother came in, and then [Peraza] said that we were playing hide
and seek…” R.937-38.
Then, a month later, “things started to happen with [K.C.’s] bum”. R.854.
The first incident “involving your butt” happened when K.C. was five years old, at
her “very first house” in Provo. R.955-57.3 Peraza would “put a sock in my mouth
so I wouldn’t scream.” R.852, 928. “He put some stuff on my butt and stick his
penis in me.” R.852. During these incidents, Peraza was behind K.C. and she was
“[a]t a 90-degree angle on the bed.” R.932. Trial was the first time K.C. told
anyone about Peraza putting a sock in her mouth. R.968. Trial was the first time
K.C. told anyone about using “weird stuff” to make penetration easier. R.968.

But see R.957-59 (K.C. recalls telling “Courtney that the first time anything
involving your butt took place was on your -- when you were eight years old”, on
her birthday, with family members gathered at the house).
3
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Then, “[a] year after he started sticking his penis in my butt”, he “stuck his
penis in my vagina.” R.853. This happened two or three times, standing up, face
to face. R.933. This happened either “[a] long time”, or a “couple months”, before
her interview at the CJC. R.934.
Peraza would talk to K.C. “about not telling anyone while this abuse was
going on” “[a]lmost every time.” R.926. “Sometimes he would push me to do
more, and it hurt, and I said, ‘I don’t want to do this’, like five times, and then he
said, ‘I don’t care’.” R.927-28. One time, K.C. told Peraza she didn’t “want to, he - and then he had choked me and lifted me off the floor and threw me.” R.928.
The abuse stopped when K.C. was nine and Peraza moved in with his mother,
before K.C. reported it to Nina. R.853.
Once, when she was eight, K.C. saw Peraza and Nina engaging in sex when
she has slept in their room, she “woke up to them doing that, and then I had tried
to ignore it, I didn’t want to leave the room because they would’ve known that I
was awake the whole time.” R.929, 962. On two other occasions K.C. “walked in
the door when I thought my brothers were in there…, so I walked in there and
then I saw him naked.” R.930.
K.C. observed a pornographic video which was playing on the TV. She
watched about 30 seconds and then went upstairs. R.938. It was a movie
involving a man and a woman doing sexual things. R.960. K.C. went upstairs to
find Peraza was asleep. R.961. She woke Peraza up, and questioned him about the
video, but he said “nothing, nothing, nothing.” R.961. Another time, Peraza was
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on the computer watching videos involving sex, “[t]wo guys, four girls”, and he
wanted K.C. “to do what they were doing on the computer.” R.939.
K.C. says she reported being abused to her mother, Nina, “[o]nly twice.”
R.855. “I told my mom when I was five or six. She believed me for a couple
minutes, and then she turned away from it.” R.855. K.C. said she told her mother
“Daddy’s really hurting me in a way that I don’t like it.” R.855. Then again, when
K.C. was seven, she told Nina, and K.C. thinks Nina told Scott because they
fought about K.C. R.855. K.C. says she told her mother “that ‘he’s sticking his
pee-pee in me, and I -- it hurts, and I don’t like it.’” R.855.
K.C. was interviewed by Echols at the CJC on August 9, 2013. R.813, see
State’s Exhibit 1. K.C. told Echols she promised her grandmother she wouldn’t do
these things with Peraza on Sundays. R.922. K.C. felt like it “was her fault
because I let him do it…” R.922. K.C. also told Echols that nothing like this has
happened with anybody else, other than Peraza. R.923. Echols asked K.C. to
describe Peraza’s penis and K.C. told her it was just “like my mom said.” R.962.4
K.C. had asked her mother about Peraza’s penis because she was curious about it.
R.962-63. K.C didn’t tell Echols about “more abuse with [her] dad that involved
things like [her] butt and [her] vagina” because she “was afraid.” R.926, 964
(Echols asked “numerous times if it had happened in any other way” and K.C.

See State’s Exhibit 1 at 36:15 (Q: Tell me what his pee-pee looks like. A: It was
like my mom said.”).
4
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told her “nothing else”).5
After the CJC K.C. told Nina that she missed Peraza, and that she wanted
to live with him again. R.945. Nina was confused about why, and asked K.C.
whether the things she had said about Peraza actually happened. R.946. K.C. told
Nina that they did not happen. R.946. K.C. acknowledged that these things did
not happen “all on [her] own”. R.946.
A couple months after she was first interviewed at the CJC K.C.’s mother
took her to an appointment to talk with a private investigator. R.917, 920-21. The
investigator asked K.C. about Peraza having her touch him and she said he had
not done that. R.942. She told the investigator Peraza didn’t touch her and she
didn’t touch Peraza. R.942. The investigator asked K.C. about what she said in
her CJC interview and she said she said those things because she “had to”. R.943,
see State’s Exhibit 2 at 6-7.6 K.C. told the investigator that an evil voice in her
head told her what to say. R.943. Nobody, but the little voice, told her what to
say. R.944. K.C. told the investigator she had never told Nina about the abuse
before. R.944. The investigator asked K.C. many times about the alleged abuse

See State’s Exhibit 1 at 35:57 (Q: Has your dad ever touched you anywhere on
your body? A: No.).
6 “Q. Did you tell her that Robert had you do things with him that you didn’t want
to do and that weren’t right? A. Yes. Q. And why did you tell her that? A. Because
I had to. Q. Why did you have to? A. Because that’s why I was there for. Q. And
why did you have to -- was it because it was true or was it for some other reason?
A. I don’t know. Q. Well, did those things happen, or didn’t they? A. Didn’t. Q.
They didn’t happen? A. Huh-uh. Q. Then why did you tell the lady they did? A.
Because that little voice went in my head. Q. A little voice went in your head? A.
Uh-huh.”
5
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and every time she said they did not happen. R.944.
At trial K.C. said her recantation to the investigator “wasn’t true, because I
didn’t want our family to get split up.” R.915. “And I had lied and said that there
was a little voice in my head that told me to lie.” R.915.
K.C. has talked a lot about the abuse with her counselor in California, Dr.
Matoon. R.844. K.C. didn’t tell Dr. Matoon everything about the abuse when they
first met because she didn’t know Dr. Matoon, “[s]he felt like a stranger”. R.975.
During her sessions with Dr. Matoon, K.C. made dolls of Peraza and Giovanni
(Peraza’s brother), which she then killed and ran over with a car. R.959. K.C.
made a doll of Cassie, Giovanni’s girlfriend, and killed her too. R.960. K.C.
learned the words penis and vagina from her grandma her therapist who “had
been preparing” her. R.925.
After she moved to California, K.C. would call her mother on the phone.
R.970. K.C. “kept telling [Nina] in those conversations that [Peraza] didn’t do
anything to” K.C. R.970-71. K.C. told her mother that nothing happened with
Peraza but that Giovanni had done things to her. R.972.
K.C. was interviewed again, in California, by “Courtney” and asked about
Giovanni. R.954. K.C. said that Giovanni’s girlfriend, Cassie, had heard K.C. and
Giovanni “doing things”. R.954. Cassie had also heard when Peraza “was doing
things to you on your butt”. R.954-55. K.C. told Courtney that Giovanni had
kissed her, but had done “nothing else”. R.955. K.C. told Courtney that Cassie had

10

been mad at K.C. and had accused K.C. of begging Giovanni to abuse her. R.959.7
Testimony of Nina Peraza –
On the day of the football game, Nina and Peraza had been involved in a
physical fight. R.985. Nina assaulted Peraza. R.1018. Then Nina took K.C. to the
football game and she explained she and Peraza would not be staying together.
R.985. That was the first time Nina had “heard [K.C.] claim that Robert had
abused her”. R.985, 1002.8 Nina came home and immediately told her dad as
much as she could “get out without… dry heaving”. R.1004. Nina then spoke to
the police and cooperated by having K.C. interviewed at the CJC. R.1004. At that
time, Nina believed what K.C. had said. R.1004-05. She thought there was no way
K.C could make something like that up. R.1005. Nina also took K.C. to for a
physical examination. R.1005. The doctor told Nina that K.C.’s hymen was still
intact, and that she had no injuries. R.1005.
While Peraza was in jail, K.C. “would cry for Daddy, she’d ask for Daddy as
we would go visit Daddy at the jail. She’d want to go, but she couldn’t because
they said she couldn’t go… It was just always Daddy, and she was crying for him.”
R.1007. Nina sensed that something was wrong with K.C. R.996-97. Nina was
conflicted, she no longer knew whether to believe K.C.’s allegations. R.987.

But see Defense Exhibit 1 at 34 (K.C. tells Courtney Lee that Giovanni’s
girlfriend said K.C. was begging Peraza to “do that” on her birthday).
8 K.C. did not tell Nina about these kinds of things in kindergarten. Nina is
confident that if her daughter had said something like that before she would
remember, she would be traumatized and sickened. R.1002-03.
7
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Nina recalls several times when K.C. walked in on Nina and Peraza having
sex. R.1016. In one instance, she observed Nina performing oral sex and later
K.C. asked about it, and about why Nina was making “those sounds.” R.1016. K.C.
also asked Nina about pornography. R.1017. Nina recalls that K.C. might have
had access to the pornography on Nina and Peraza’s iPad’s and phones. R.1017.
Nina recalled the apartment where K.C. alleged the abuse occurred. R.1019.
She wasn’t working while they lived there because she was pregnant. R.1019.
Robert was working and for a time he was gone to New York for work. R.1020. It
was a small apartment, all on one floor, with thin walls. R.1019. If “something
was being done in another room against someone’s will” Nina believes she would
have heard it. R.1020. She would check on her kids all the time at night. R.1020.
Eventually, Nina asked K.C. whether these things really happened and K.C.
said they didn’t happen. R.1007. Nina remembered that K.C. “wrote on a piece of
paper what had happened, and she said that it was -- that she wasn’t telling the
truth, that it was Satan that told her.” R.996. Nina was confused and hurt.
R.1007.
Nina considered K.C.’s history of getting in trouble as school for talking
with other children about sex. R.1010-11. She considered times when K.C. would
initially accuse the boys in the neighborhood of kissing her and then later admit
they had not done it. R.1011. K.C. had a character for fabricating allegations
against people. R.1012-13. Eventually, as time went on and Nina considered what
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she knew about K.C., the history and recantations, and her husband, she
concluded K.C.’s allegations were not true. R.988-89.
Nina arranged with Peraza’s attorney for K.C. to meet with a private
investigator for an interview. R.990. Nina took K.C. “to the private investigator
only after she recanted to me.” R.995. Nina did not call the police to report that
K.C. had recanted her allegations. R.990-91. Nina called Peraza’s attorney, not
the police or DCFS, because the attorney “I knew that he was the one that need to
know.” R.996. Nina assumed the attorney “would then pass it on to the
prosecution.” R.1018.
K.C. continued to live with Nina for “about a year after everything came
out” but then, based on a court’s order, K.C. moved to California to live with her
biological father. R.992-93. After K.C. moved to California Nina learned from
K.C.’s biological father that K.C. had claimed Peraza had anally sodomized her.
R.1013. Nina wondered why K.C. would say these things when Nina knew there
had not been any injuries. R.1013-14.
Testimony of Matt Pedersen –
Matt Pedersen was the lead detective on this case. R.1042. Pedersen
interviewed Peraza. R.1045. Pedersen informed Peraza about K.C.’s allegations
and Peraza initially offered a denial, then blamed others. R.1046. Peraza said
these allegations were made up or coached by his wife (Nina) or by the
grandfather (Scott). R.1046. Peraza also said K.C. may have walked in on him
while he was viewing pornography or she may have viewed it herself. R.1047.
13

Peraza told Pedersen that K.C. “walked in on his wife giving him oral sex”
numerous times, and that she observed them having sex, including in the shower.
R.1047.
Pedersen asked Peraza about his alcohol use and posed a hypothetical
about the possibility that something happened with K.C. while he was drunk or
passed out. R.1048. Peraza stated that “if he was really drunk” he “imagine”
mistaking K.C. for his wife. R.1048. Peraza described a situation where he “drank
and passed out on the couch” and someone was shaking him. R.1049. Peraza
“assumed it was his wife, so he grabbed the head of that person, guided it to his
genital area, there was oral sex… he thanked them, and fell back asleep.” R.104950. The next day Peraza thanked his wife for the act and she didn’t know what he
was talking about. R.1050. Peraza admitted because it wasn’t Nina, “it could’ve
been [K.C.].” R.1050. The State stipulated that Peraza’s statements to Pedersen
were made in the form of instances where “it could’ve happened”, not that any of
it did happen. R.1075.
Testimony of Ken Bourne –
Ken Bourne is an independent private investigator who was retained by
original defense counsel to investigate the case. R.1105, 1108. Bourne interviewed
K.C. R.1109. Numerous times during that interview K.C. recanted the allegations
she had made against Peraza. R.1110-11. See State’s Exhibit 2, Addendum A.
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“Rebuttal”9 Testimony of Chelsea Smith –
Chelsea Smith works at the Utah County CJC as a forensic interviewer.
R.1131. Smith has a bachelor’s degree in “marriage, family, human development”
and a master’s degree in social work. R.1132. She received training in “the Tom
Lyons 10 step” protocol. R.1132. She has gone to “advanced forensic interview
training, and extended forensic interview training” and other conferences and
trainings reviewing forensic interviewing. R.1132. Smith did not interview or
make an assessment on K.C., she did not read the transcript of Bourne’s interview
of K.C, and she did not review any medical records or counselling records.
R.1148, 1154.
Smith has performed “[a]round 1,900” forensic interviews. R.1141. In her
experience, the fact that a “child recants does not mean that it did not occur.”
R.1142. The research about the frequency of recantations “varies between four
percent to 20 percent of cases, so it’s not something that’s typical, but it’s not
unheard of that it does happen.” R.1141-42. “Sometimes when a child recants, it
may be feeling pressure from family members.” R.1142. “It may be feeling
pressure from family members.” R.1142. A child may “also recant because they’re
feeling guilty or something” about making a false allegation to begin with. R.1148.
When people in the “sexual abuse community” disclose it is often delayed

Although the State characterized Smith’s testimony as rebuttal, the evidence her
testimony was admitted to rebut, the multiple inconsistent statements, the
delayed and partial disclosure, and the recantation, was all initially admitted
through witnesses called by the State.
9
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“until they’re an adult”, so “when they do disclose as a child, even then, the
disclosure can be delayed.” R.1143. Sometimes disclosure comes gradually where
“kids will just give a little bit of information to test the waters, to see how it is
received.” R.1143-44. “Sometimes the children are supported and then they feel
more comfortable talking about things. Sometimes it’s not that well by the person
who receives it, and then the child will kind of shut down and not talk about
things a lot.” R.1144. “Other times, children will say the information that they can
think about that time, but just often times, we don’t remember all of the
information about an experience when someone’s asked us about that experience,
and so when someone’s asked us about that experience, and so sometimes later
we’ll think, oh, I forgot to tell them that part, or the more we talk about things,
the more we remember different experiences.” R.1144.
B. Procedural History of the Case
On August 15, 2013, Robert Peraza was charged by information with four
(4) counts of sodomy upon a child, each a first degree felony, and one (1) count of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony. R.001-02.
The case was assigned to Judge McDade who held a preliminary hearing on
September 4, 2014. At the preliminary hearing the State submitted a video
recorded interview of the complaining witness (K.C.) at the Children’s Justice
Center (CJC). R.091. During the CJC interview K.C. describes multiple incidents
of Peraza’s misconduct, some involving his causing K.C. to touch his penis with
her hands, and others where Peraza caused K.C. to perform oral sex upon him.
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See State’s Exhibit 1.10 The trial court found sufficient evidence to bind over for
trial. R.152.
On November 24, 2014 the trial court held a hearing at which the parties
disclosed that no resolution had been reached and the defense asked for a jury
trial. R.450. The Court scheduled trial for March 17-19, 2015. R.451. On March 2,
2015 the parties appeared at a pre-trial conference at which they discussed
Peraza’s written motion to continue the trial on the basis that facts had arisen
“requiring the exploration by the defense into a memory expert”, Peraza needed
access to therapy records, and to consult with an expert in relation to the State’s
proposed expert. R.164-167. At the hearing, counsel for the State acknowledged
that additional evidence was still being gathered (K.C. had disclosed additional
abuse by “another suspect” and had been interviewed again in California) so the
State did “not want to go forward on the case…” and would not object to the
continuance “on those grounds.” R.456. The trial court noted that the “case needs
to get moving” and scheduled a pretrial hearing to look for another trial date.
R.458-59.
At that pretrial hearing, April 27, 2015, the defense asserted that a new trial
could not be set because the State had still not provided the additional discovery
(new California interview) and because the matter of disclosing K.C.’s therapy
It should also be noted that the Information, which was not amended, charges
four counts of Sodomy upon a Child pursuant to Utah Code §76-5-403.1. The
probable cause statement within the Information and describes four instances of
oral sodomy. Nothing in the case up to the time of trial suggested Peraza would
need to confront allegations of anal sodomy or vaginal intercourse.
10
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records had not been resolved. R.466-467. The State responded that it was in the
process of reviewing the new interview evidence and would provide it soon.
R.467-468. The court wondered why, in a case that had already been set for trial,
the evidence had not already been provided, to which the State responded that
the new evidence and the therapy records had only recently come to light. R.468469.
On June 1, 2015 the parties stipulated to Peraza’s Rule 14(b) request for a
subpoena and in-camera review of K.C’s therapy records. R.478-479. The trial
court issued its subpoena duces tecum for the therapy records on June 19, 2015.
R.207-08. At a status conference the parties discussed the progress of the 14(b)
subpoena, but at that point the court had not yet received the records. R.487. At
the follow-up hearing the court had still not received any records from K.C.’s
therapist. R.494. The parties expected the records to be provided shortly so they
set a new trial for October 27-29, 2015. R.495-497.
At the August 24, 205 status conference the trial court informed the parties
it had received the therapy records and was waiting for defense counsel to file
something about what information in the therapy records would be relevant.
R.504-06. On September 23, 2015 defense counsel filed that notice (R.217-18)
and at the following review hearing the court informed the parties it intended to
provide the redacted records “by the end of the week”. R512.
On October 19, 2015 defense counsel “ask[ed] to reset the trial” because it
had learned of a recorded recantation by K.C. in the possession of a private
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investigator, and because, based on the recently released therapy records, defense
counsel believed it was necessary to secure Dr. Matoon as a fact witness “for
impeachment purposes.” R.1330-31.11 The State was unaware of the recantation
but did admit that the records of the “therapist is kind of a big deal”. R.1331. The
State also wanted to “look at re-filing… expert notice” because their notice for Dr.
Matoon had been filed late. R.1332. The State admitted it would “be better to
continue the trial.” R.1331. The court was concerned about further delay but
noted that it didn’t “know that [it] ha[d] any choice”, struck the trial, and set a
new trial for February 9-11, 2016. R.1336, 1338.
On January 8, 2016 (32 days before trial) the State filed notice of expert
testimony for Chelsea Smith. R.282-83. The State’s notice did not include a
report, or a detailed description of what Smith’s testimony would be. See UTAH
CODE §77-17-13. The notice only said that the Smith would present evidence of
the “methodology and science related to forensic interviewing of suspected child
sex abuse victims; science and research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse
including identified factors related to delayed, partial and gradual disclosures
and recantation.” R.283. Attached to the notice was a copy of Smith’s Curriculum
Vitae (R.284-87), a document titled “Areas of Inquiry for Expert Testimony and
Supporting Research Citations Chelsea Smit, LCSW” (R.288-92), and a document
titled “References for Court Testimony Chelsea Smith (R.293-301). The “Areas of

The private investigator had been hired by Peraza’s public defender prior to the
time Mr. Bautista entered the case as private counsel.
11
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Inquiry” document was numbered list of 38 general topics, like “1. Incidence of
Stanger v. Intimate Abuse” and “18. Sexual Behavior in Abused and Non-Abused
Children”, each of which is accompanied by references to what the document
refers to as “Research Literature Support”. R.288-92. Other than the titles and
citations, the “Areas of Inquiry” document has no information. The “References
for Court Testimony” document is an alphabetized list of 99 articles. This
document does not give any description of the articles, beyond their titles, nor
does the document provide any information about how the articles relate to
Smith’s testimony.
On January 28, 2016 the court held oral argument on Peraza’s objection to
the State’s notice of Chelsea Smith as an expert witness. Peraza objected claiming
that the expert notice did not include an adequate report so the defense did not
“really know exactly what this expert would be testifying to”, that the list of
articles cited within the notice were not explained how they would correspond to
Smith’s proposed opinion, and that the proposed testimony was not supported by
any “actual statistical basis”. R.533-36. The State responded by claiming that its
notice of expert witness for Dr. Matoon was “a little bit different” from its notice
for Chelsea Smith because Smith would be called “to rebut the evidence that [the
prosecutor was] sure will come in at trial… that this child has changed her
testimony over time, at one point that there was a recantation”. R.536-37. The
State intended Smith to “explain as an expert that the science behind child -disclosures of children suspected of child abuse, recognizes that there are times
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where children do not make a full disclosure initially, and that it’s a process.”
R.538. In support of that position the State cited to a 2015 Utah Supreme Court
case where the Court apparently recognized that “[c]ommon experience with rape
and child sexual abuse cases indicates that it is not unusual for a victim to
recant… or change their stories over time.” R.538.12
Defense counsel argued that the State’s notice was inadequate because it
did not provide “a thorough enough written explanation of the expert’s proposed
testimony” such that the defense did not “know which [studies] she’s specifically
relying on” and would “have no ability to cross examine her without having more
information”. R.548-49.
The trial court stated, “according to the rules of evidence, this person
would meet the criteria for being an expert…” R.548. After further discussion, the
court denied Peraza’s objection to the State’s proposed expert witness noting she
“qualified as an expert, looking at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of
things.” R.550.
Later that same day, on a phone conference with the parties, defense
counsel informed the court that, based on the court’s earlier 702 ruling and a
conversation with the “director of the mental health and social work and
Peraza assumes the prosecutor was referring to State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT
1204, ¶37, 356 P.3d 1204. Peraza notes that the analysis and holding in Schmidt
has nothing whatsoever to do with the admissibility of expert testimony on the
behavior of complaining witnesses being consistent with abuse. Defense counsel
accurately pointed out that Schmidt “was a case analyzing whether it was proper
for a case to have been dismissed at the preliminary hearing” so the Court was
“talking about a different standard”. R.539.
12
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mitigation department at the Salt Lake legal defenders”, the defense needed an
expert to review K.C.’s therapy records, that the therapy “could lead to
recantation of the recantation, and also… this therapy practice might have led to
the allegations becoming much more violent and much more pronounced as the
years have gone on.” R.590. The defense requested a continuance of the trial to
secure an expert. R.591. The State was “unhappy” with the prospect of a
continuance but understood “the basis of what they’re asking for.” R.591-92. The
court decided it had “to draw the line somewhere” and, because “this information
could’ve been determined much, much longer -- much -- I mean, this is -- can't be
something that could come up on the eve of trial”, it denied the motion. R.592.
The court “recognize[d] that this might be something that could be used later, but
[felt] like this is too late in the game, especially this being the third time that
we’ve set a trial. We have an obligation as well to this victim -- alleged victim, that
I have to consider. And so, weighing all things and hearing what I’m hearing
today, I see no reason why this trial should not go here in 10 days, whatever it
might be.” R.592.
The case preceded to trial on February 9, 2016. R.599. The State called
Nina Peraza. During her testimony, Nina testified that K.C. admitted she wasn’t
telling the truth and that Satan had told her to say these things. R.996. K.C. wrote
a note to that effect. R.997. Nina testified that she took K.C. to an interview with a
private investigator where K.C. again recanted her allegations. R.989. After the
State closed its case the defense called Ken Bourne, the private investigator who
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testified that he had interviewed K.C., that she had recanted several times.
R.1109-11. On rebuttal the State called Chelsea Smith and the defense objected
claiming, if she was there to explain or rebut the evidence of recantation, that she
was not a rebuttal witness because that testimony came during the State’s case in
chief from the State’s witness, Nina Peraza. R.1133. The court overruled the
objection and allowed Smith to testify in rebuttal. R.1133-34.
Peraza was convicted on four counts of Sodomy on a Child. R.1292, 36768.13 At sentencing the court ordered Peraza to serve 25 years-to-life on each of
the four counts, each to run concurrently. R.1318. Peraza filed a timely notice of
appeal. R.392.
The case was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. There, Peraza made 4
claims: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to
present expert testimony in violation of Rule 702, (2) the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied Peraza’s motion to continue the trial, (3) that Peraza
was denied effective assistance of counsel in two ways, and (4) that the trial court
erred in providing the DVD of the complaining witness’s CJC interview to the jury
during deliberations. Along with Peraza’s ineffectiveness claims he filed a Rule
23B motion to remand to supplement the record with evidence of ineffective
assistance.

Prior to giving the jury the closing instructions, the State moved to dismiss
Count 5 which was granted. R.1200.
13
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C. Disposition of the Court Below
The Court of Appeals did not address Peraza’s motion for a Rule 23B
remand. Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, fn.1. Instead the court reversed Peraza’s
convictions on two independent preserved grounds. First, the Court of Appeals
agreed with Peraza when he “contend[ed] the district court exceeded its
discretion by admitting Expert’s testimony without fulfilling its gatekeeping role
under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.” Peraza, ¶¶31-32, ¶25. Because the
State’s notice, the only information upon which the court could base its 702
decision, “did not provide an expert report or detailed information with respect to
Expert’s testimony or the scientific basis on which she would rely… the
requirements under rule 702 were not met”. Id., ¶37. The court found the error in
the application of rule 702 was prejudicial because “Expert’s testimony was
‘clearly calculated to bolster [Child’s] believability by assuring the jury no
credibility problem was presented by the delay’ in reporting to conduct or her
subsequent recantations.” Id., ¶36 (State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)).
Second, the Court of Appeals agreed with Peraza that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance for time to respond to the
State’s expert testimony. The court analyzed the claim under the factors found in
State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997) and found defense counsel
was diligent in preparing for trial and responding to the 702 ruling, that counsel
likely could have obtained rebuttal expert evidence had the continuance been
granted, that Peraza’s right to a fair trial outweighed the threat of inconvenience
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or efficiency, and that the State had failed to show there was no reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Peraza. Peraza, ¶¶40-45.
The court addressed Peraza’s claim that the CJC DVD should not have been
sent to the jury in a footnote and concluded the error was not preserved. Id., fn.6.
Finally, the court addressed Peraza’s claim that if neither of the individual errors
was prejudicial, the court should consider the cumulative effect of the two errors.
Because the court found “both errors were independently prejudicial and each
warranted a reversal and new trial” it did not apply the cumulative error doctrine.
Id., fn.10. However, the court did note that “viewing the two harmful errors
together” made the court “even more confident in [its] determination that Peraza
was denied a fair trial.” Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals did not conflate the expert-notice requirements with
the 702 requirements, but if it did, this Court can easily affirm because,
regardless of the notice, the State failed to meet the 702 requirements before the
trial court ordered expert could testify. The Court of Appeals did not incorrectly
place the burden on the State to disprove prejudice from the denied continuance,
but if it did, this Court can easily affirm because, regardless of who bore the
burden, the record clearly shows Peraza was prejudiced.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the State’s
expert testimony
A. The Court of Appeals did not err in its reference to the expertnotice statute when considering Rule 702
In its first argument the State claims that the Court of Appeals must be

reversed because it “held that providing adequate notice under the expert-notice
statute is an element of admissibility under rule 702.” Petitioner’s Brief at 21. The
State goes on to cite the language of both the expert-notice statute and Rule 702
and points out that neither refers to the other, and specifically that 702, because
it is about admissibility, relevance and reliability, notice is not generally required.
Petitioner’s Brief at 22-23. None of this is controversial, and none of it has
anything to do with the decision below.
What happens next in the State’s brief is the problem, it misinterprets, and
incorrectly cites, what the Court of Appeals did when it referenced the expertnotice statute in its discussion of what happens in a criminal case when “[a] party
intends to call an expert to testify at trial”. Peraza, ¶28. But the State puts words
in the Court of Appeals’ mouth to create an issue where none exists. The State’s
brief contains the following sentence, which does not accurately quote the
opinion:14

Peraza will underline the areas of the State’s sentence which are not quotations
to highlight how the State replaces the Court of Appeals’ actual language with its
own.
14
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“By ruling that ‘the first step’ under rule 702 ‘ involves giving notice’
under the statute, and then by ruling that ‘the State failed to satisfy
the notice requirements under Utah Code section 77-17-13 … and
therefore the district court exceeded its discretion when it admitted
[Smith’s] testimony at trial without sufficient information to satisfy
rule 702,’ [], the Court of Appeals imported requirements into the
rule 702 determination that the rule’s plain text does not support.”
Petitioner’s Brief at 27. These underlined sections where the State is using its own
words, or simply omitting the court’s words, tell the story the State does not want
this Court to hear. When the court refers to the “first step” it is not referring to
702 admissibility, it is referencing in a broader sense what must occur when a
“party intends to call an expert to testify at trial”. Peraza, ¶28. And there is
nothing unusual or inappropriate about that, nor does it conflate the two sets of
requirements, it merely sets the state, the context.
What the State excluded by its “…” is telling too. The Court of Appeals
found that the State’s notice was insufficient because “it failed to provide an
expert report or other written explanation articulating the scope of Expert’s
testimony…” Peraza, ¶49. And that failure, failing to provide any information
about what the expert’s testimony would be, is also why the State also failed to
satisfy the basic requirements of Rule 702, because Rule 702 requires a
“threshold showing” that the expert’s testimony “will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence”, that the “principles and methods that are underlying
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the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have
been reliably applied to the fact.” UTAH R. EVID. 702.
The State argues that the “Court of Appeals imported requirements into the
rule 702 determination”, but that is not what happened. Petitioner’s Brief at 27.
Instead, the Court of Appeals looked at the record and found that no pretrial
hearings were held at which the State could have presented that “threshold
showing”, it looked to the pleadings and found no proffer of expert’s testimony, it
looked to the transcripts and found none. So, then the Court looked to the only
other place where such a showing could have occurred, in the State’s §77-17-13
notice. Because the expert-notice statute requires the proponent of expert
testimony to provide a report or written explanation of the proposed testimony,
the court was trying to give the State, and the trial court, the benefit of the doubt.
After all, it was the State’s notice, and only that notice, upon which the trial court
could have based its conclusion that Smith, “according to the rules of evidence,
this person would meet the criteria for being an expert…” Peraza, ¶31, R.548. It
was the State’s notice, and only that notice, upon which the trial court could have
based its conclusion that “looking at skill, expertise, education, and those kinds of
things… it appears to me that she does meet those qualifications, so I’ll go ahead
and deny a motion to exclude this particular witness at this point in time.” R.
550.
It was not only the State’s “notice [that] ‘deprived the district court of the
information necessary to rule on the admissibility of Smith’s testimony under
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rule 702’ at the pretrial hearing”, it was the complete lack of any information,
either through testimony, report, or any other method, that could have satisfied
even the low threshold showing required by Rule 702.
The only thing the Court of Appeals did when it introduced the idea of the
deficiency of the notice was to identify the absolute dearth of “information to rule
on the 702 objection”. By pointing out that not even the State’s notice, which
failed to meet the statutory requirements, contained no information, the court
exhausted all avenues that could show the State had met its 702 burden.
Of course, it may have been simpler, more clear, for the court to use the
State’s words, “[c]ertainly the court needs information to rule on a rule 702
objection, and it is the proponent’s burden to supply that information.”
Petitioner’s Brief at 25. On this record, that would have been easy enough, and in
reality, that is what the court did. If found that considering the record, which
included the State’s notice, the State did not provide “an expert report or detailed
information with respect to Expert’s testimony or the scientific basis on which
she would rely” and “[w]ithout this information the requirments under rule 702
were not met”. Peraza, ¶37.
While the State tries to make hay of the court’s refence to §77-17-13, it does
not do so persuasively in light of the record and the actual language of the court’s
opinion. In the end, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court abused its
discretion because when it was called upon to decide whether the State had met
its burden to satisfy the threshold showing required by Rule 702, it denied
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Peraza’s objection without “any idea what Expert’s testimony would be or what
scientific basis it was based upon.” Peraza, ¶31. That was the correct conclusion
and the only reasonable one given the record in the case. This Court should
affirm.
B. This Court should affirm because the Court of Appeal’s
ultimate conclusion was correct, the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting expert testimony under Rule 702
If the Court disagrees and concludes that the Court of Appeals did
improperly apply the requirements of the expert-notice statute into the Rule 702
analysis, the Court can and should affirm on the alternative grounds that were
initially argued to the Court of Appeals, namely that regardless of the adequacy of
the notice, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Smith to testify
because the State utterly failed to meet the requirements under Rule 702.
1. Rule 702
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence outlines 3 basic steps a trial court,
acting as a gatekeeper, needs to take before admitting expert testimony.15 Step
one, the court must determine “whether expert testimony is necessary to assist
the trier of fact”. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT
59, ¶9, 242 P.3d 762 (citing UTAH R. EVID. 702(a)). In other words, is there
In a more recent case, this Court has characterized the 702 analysis as a “twopart analysis” essentially eliminating (or at least omitting) the question of
whether the proposed expert has the necessary knowledge or experience. See
State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶72, 322 P.3d 624 (citing State v. Clopten, 2009 UT
84, ¶31, 233 P.3d 1103). Whether this omitted factor has actually been removed
from the 702 analysis is beside the point for this case, because the two remaining
steps articulated in Perea are the factors that Peraza claims were not satisfied
here.
15
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something about the facts of the case that may need to be explained by an expert?
Next, the court should consider “whether the proposed expert has the necessary
‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ to provide such assistance to
the trier of fact.” Eskelson, ¶9 (citing UTAH R. EVID. 702(a)). In other words, is the
witness qualified to help the jury understand specialized information?
Finally, the “court then turns to the reliability of the ‘scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge’ that serves as the basis for the expert’s testimony.”
Eskelson, ¶9 (citing UTAH R. EVID. 702(b)). In this step the court must ask
whether the “principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are
reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably
applied to the facts.” UTAH R. EVID. 702.
2. The State did not meet the threshold for admitting
expert testimony
At the hearing on Peraza’s objection to Smith’s proposed expert testimony
the defense asked to have it’s earlier “objection applied to this expert as well”.
R.533.16 Peraza objected that the State’s notice, which did not include a report,
didn’t show what Smith would actually be testifying to. R.534, 536. The defense
complained that “identified factors related to delay, partial and gradual
disclosure and recantation” were merely “topics”, and were insufficient to identify
what the expert opinion would be, and insufficient to allow the defense to crossDefense counsel was referring to its April 26, 2015 Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of State’s Expert Lyssabeth Mattoon. R.190. In that motion the
defense claimed the State’s notice was too vague to provide fair notice, and that
statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis were
inappropriate to be provided to the jury. R.190-94.
16
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examine the witness or prepare for the proposed testimony. R.534-35. The
defense also argued that any testimony about the statistical prevalence of
recantation in child sex allegation cases could not be supported by scientific
studies. R.534-35.
The State responded by claiming that its purpose in calling Smith as an
expert was to “rebut the evidence… brought forth by the defense that this child
has changed her testimony over time, at one point that there was a recantation,
and then, you know, making arguments to the jury that this is a reason that they
should… disbelieve the child.” R.537. The State wanted Smith to “explain as an
expert that the science behind child -- disclosures of children suspected of child
abuse, recognizes that there are times where children do not make a full
disclosure initially, and that it’s a process.” R.537-38. The State did not present
Smith as a witness to demonstrate reliability of her testimony, nor provide any
details about what her testimony would be.
Defense counsel argued that the studies he presumed Smith was relying
upon, were directed mainly at therapeutic standards, rather than forensic
circumstances. R.540. Defense counsel claimed that allowing the State to present
expert testimony about “why a child might recant, when that therapist hasn’t
actually interviewed and assessed this alleged victim” “gives weight and
credibility to [the alleged] victim without a scientific basis for that.” R.542.
The trial court denied Peraza’s motion in limine, concluding that Smith
would be allowed to testify. R.550. According to the court, in response to Peraza’s
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motion to exclude the State’s witness under 702, all it could do “is look at her
criteria, figure out for myself whether or not she’s qualified as an expert, looking
at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things.” R.550. After the court
looked at ‘those kinds of things’, presumably in the State’s notice and found
Smith did ‘qualify’ as an expert, the court denied the defense motion in limine.
R.550.
The court admitted that it did not know whether Smith’s testimony would
“help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). After claiming that Smith “would meet the criteria for
being an expert” the court noted, “but again, I -- none of us can really tell until we
get the testimony… whether or not she going to be needed.” R.548.
The court did not consider any evidence, nor did the State present any,
upon which the court could determine whether “the principles or methods that
are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based on sufficient facts or
data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). The
threshold showing required by paragraph (b) was not satisfied because there was
nothing presented to the court to show the “the underlying principles or methods,
including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to
the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.”
UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). As admitted by the State, “it is the proponent’s burden to
supply” the information needed for the court “to rule on a rule 702 objection.
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3. The trial court definitively ruled
In a new argument, the State now claims that the trial court was not
required to rule on the pretrial motion in limine prior to trial. In its argument the
State cites Rule 103(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence emphasizing the “either
before or at trial” language. Petitioner’s Brief at 25. It strikes Respondent’s
counsel that the State is implying that the cited language means judges are
allowed to rule on evidentiary objection either before or at trial, and thus it was
appropriate for the trial court here to implicitly deny Peraza’s objection after it
heard Smith’s introductory testimony at trial. Petitioner’s Brief at 25, also 28.
But the problem is that the State’s emphasis misses the point to the rule
itself. The rule is not authorizing trial court’s to wait until trial to rule on
evidentiary objections, though in many instances courts are allowed to do so. The
point of the rule is, and it is incredibly important to this case, that when the court
“definitively” rules on an objection, whether it be in a pretrial hearing or during
trial, there is no further need of preservation attempts by the objecting party.
When the court definitively rules, it has ruled and the objecting party “need not
renew an objection… to preserve a claim for appeal.” UTAH R. EVID. 103(b).
As the State’s brief here makes clear, “[o]nce the court rule[d] definitively
on the record – either before or at trial – a party need not renew an objection or
offer proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Petitioner’s Brief at 25 (citing
UTAH R. EVID. 103(b)). While it is true that the trial court could have deferred
ruling on Peraza’s motion to exclude Smith’s expert testimony until trial, that is
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not what it did. Peraza made a clear pretrial objection based on 702. The trial
court did not require the State to provide information related to the elements of
rule 702 at that hearing. The court did not postpone ruling on the objection until
such information could be presented. Instead, the court recognized Peraza’s
objection, took argument from the parties and ruled definitively citing what it
believed to be the 702 standards. Once that occurred, Peraza’s objection was
preserved, Smith’s testimony, whatever it was going to be was admissible, and
Peraza was able to appeal the legitimacy of the pretrial ruling without being
required to raise the objection again at trial when the testimony was presented.
4. The trial court abused its discretion
As this Court explained in Eskelson, even though the trial court has
discretion on questions of whether or not to admit expert testimony, trial courts
must apply the correct test in exercising that discretion. See Eskelson, ¶5. And if
the trial court erred in interpreting Rule 702, “it did not act within the limits of
reasonability”. Id. In this case it is clear, the trial court did not apply the correct
test, therefore it abused its discretion.
When the trial court concluded that Smith could testify it did so after
acknowledging that neither it, nor the parties, “can really tell until we get the
testimony… whether or not she going to be needed.” R.548. The court explicitly
found that it did not know whether the expert testimony would “help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” UTAH R. EVID.
702(a).
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When the trial court concluded that Smith could testify because she had
sufficient “skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things” (R.550) it
completely failed to examine whether her testimony and opinions were based
upon principles and methods that were reliable, that they were based upon
sufficient facts or data, and had been reliably applied to the facts. UTAH R. EVID.
702(b). Nor could the court have made any such conclusions because the court
had no idea what Smith’s testimony was going to be, or what her opinions or
conclusions were based upon. The State presented no report containing her
opinions and proposed testimony, nor did the State produce Smith at an
evidentiary hearing. Instead, and over defense counsel’s objection and implicit
request for a hearing (R.542, 548-49), the trial court proceeded upon Peraza’s
motion in limine with only the State’s one sentence explanation in its notice and
its oral assertions about why it wanted to call Smith to rebut Peraza’s evidence.
The trial court, just like Peraza, had no idea what Smith’s testimony would be,
whether her methods or principles were reliable, whether they were based upon
sufficient facts or data, and whether those methods and principles had been
reliably applied to the facts in this case. The trial court did not consider any of
these question, each of which is required under Rule 702.
The only question the court considered was if Smith “qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”. UTAH R. EVID. 702(a).
This is not sufficient to establish that Smith was admissible as an expert to testify
about anything and everything related to the “methodology and science related to
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forensic interviewing of suspected child sex abuse victims” and the “science and
research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse including identified factors
related (sic) delayed, partial and gradual disclosures and recantation.” R.283. The
scant information provided by the State left all the important questions
unanswered. What methodology? What science? What factors? None of these
questions were answered by the State or even asked by the court. The trial court’s
failure to properly apply Rule 702 and require the State to provide information
under the other 702 steps constitutes an error in interpreting Rule 702 and
exceeds the limits of reasonability and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
C. Expert’s subsequent testimony at trial did not remedy the
court’s abuse of discretion, the court definitively ruled before
trial
There is no way the State can defend the trial court’s application of Rule
702 when it denied Peraza’s objection, so instead the State now argues, that
despite what happened at the January 28, 2016 pretrial hearing,17 the court did
not err in applying the 702 standards because Smith’s trial testimony laid a
sufficient foundation. Petitioner’s Brief at 28. The State’s position here is
modified, in a subtle but significant way, from its arguments to the Court of
Appeals. That modification implicates the preservation rule as it applies to
petitioners for writ of certiorari.

The trial court denied Peraza’s 702 objection to exclude Smith’s testimony
based on the State’s notice because it found Smith “met the criteria… looking at
skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things”. R.550.
17
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To the Court of Appeals, the State argued that Peraza did not preserve his
702 objection and, because the objection wasn’t properly preserved, Peraza must
rely on plain error. See Appellee’s Brief at 28-29, 33-34. According to the State’s
arguments to the Court of Appeals, Smith’s “unchallenged testimony clearly met
rule 702’s threshold.” Appellee’s Brief at 34. Because Peraza did not elicit any
testimony at trial suggesting the articles Smith relied upon were “inaccurate” he
could not show that the trial court plainly erred by admitting Smith’s expert
testimony after she laid the foundation. Appellee’s Brief at 35.
That plain error argument is different than the Rule 103 argument the State
now makes to this Court. Rather than depending upon the idea that Peraza’s
objection was not preserved and must meet plain error, the State now
acknowledges Peraza’s objection was sufficient but claims that the trial court
need not have ruled on the objection until trial. The State wants this Court to
reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals “so that court can consider the rule
702 issues presented by the parties.” Petitioner’s Brief at 28. But this new
argument is not what the State presented to the Court of Appeals.
What has not changed is Peraza’s position. As made clear during rebuttal at
oral arguments, Peraza’s position was that when the trial court said, “I know you
want to know whether or not this lady is going to be allowed to testify, for the
purpose of today she meets the criteria”, “That’s a definitive ruling.” Oral
Arguments in Court of Appeals, 31:45-32:27 (February 21, 2018). Because it was a
definitive ruling, because the judge ruled the expert could testify, Peraza’s

38

objection to the evidence was preserved based on the information provided to the
judge at the pretrial hearing.
D. Admission of expert testimony was prejudicial
1. Preservation
The State argues that the “Court of Appeals also erred when it concluded
that admitting Smith’s testimony prejudiced Peraza.” Petitioner’s Brief at 29. The
problem is that this Court did not grant the petition for writ of certiorari on the
issue of prejudice resulting from the 702 ruling. The exact relevant language of
this Court’s order is as follows: “1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in vacating
Respondent’s convictions based on its construction and application of Rule 702
of the Rules of Evidence and Section 77-17-13 of the Utah Code.” And it should
not surprise the State that the Court’s order does not include a review of the
prejudice question because the State did not put that issue in its petition.
Nowhere in any of the State’s petition discussing the 702 claim does the State
challenge the Court of Appeals’ ruling on prejudice, nor does it ask this Court to
grant cert to review the issue of prejudice. See State’s Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, pages 11-14.
The only relevant issue in the State’s petition was “Whether the Court of
Appeals erred by conflating the standards and remedies under the expert notice
statute and rule 702.” State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3. The merits of
that request are found on pages 11-14. Nowhere in the petition did the State invite
the Court to review whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the error in
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admitting Smith’s testimony was prejudicial. Neither is any mention of the 702
error’s prejudice discussed in the State’s Reply to Brief in Opposition to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
Just as appellants are obliged to demonstrate that they preserved an issue
in the trial court before it can be raised on appeal, petitioners are obligated under
the preservation rule to demonstrate that they both preserved the issues at the
appellate court below, but also that they raised the issue in the petition for writ of
certiorari and that the Court included the issue in the order granting certiorari.
“Issues not presented in the petition for certiorari, or if presented, not included in
the order granting certiorari or fairly encompassed within such issues, are not
properly before this Court on the merits.” Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443
(Utah 1995) (citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 fn.2 (Utah 1992)).
The State briefly cites State v. Hummel, 2017 UT 19, ¶42, 393 P.3d 314 in
support of the idea that “reversible error requires proof of both error and
prejudice” in hopes that this Court will allow it to address an issue which it did
not raise in its petition. Petitioner’s Brief at 29. But that citation to Hummel does
not eliminate the preservation rules nor expand the scope of the issues which this
Court has agreed to review.
The axiomatic proposition, that reversible error requires both error and
prejudice, has no bearing on and no effect on what issues the State raised in its
petition and on what issues this Court granted review. The fact of the matter is
clear, the Court of Appeals found the trial court’s abuse of discretion was
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prejudicial, the State did not seek review of that question and this Court did not
grant review of the issue, therefore the State’s attempt to widen the scope of the
cert review is unavailing.
Because the State did not include a challenge to the Court of Appeals’
decision related to prejudice in its petition, and because the Court did not grant
review on the question of prejudice, the merits of that argument are not before
the Court and the State’s arguments should be stricken or ignored.
2. There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result if Smith’s bolstering was excluded
If for whatever reason the Court is inclined to review an issue that was not
part of the petitioner’s petition, not part of the Court’s order granting cert, and
not properly before the Court, the Court should find, just as the Court of Appeals
did, that but for the trial court’s abuse of discretion there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Peraza.
Not every abuse of discretion constitutes reversible error, but in this case,
the improper admission of Smith’s testimony, and its effect of bolstering K.C’s
trial testimony, prejudiced Peraza’s case. “When Utah appellate courts reverse for
improper bolstering, they usually do so not only where a case hinges on an
alleged victim’s credibility and there is no physical evidence, but also where the
bolstering was done by an expert witness.” State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶46,
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248 P.3d 984.18 In this case the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony
directed specifically at rehabilitating and bolstering K.C.’s impeached testimony.
The case hinged on K.C.’s credibility and there was no physical evidence. K.C.’s
credibility had been impeached by her multiple inconsistent statements, her
delayed and partial disclosures, and significantly by her recantations. This kind of
error is exactly the kind that Utah courts have repeatedly found to be prejudicial
because the error goes to the very heart of what the jury had to decide, whether
K.C. was credible in spite of the impeaching evidence.
“The Utah Supreme Court has continued to condemn anecdotal ‘statistical’
evidence concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as
witness veracity, as one of the categories of evidence leading to undue prejudice.”
State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah App 1990) (citing State v. Dibello, 780
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989)). In Iorg, the defendant was charged with sexual
abuse of a child where the victim testified that the defendant “entered a tent
where she and her cousins were sleeping and touched her breasts.” Iorg, 801 P.2d
at 939. The defendant acknowledged entering the tent to check on the children
but denied the illegal touching. The victim delayed reporting. The deputy who
interviewed the victim testified that at least half of the victims “she had
interviewed delayed reporting for over a year.” Iorg, 939. The deputy testified “it
was not unusual for [the victim] to wait from age eleven to fourteen to report the
See e.g. State v. Stefanik, 900 P.2d 1094 (Utah App 1995); State v. Jacques,
924 P.2d 898, fn.4 (Utah App 1996); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah App
1990); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
18

42

incident” and that “based on her experience, the fact that [the victim] delayed
reporting was not an indication she was not telling the truth.” Iorg, 939. The
Court of Appeals found the deputy’s erroneous testimony was prejudicial because
the entire case “hinged on credibility”. Id., 941.
This is exactly the kind and significance as the evidence Smith presented in
this case. Smith presented evidence that between four to 20 percent of victims
recant. R.1141. She testified that “because a child recants does not mean that it
did not occur. R.1142. Smith testified that, in her experience, victims may recant
based on family pressures and other personal concerns, irrespective of the
validity of the allegations. R.1142. Smith testified that the majority of people who
have been sexually abused as a child delay disclosure. R.1143. She testified that
gradual disclosure occurs for a number of reasons. R.1143-44. Each of these
statements were admitted to bolster K.C.’s testimony and rebut impeachment
based on the generally held belief that inconsistent statements, delayed and
incomplete reporting, recantations, and changing allegations, could undermine a
witness’s credibility. Because, like Iorg and the other case cited in the footnote
above, this case “hinged on the jury’s assessment of Child’s credibility” (Peraza,
¶36), which had been impeached, without the erroneous admission of Smith’s
bolstering evidence there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.
This is a prejudicial error and this Court should reverse.
In it’s brief the State alleges that, under the totality of the evidence, any
error in admitting Smith’s testimony was harmless. For the State, Smith’s
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testimony did not have an effect upon the “entire evidentiary picture” because the
“record as a whole reveals that excluding Smith’s testimony was not reasonably
likely to have led to a more favorable outcome”. Petitioner’s Brief at 30-31.
The State believes that the testimony from Smith, who was presented as an
expert in forensic interviewing, had performed 1,900 interviews, had been
trained interview techniques, reviewed scientific research on the subjects of
delayed disclosure, partial disclosure, and recantation, who testified that delay in
disclosing was normal, who testified that partial disclosure was normal, and who
testified that false recantation occurs when a child feels pressure from family
members was “a wash” and “helped both the defense and the prosecution.”
Petitioner’s Brief at 31-32.
But getting Smith to admit on cross examination that a recantation might,
in some cases be true, was hardly the equivalent of having Smith’s testimony
excluded entirely. Getting the expert witness, who testified that children who
allege abuse and then later recant falsely do so for all the reasons the State has
presented from its earlier witnesses, to also say that sometimes recantations are
truthful was actually of almost no persuasive value. In fact, that point, that a
recantation may actually be the truth, requires no expertise at all. And for the
State to now claim that Smith’s testimony was a wash is an unfair
characterization of the evidence and not helpful in analyzing prejudice.
The State also tries to downplay Smith’s testimony regarding delayed
disclosure with an clever spin. At trial, the State asked Smith to opine about
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K.C.’s delay in disclosing the allegations against Peraza. In order to combat the
assumption that K.C. should have disclosed earlier the State asked Smith whether
the research and her experience showed that victims give delayed disclosures.
R.1143. Smith did one better and said that not only do victims often delay, “the
majority of people who have been sexually abused as a child delay disclosure.
Most often, they don’t disclose about it until they’re an adult.” R.1143. In context,
Smith’s testimony regarding delayed disclosure was intended to bolster K.C.’s
credibility to show that her delay was not unusual. The State now changes that
context to say that Smith’s testimony was that because most victims delay even
longer, K.C.’s shorter delayed disclosure makes her unusual. Petitioner’s Brief at
33. But the point of the State’s evidence, and the clear emphasis of Smith’s
answer, was that disclosure is usually delayed, often for many years, and
therefore K.C.’s delayed disclosure is not indicative of falsity.
The State’s assertion now that Smith’s testimony was unlikely to have an
impact on the outcome of the trial, when the clear intent and effect of the
testimony was to bolster K.C.’s testimony is inconsistent with the way Utah cases
have examined erroneous expert bolstering and the record of the evidence in this
case. As explained above, the Court should strike the State’s argument on the
prejudice of the 702 error, it is not properly before the Court on cert review. And
if the Court does address it, the purpose and significance of Smith’s testimony
was directed at and likely successfully addressed many if not most of the
credibility issues in K.C.’s testimony. This kind of bolstering from an expert
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witness has an outsized impact on juries and in this case there is clearly a
reasonable likelihood that the jury may have entertained a reasonable doubt
where K.C.’s multiple statements changed, and where she recanted multiple
times. If the Court does consider the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ prejudice
determination, the Court should affirm.
II.

Peraza was prejudiced by the denial of his motion to continue
A. The Court of Appeals properly assigned the burden of
disproving prejudice to the State
The second issue in the Court’s order granting cert review is whether the

Court of Appeals erred in assigning Petitioner the burden of demonstrating that
Respondent was not prejudiced by the district court’s denial of his motion for a
continuance. It should be understood upfront, on the issue of the trial court’s
denial of Peraza’s motion to continue the State is not now contesting that the
denial was correct, or that there was no error. And frankly, how could it? The
State knows, based on its position related to the 702 error and its complaints
about the Court of Appeals’ use of the expert-notice statute, that because of the
inadequacy of the State’s notice (it did not contain an expert report, or an
adequate explanation of the testimony) Peraza was “entitled to a continuance of
the trial… sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.” UTAH CODE §7717-13. Therefore, the State’s only contention on the issue of the continuance was
whether the Court of Appeals’ should have required the State prove the error was
not prejudicial because Peraza did not argue insufficient notice on appeal.
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In its decision, the Court of Appeals cited State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37,
19 P.3d 400 when it placed the burden of disproving prejudice on the State.
Peraza, ¶44. In Tolano, the defendant claimed “that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance because the State failed to
fulfill the mandatory notice requirements regarding expert witnesses set out in
Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13”. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, ¶1.
The State now objects to that burden shifting because “Peraza did not seek
a continuance under the expert-notice statute, and this Court has required the
moving party to prove prejudice for non-expert-notice-statute continuances.”
Petitioner’s Brief at 38. That is not entirely correct. Peraza did seek a continuance
under the expert-notice statute, though not by name, it just wasn’t raised as the
justification on appeal. During the phone conference where Peraza requested the
continuance, counsel complained that because he didn’t have a “full report by”
Smith he was doing his best by “consulting with Mr. Swickert”, but it was “all new
to me as of today”. R.594. This request has to be viewed in light of counsel’s
earlier objection to Smith as an expert where he repeatedly complained that he
did not know what her testimony would be without a report.19 Without
specifically citing to §77-17-13, counsel repeatedly notified the Court that his

R.534 (“Without having more of a report, I don’t really know exactly what this
expert would be testifying to.”), 536 (“I’m concerned because I don’t have an
actual report from the expert, so I don’t know exactly what studies she’s drawing
on…”), 540 (“and again, without having the report, I don’t know what her basis
is…”), 542 (“without reviewing these studies, and hearing from the expert in a
more thorough report, we don’t really know exactly what they’re basing it on.”).
19
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difficulty in responding to the State’s expert was directly tied to the lack of any
report explaining what Smith’s testimony would be.
So, while it’s true that Peraza did not mention the statute by name to the
trial court, and true that Peraza did not base his appellate claim on the expertnotice statute, it is clear that the issue was preserved in the trial court. Because
the State’s notice was clearly insufficient, and because the Court of Appeals
recognized trial counsel was “hitting the notice drum hard” (Oral Arguments in
Court of Appeals, 9:30 (February 21, 2018)) to the trial court, it was not unusual
for the Court of Appeals to apply its cases which place the burden on the State to
disprove prejudice when the State’s notice is insufficient.
B. This Court should affirm on alternative grounds because even
if Peraza bore the burden of demonstrating prejudice he met
that burden
In its briefs to the Court of Appeals, Peraza did not argue that the State
bore the burden of disproving prejudice according to Tolano. To be frank,
appellate counsel simply missed that case and in hindsight, that was a huge
mistake. Instead, Peraza argued to the court that prejudice was demonstrated
because Smith’s testimony bolstered K.C.’s credibility which had otherwise been
significantly impeached, through scientific explanations related to K.C.’s
inconsistencies. See Appellant’s Brief at 43. Peraza asserted that there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome had he been granted time “to
procure an expert witness or adequately prepare cross-examination strategy prior
to trial”. Appellant’s Brief at 45. Those arguments remain persuasive now and for
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all the same reasons the 702 error is prejudicial, the denial of the continuance to
address Smith’s testimony is equally prejudicial.
The State now claims that the entire burden-shifting scheme in Tolano and
its predecessors should be overturned. Peraza, as an individual defendant has no
bone in this fight, he did not argue to the Court of Appeals that the State bore the
burden, nor encourage the court to apply Tolano. To the extent that this issue has
been raised for the first time in the State’s brief on cert, Peraza objects to being
forced into an argument that he never invited, that he believes has little bearing
on the merits of his claims, and to be fair, that the Court of Appeals was never
asked to justify. To the extent that the State wants to take the opportunity to
challenge a pet peeve in the Court of Appeals’ case law, Peraza asks the Court to
reserve that argument to a case where more time and space can be devoted by
two parties that have squarely addressed the issue below. Here, Peraza must
dedicate all available space to arguments which will ensure that his reversed
convictions stay reversed.
Peraza notes that the State makes no attempt to actually address the merits
of whether he met the burden of demonstrating prejudice in the Court of Appeals.
Due to a lack of space, Peraza will not repeat the arguments about prejudice in
Section I D 2 above, but asks the Court to apply them equally to the prejudice
question here.
C. This Court should affirm on alternative grounds because the
cumulative effect of the 702 error and the continuance error
was prejudicial
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As was argued to the Court of Appeals, application of the cumulative error
doctrine in this case is natural because of the close relationship between the trial
court’s ruling that the State’s expert testimony was admissible and it’s denial of
Peraza’s motion for a continuance to prepare rebuttal evidence to that expert
witness. To be clear, Peraza agrees with the Court of Appeals that each of these
“errors were independently prejudicial and each warranted a reversal and new
trial.” Peraza, fn.10. However, because the State has petitioned this Court to
reconsider the prejudice associated with the continuance error and challenged
both the error and prejudice of the expert witness claim, Peraza now reasserts his
claim that, in the event that this Court reaches the 702 prejudice question and
finds these errors were not independently prejudicial, the combined effect of
erroneously allowing Smith to testify and erroneously denying Peraza a
continuance to answer to Smith’s testimony was undoubtedly prejudicial.
III. Peraza was denied effective assistance of counsel
Peraza asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (IAC) in two ways. First, counsel
failed to investigate and present expert witness evidence related to the reliability
of K.C.’s multiple and conflicting statements. Second, counsel failed to investigate
and present expert witness evidence related to the medical evidence collected
when K.C. was subject to a physical examination after her disclosure. To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that
trial counsel's “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”
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and that the defendant was prejudiced by the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88.
Cases reviewing IAC claims based on failing to investigate and secure expert
testimony have established that questions of deficient performance are reviewed
in light of “prevailing professional norms”, which include “an important duty to
adequately investigate the underlying facts of the case… ‘because investigation
sets the foundation for counsel’s strategic decisions about how to build the best
defense.’” State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, ¶27 (citing State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,
¶96, 152 P.3d 321). Reviewing courts “attempt to ‘eliminate the distorting effects
of hindsight’ by adopting [trial counsel’s] perspective at the time of the decision
to limit their investigation”. Hales, ¶70.
Because these IAC claims depend heavily upon evidence not currently in the
record, and appellate courts will only consider extra record evidence to determine
the propriety of remanding on 23B Peraza cannot fully brief his IAC claims at this
time. However, in anticipation of the Court’s granting of the 23B motion and the
supplementation of the record, Peraza now signals to the Court and the State the
two IAC claims he will make. First, trial counsel did not investigate and present
evidence related to K.C.’s multiple statements, recantations, and controversial
therapy. Second, trial counsel did not investigate and present expert witness
evidence related to the medical records and evidence provided in discovery.
When the record is supplemented, Peraza will show that trial counsel’s failures in
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these areas were unreasonable under the circumstances and that if counsel had
done the work, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.
CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RELIEF SOUGHT
The Utah Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the trial court
abused its discretion, both with respect to admitting the expert witness evidence
and the denied motion to continue. This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals
and remand the case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of January, 2019.
/s/ Douglas Thompson
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ADDENDA
A – State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, --- P.3d ---B – State’s Exhibit 2
C – Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702
D – Utah Code §77-17-13
(digital only)20
E – Appellant’s Brief
F – Appellee’s Brief
G – Appellant’s Reply Brief
H – Petition for Writ of Certiorari
I – Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
J – Petitioner’s Reply to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Including paper copies of each of the parties’ briefs and petitions would not
only make the brief prohibitively long for binding purposes, it would also not be
particularly helpful. Instead, Peraza makes them available as addendum in the
digital copy of the brief in case the Court wants easy access.
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2018 UT App 68

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT ALONZO PERAZA,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20160302-CA
Filed April 19, 2018
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Darold J. McDade
No. 131402387
Douglas J. Thompson and Margaret P. Lindsay,
Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and William M. Hains, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
JILL M. POHLMAN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
TOOMEY, Judge:
¶1
Robert Alonzo Peraza appeals his conviction of four
counts of sodomy on a child (Child). Peraza’s trial was
continued twice because the State did not provide all relevant
discovery in time for defense counsel to prepare a defense and to
procure an expert witness for impeachment purposes. Then,
thirty-two days before trial, the State filed a notice of expert
witness to rebut Peraza’s anticipated defense. The notice
disclosed the name and address of the expert (Expert), her
curriculum vitae, a one-sentence description of the nature of her
testimony, and a list of citations to more than 130 articles upon
which Expert would rely; the notice did not include an expert
report.

State v. Peraza

¶2
We are asked to determine whether the State sufficiently
complied with the notice requirements under Utah Code section
77-17-13 and, if not, whether the district court erred in admitting
Expert’s testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
We are also asked to determine whether, based on the lack of
expert report, Peraza’s third motion for a continuance should
have been granted. We conclude the district court exceeded its
discretion when it denied the motion to continue after
erroneously deciding to allow Expert to testify. The State’s notice
did not comply with section 77-17-13, depriving the court of the
information necessary to rule on the admissibility of Expert’s
testimony under rule 702. The State also failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating that Peraza would not be prejudiced by the
denial of his motion. Peraza was entitled to a continuance so that
he could prepare to respond to Expert’s testimony. We therefore
vacate Peraza’s convictions and remand for a new trial. 1
BACKGROUND
The Allegations
¶3
Peraza was charged with four counts of first-degree
sodomy on a child 2 after Child accused him of sexually abusing
her. 3
1. Peraza also filed a motion for a rule 23B remand “for findings
necessary to determine ineffective assistance of counsel.” See
Utah R. App. P. 23B. Because we vacate Peraza’s convictions and
remand for a new trial on other grounds, we need not address
Peraza’s motion or consider his claims that his counsel was
ineffective. See State v. Richardson, 2006 UT App 238, ¶ 1 n.2, 139
P.3d 278.
2. Peraza was also charged with one count of first-degree
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, but the State dismissed the
charge after closing arguments and it is not an issue on appeal.
3. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.
(continued…)
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¶4
Child informed her mother (Mother) and her grandfather
that Peraza did “bad things” to her that she “did not like.”
During an interview at the Children’s Justice Center (CJC), Child
told a social worker that Peraza did something to her that
happens “when parents really love each other.” Child explained
that Peraza showed her his “pee pee,” and made her use a hand
gesture while she touched it, and he forced her to touch it with
her mouth. She said he forced her to do this more than once.
¶5
After the first CJC interview, Child moved to California to
live with her father, and after relocating to California she began
therapy. Part of her treatment was to, “make effigy dolls, and . . .
kill the effigy doll named [Peraza].” Eventually, Child disclosed
that a second perpetrator may have also sexually abused her,
and she made and “killed” effigy dolls of that person too.
¶6
Child’s descriptions of the abuse varied over time. On
some occasions, she was explicit in describing the acts Peraza
had her perform, including descriptions of anal penetration; at
other times she recanted what she had described. While she was
living with Mother in Utah, Child wrote Mother a note asserting
that the abuse did not happen. After she moved to California,
Child called Mother, more than once, to say that Peraza did not
do anything to her. She also told a private investigator that
Peraza did not touch her and that she never touched him.
¶7
But at trial, Child withdrew her recantations and testified
that Peraza sexually abused her. She also provided more detail
when describing the abuse than she had done in previous
interviews and therapy sessions. For example, at trial, she
testified that “Peraza had put his penis in her vagina”; that
testimony was the first time the prosecutor and defense counsel
had heard that allegation.

(…continued)
We present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ¶ 2 n.1, 387
P.3d 986 (quotation simplified).
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Pretrial Proceedings
¶8
Peraza’s trial was first scheduled for March 2015. But the
district court granted Peraza’s motion for a continuance based
on newly disclosed “evidence warranting additional
investigation”—including a sexual assault nurse examination
report; Child’s second interview with someone at a CJC in
California; and the State’s indication of its “intent to have
[Child’s therapist] testify at trial.” The court set a pretrial hearing
in April to schedule a new trial date. During that hearing,
defense counsel argued, based on arguments made in Peraza’s
motions supporting his motion for a continuance, that trial could
not be scheduled because the State still had not produced the
requested evidence, the therapist had not provided Child’s
therapy records, and these records had not been subjected to an
in camera review. 4 The court determined it would postpone
scheduling a trial until further evidence had been disclosed.

4. “In camera” means “[i]n the judge’s private chambers” or “[i]n
the courtroom with all spectators excluded.” In Camera, Black’s
Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence “cloaks in privilege confidential communications
between a patient and her therapist in matters regarding
treatment.” State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 18, 63 P.3d 56. An
exception to this rule applies if an otherwise privileged
communication is “‘relevant to an issue of the physical, mental,
or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which
that condition is an element of any claim or defense.’” Id.
(quoting Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1)). If a party resists disclosure of
the physician-patient communications, “the defendant must
petition for an in camera review in which the [district] court will
review the records to determine if they actually contain material
that is relevant and ought to be disclosed.” State v. Otterson, 2010
UT App 388, ¶ 5, 246 P.3d 168. This review may be conducted
“only if the defendant shows with reasonable certainty that
exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to [the]
defense.” Id. (quotation simplified).
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¶9
In June 2015, the district court issued a subpoena duces
tecum for Child’s therapy records, and the State stipulated to an
in camera review of those records. By August, the court still had
not received Child’s therapy records, but the therapist indicated
she was reviewing them to redact information not relevant to the
case. Relying on this, the court scheduled trial for October 2015.
Then in late September, after receiving the records and defense
counsel’s request for information from the records, the court
informed the parties it would provide the redacted records “by
the end of [the] week.”
¶10 Although trial was set for the end of October 2015,
defense counsel requested another continuance because he had
learned that a private investigator recorded one of Child’s
recantations. Counsel also explained that he needed more time
to secure Child’s therapist as a fact witness “for impeachment
purposes” because of Child’s recantations. The State agreed that
given the circumstances, “it’d be better to continue the trial” and
stated that it was also “look[ing] at re-filing” a notice of expert
witness based on Child’s therapy records. The court commented
that it did not “know that [it] ha[d] any choice” and continued
the trial to February 2016 with a final pretrial conference
scheduled for late January.
¶11 During the January pretrial conference, the State
stipulated to the introduction of Child’s therapy records for
impeachment purposes because defense counsel was unable to
procure Child’s therapist as a witness at trial. Peraza also
challenged whether Expert should be allowed to testify. The
court agreed to hear oral argument on Peraza’s objection the
following week, on January 28, 2016—twelve days before trial.
¶12 During the hearing, defense counsel argued that the
State’s notice of expert witness was inadequate because it did
not include an expert report or any written explanation that
would inform the court “exactly what this expert would be
testifying to.” The notice provided Expert’s name and address,
her curriculum vitae, and a list of more than 130 articles that she
would be relying upon. The notice also included a one-sentence
statement that the State intended to use Expert to present
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evidence of the “methodology and science related to forensic
interviewing of suspected child sex abuse victims” and related to
“child disclosures of sex abuse including identified factors
related [to] delayed, partial and gradual disclosures and
recantations.” But counsel asserted that he could not get access
to the articles cited, because the medical journals in which they
were published required readers to pay for a subscription. And
without an expert report, defense counsel argued that all he had
been provided were “topics” that could be related to Expert’s
testimony. Further, he argued,
What’s troubling to me is, I don’t know if those are
case notes that talk about possible theories, which
if they’re just theories, that would be argument,
and the state is clearly allowed to argue. But to
present evidence of this nature, I think implies a
statistical analysis. And the case law that was cited
in my objection . . . ha[s] already said that [our
courts] disfavor this type of testimony,
because . . . it implies there’s a scientific . . . [and]
statistical basis for it, but yet there isn’t an actual
statistical basis for [the theories].
He asked the court “to incorporate the objection that [was] filed”
in response to the State’s initial notice of expert when the State
sought to admit Child’s therapist’s testimony. This written
objection, based on Utah Code section 77-17-13 and rules 702
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, discussed the prejudicial
effects of expert witnesses testifying to “statistical evidence of
matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis” and pointed out
that the Utah Supreme Court had determined in State v. Rammel,
721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), that “statistically valid probabilities
evidence that focuses the jury’s attention on ‘a seemingly
scientific, numerical conclusion’” should be excluded. Id. at 501.
¶13 The State handed the court a copy of defense counsel’s
previous written objection, then explained that the purpose of
Expert’s testimony was to rebut the defense’s assumed strategy
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of showing “that [Child] changed her testimony over time, [and]
at one point that there was a recantation.” Moreover, it did not
intend “to have [Expert] say that [Child] is telling the truth or
lying, but to simply explain to the jury that there are
circumstances” where children “with confirmed histories of
sexual abuse” have expressed “denial or hesitation” in their
disclosures of the abuse.
¶14 Defense counsel countered that “with no doubt, we will
be presenting evidence that [Child] has recanted both to her
mother and also [to] a private investigator.” But he argued that
without a report from Expert, the State’s notice did not provide
sufficient information with respect to Expert’s proposed
testimony to allow the defense to adequately prepare to rebut
her testimony. Further, he argued that it appeared Expert’s
testimony would relate only to “possibilities” for why Child
recanted and that to have “an expert testify about them without
a scientific basis, is concerning because it gives more weight to
the state’s arguments than maybe it should.” Defense counsel
added that, if Expert were to mention the “possibility that there
are repressed memories,” such references are prohibited by Utah
Supreme Court precedent, and while they may be “valuable in
the therapeutic setting . . . they’re too prejudicial and not
allowed in a forensic setting.” 5

5. This argument was further supported by Utah case law cited
in Peraza’s motion to exclude Child’s therapist as an expert
witness, which he incorporated into his motion with respect to
Expert. For example, Peraza cited State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498
(Utah 1986), in which a detective drew on his experiences and
provided anecdotal data to support his conclusions that “there
was a high statistical probability” that a witness lied to the police
in his first interview. Id. at 501. The Utah Supreme Court
determined that the detective failed to show that the anecdotal
data from which he drew his conclusions had any statistical
validity or that the data established the detective as an expert. Id.
It also determined that the detective’s testimony stating that
(continued…)
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¶15 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
determined that Expert would be allowed to testify at trial if the
State determined her testimony was necessary for rebuttal. It
told the parties, based on its assumption of what Expert would
testify to, Expert was qualified because “according to the rules of
evidence, this person would meet the criteria for being an expert
even [though] . . . none of us can really tell until we get to the
testimony . . . whether or not [Expert is] going to be needed [for
rebuttal].”
¶16 Later that day, after the State “provide[d] some” of the
articles on which Expert would rely, the court held a telephone
conference to address defense counsel’s motion to continue the
trial in light of the court’s decision to allow Expert to testify. The
State’s disclosure led defense counsel to consult a social worker
from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to help prepare a
defense strategy with respect to Expert’s testimony. Counsel
requested, once again, a continuance to allow him to procure an

(…continued)
“there was a high statistical probability” that another witness
lied should have been excluded because “its potential for
prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value.” Id. The
supreme court explained that “[e]ven where statistically valid
probability evidence has been presented . . . courts have
routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury to focus
upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than to
analyze the evidence before it and decide where truth lies.” Id.
And “[p]robabilities cannot conclusively establish that a single
event did or did not occur and are particularly inappropriate
when used to establish facts not susceptible to quantitative
analysis, such as whether a particular individual is telling the
truth at any given time.” Id. (quotation simplified). Peraza used
Rammel and other cases to support his argument that “proposed
testimony linking [Child’s] symptoms and behavior to
behavioral norms testimony is presumptively unreliable and
prejudicial . . . and inadmissible as expert witness evidence
under Rule 403.”
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expert to rebut that testimony. He explained that he felt further
obligated to make this request because of the therapy treatments
Child received—specifically, killing the effigy dolls of her
alleged abusers—“could give grounds for the recantation of the
recantation . . . [and] might have led to the allegations becoming
much more violent and much more pronounced as the years
have gone on.” The State responded that although it was
“unhappy with the fact that we’re continuing again” but
understood the basis for it. Nevertheless, the court stated that it
was “not inclined” to continue the trial and that it had to “draw
the line somewhere.” After denying the motion to continue, the
court “recognize[d] this might be something that could be used
later” on appeal, but determined “this [was] too late in the
game.”
The Trial
¶17 The following week, the case proceeded to trial. During
the State’s case-in-chief, Child testified to the nature of the abuse
she allegedly suffered from Peraza, beginning when she was six
years old. She also testified that she lied to Mother and the
private investigator when she said the abuse did not occur.
¶18 The State also called Mother, who testified that Child
recanted her allegations to her and to the private investigator.
Mother testified that Child recanted her allegations more than
once. Defense counsel called the private investigator, who
testified about his interview with Child in which Child recanted
her allegations.
¶19 In an effort to rebut Mother’s and the private
investigator’s testimonies that Child had recanted her allegations
on different occasions, the State called Expert to testify about
disclosures and recantations by victims of sexual abuse. Defense
counsel objected to Expert’s testimony on the ground that she
was not a “rebuttal witness” because “the evidence about [Child]
recanting her statements came out in the [S]tate’s case.” Defense
counsel added that it was the State that introduced Child’s
interview in which Child recanted her allegations against Peraza,
and as such, Expert’s testimony could not be characterized as a
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rebuttal. The court overruled the objection and allowed Expert to
testify.
¶20 Expert explained she was “trained as a forensic
interviewer” and that she had provided “supporting research
citations” for the “areas of inquiry for expert testimony.” She
said that the articles identified in the notice were “articles that
[she had] read, and so, the topics that would be contained in
some of those different articles” were information “that [she]
felt” allowed her “to testify as an expert.” But Expert did not
interview or assess Child. She had not reviewed any evidence of
the case before testifying and answered questions “based off of
the testimony [she] heard, since [she had not] seen transcripts or
anything.” Expert acknowledged her testimony was only
“academic.”
¶21 Expert testified she had conducted around 1,900 forensic
interviews with children and that recanting is “not something
that happens in all cases, as far as some of the research says,”
and that recantations can “var[y] between four percent to 20
percent of cases, so it’s not something that’s typical, but it’s not
unheard of.” She reiterated that “generally, because a child
recants does not mean that it did not occur” and commented,
Sometimes, when a child recants, it may be feeling
pressure from family members. . . . [O]ften times if
it’s someone that they love, having gone to jail, or
if the person’s no longer in the home, and now the
family is struggling for money, sometimes those
are circumstances where the child might think,
“things were not like this before I talked about it,
I’ll just—it’s just better to go back to how things
were, I can deal with that.”
¶22 The jury convicted Peraza on all four counts of sodomy
upon a child. Peraza appeals his convictions.
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶23 Peraza contends the district court erred when it admitted
Expert’s testimony at trial because the State had not provided
sufficient information to demonstrate the scientific validity or
basis of the testimony that would have allowed the court to
determine whether she met the requirements for expert
testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 6
Specifically, Peraza argues that the State did not provide “any

6. Peraza also contends the district court erred when it permitted
the jury to review the video of the CJC interview during
deliberations. This argument is unpreserved. Generally, “an
appellant must properly preserve an issue in the district court
before it will be reviewed on appeal.” State v. Houston, 2015 UT
40, ¶ 19, 353 P.3d 55 (quotation simplified). To preserve an issue,
it must have been presented “in such a way that the court ha[d]
an opportunity to rule on [it].” Id. (quotation simplified). There
are limited exceptions to the preservation rule, including
instances of plain error or exceptional circumstances—neither of
which are argued by Peraza on appeal. See id.
Although this argument is unpreserved, we briefly
address this issue to avoid its recurrence on remand. Rule 17 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the jurors to “take
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which
have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not,
in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury.” In
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), superseded by statute as
stated in Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, 267 P.3d 232, the Utah
Supreme Court determined that rule 17 “indicates that exhibits
which are testimonial in nature should not be given to the jury
during its deliberations.” Id. at 643. After Peraza’s trial, this court
determined in another case that video recordings of CJC
interviews are recorded testimony and should not be given to
the jury during deliberations. State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234,
¶¶ 37–41, 387 P.3d 618. Accordingly, on remand the district
court should not provide any testimonial evidence to the jury
during its deliberations.
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details about what [Expert’s] testimony would be so that the
defense could investigate whether such testimony could be
supported by” the more than 130 article citations Expert
provided. The district court “has wide discretion in determining
the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Hollen,
2002 UT 35, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 794 (quotation simplified). “[W]e will
not reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Id.
(quotation simplified). Even if we determine the testimony was
erroneously admitted, the defendant must show that the error
was prejudicial. State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
¶24 Peraza also contends that the district court’s denial of his
third motion to continue the trial to allow him to procure an
expert witness to rebut Expert’s testimony constituted an abuse
of discretion and prejudiced his trial. We review the grant or
denial of a motion to continue under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, ¶ 5, 19 P.3d 400.
ANALYSIS
I. Expert Witness Testimony
¶25 Peraza contends the district court exceeded its discretion
by admitting Expert’s testimony without fulfilling its
gatekeeping role under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
He argues the court “failed to examine whether [Expert’s]
testimony and opinions were based upon principles and
methods that were reliable, that they were based upon sufficient
facts or data, and had been reliably applied to the facts” of this
case.
¶26 Rule 702 provides that a witness may testify as an expert
if that person “is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education” and “the expert’s scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
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Utah R. Evid. 702(a). An expert’s “scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge” must meet “a threshold showing that
the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” Id. R. 702(b). This
threshold showing “is satisfied if the underlying principles or
methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the
manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community.” Id. R. 702(c).
¶27 District courts are assigned the duty of “gatekeeper” and
are responsible for preventing the admission of unreliable expert
testimony. State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 1195. Even if
the testimony satisfies rule 702, the court must also “determine
whether the proffered scientific evidence will be more probative
than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.” State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996).
¶28 A party that intends to call an expert to testify at trial
must demonstrate that the expert meets the requirements of rule
702. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); 7 see also
State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ¶ 11, 131 P.3d 292
(explaining the notice requirements under section 77-17-13). In
criminal cases, the first step involves giving notice to the
opposing party “not less than 30 days before trial or 10 days
before the hearing.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1)(a). The notice
“shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert’s
curriculum vitae,” and either “a copy of the expert’s report,” “a
written explanation of the expert’s proposed testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet
the testimony,” or “a notice that the expert is available to
cooperatively consult with the opposing party on reasonable

7. Recent amendments to the relevant statutes cited within this
opinion are not substantive and do not affect the outcome of this
appeal. We therefore refer to the most recent edition of the Utah
Code for convenience. See State v. Rackham, 2016 UT App 167, ¶ 9
n.3, 381 P.3d 1161.
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notice.” Id. § 77-17-13(1)(b). If the party seeking to admit expert
testimony “fails to substantially comply with the requirements
of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.”
Id. § 77-17-13(4)(a).
¶29 Here, thirty-two days before trial, the State filed a notice
of expert testimony with a copy of Expert’s curriculum vitae and
a list of medical journal articles that she would rely upon for her
testimony. The articles were not readily accessible to the court or
to defense counsel because they were published in journals for
which subscriptions were required.
¶30 Peraza argues the district court had no basis for
determining that rule 702 was satisfied because “the court had
no idea what [Expert’s] testimony was going to be . . . what her
opinions or conclusions were based upon . . . [or whether her]
methods and principles had been reliably applied to the facts in
this case.” 8 We agree.
¶31 In determining that Expert was qualified under rule 702,
the district court relied solely on her curriculum vitae, the list of
article citations, and the State’s “oral assertions about why it
wanted to call [Expert].” There was no information from which
to determine the principles or methods that would form the
basis of Expert’s testimony, or whether her opinions were based
upon sufficient facts or data. See Utah R. Evid. 702(b). The State
did not provide an expert report, gave only a single-sentence
description of the broad subject upon which Expert would
testify, and failed to provide meaningful access to the articles
upon which Expert relied. We agree with Peraza that neither the
court nor defense counsel had “any idea what [Expert’s]
testimony would be or what scientific basis it [was] based upon.”

8. At trial, Expert testified she had not read the transcripts of
interviews, had not reviewed any material involving the case,
and had not interviewed Child or any other witness.
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¶32 We therefore conclude the district court exceeded its
discretion when it admitted Expert’s testimony at trial without
complying with the requirements of rule 702.
¶33 Having made that determination, “we must separately
determine whether the error was prejudicial.” State v. Stefaniak,
900 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). “If there is a reasonable
likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a more
favorable result for the defendant, then his conviction must be
reversed.” State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
¶34 Peraza argues that the improper admission of Expert’s
testimony constitutes reversible error because of “its
[prejudicial] effect of bolstering [Child’s] trial testimony.” We
agree.
¶35 In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), the district
court admitted a detective’s testimony stating that, “[b]ased on
his experience interviewing several hundred criminal suspects,”
it was not “unusual for [a suspect] to lie” when first
interrogated. Id. at 500. The district court determined that the
detective “was an expert apparently qualified to testify on [a
suspect’s] capacity for telling the truth” as a witness in a criminal
case. Id. Although our supreme court concluded that the
testimony was inadmissible because it “did not relate to [the
suspect-witness’s] character for veracity, but instead invited the
jury to draw inferences about [the suspect-witness’s] character
based upon [the detective’s] past experience with other
suspects,” it held that, “in view of the other evidence supporting
defendant’s conviction,” the admission of the detective’s
testimony was harmless. Id. at 500–01.
¶36 Here, unlike Rammel, there was no “other evidence
supporting [the] conviction.” See id. Instead, this case hinged on
the jury’s assessment of Child’s credibility versus that of Peraza.
See Iorg, 801 P.2d at 941–42. We agree that Expert’s testimony
was prejudicial because it was “clearly calculated to bolster
[Child’s] believability by assuring the jury no credibility problem
was presented by the delay” in reporting the conduct or her
subsequent recantations. See id.; cf. State v. King, 2010 UT App
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396, ¶ 46, 248 P.3d 984 (“When Utah appellate courts reverse for
improper bolstering, they usually do so not only where a case
hinges on an alleged victim’s credibility and there is no physical
evidence, but also where the bolstering was done by an expert
witness.”(internal citation omitted)). Because there was “no[]
other evidence [to support his] conviction beyond that which is
tainted by” Expert’s testimony, “we cannot say that absent the
error there is not a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result” to Peraza. 9 See Iorg, 801 P.2d at 942 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

9. Peraza has suggested that Expert’s testimony is the type of
“anecdotal ‘statistical’ evidence” condemned by the Utah
Supreme Court, see State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), and implies that, even if the testimony had been properly
and timely disclosed, it should be excluded on its own merits.
We recognize that our supreme court “has continued to
condemn anecdotal ‘statistical’ evidence concerning matters not
susceptible to quantitative analysis such as witness veracity, as
one of the categories of evidence leading to undue prejudice.” Id.
801 P.2d at 941 (referencing State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229
(Utah 1989)); see also State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 50, 345 P.3d
1195 (explaining that the Utah Supreme Court has “condemned
anecdotal statistical evidence when it concerns matters not
susceptible to quantitative analysis,” but determining that
testimony “regarding the percentage of crimes linked to drug
use” was a quantifiable metric (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986)
(“Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been
presented . . . courts have routinely excluded it when the
evidence invites the jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific,
numerical conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence before
it and decide where truth lies.”). But because Peraza includes
this argument only as part of the harmless error analysis, we are
not asked to directly address whether the evidence is admissible
even if it had been timely disclosed, and we therefore decline to
do so.
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¶37 We conclude the district court exceeded its discretion in
admitting Expert’s testimony at trial because the State failed to
comply with Utah Code section 77-17-13 in that it did not
provide an expert report or detailed information with respect to
Expert’s testimony or the scientific basis on which she would
rely. Without this information the requirements under rule 702
were not met, and this error prejudiced Peraza’s trial. We were
not asked to determine whether—assuming that the testimony
had been properly and timely disclosed—the Rule 702
requirements could be met with respect to Expert’s testimony
that “between four and 20 percent” of sex abuse victims recant
their allegations or that the “majority” of these victims delay
disclosures. On remand, if the State seeks to admit testimony
with respect to delayed disclosure and recantations of sex abuse
victims, from either Expert or any other expert witness, it must
provide sufficient information, consistent with this opinion, to
allow the court the opportunity to properly rule on its
admissibility under rule 702.
II. Denial of the Motion to Continue
¶38 Peraza contends the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to continue the trial to allow him to
adequately prepare to cross-examine the Expert and to procure
an expert witness to rebut her testimony. He argues that this
prejudiced his trial because had he been able to procure a
rebuttal expert, there would have been a “reasonable likelihood
that the outcome of the case would have been different.” We
agree.
¶39 As we have discussed, the party seeking to use an expert
witness at trial must disclose certain information. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-17-13 (LexisNexis 2017); see also State v. Torres-Garcia,
2006 UT App 45, ¶ 11, 131 P.3d 292 (explaining the notice
requirements under section 77-17-13). If the party “fails to
substantially comply with [these] requirements . . . the opposing
party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be
entitled to a continuance of the trial . . . sufficient to allow
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preparation to meet the testimony.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-1713(4)(a).
¶40 When we review the denial of an appellant’s request for
continuance, we consider four factors:
(1) the extent of appellant’s diligence in his efforts
to ready his defense prior to the date set for trial;
(2) the likelihood that the need for a continuance
could have been met if the continuance had been
granted; (3) the extent to which granting the
continuance would have inconvenienced the court
and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which
the appellant might have suffered harm as a result
of the court’s denial.
State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), superseded
on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v. Roberts, 2018 UT
App 9. We will address each factor in turn.
¶41 First, defense counsel diligently prepared the defense
prior to trial. He timely moved to exclude Expert’s testimony,
highlighting the State’s failure to comply with the notice
requirements and emphasizing the risk of unfair prejudice to the
defense when “‘statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to
quantitative analysis’” is presented at trial because it is
“‘uniquely subject to being used to distort the deliberative
process and skew the trial’s outcome.’” (Quoting State v. Dibello,
780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989).) After the court determined it
would admit Expert’s testimony if necessary, counsel
immediately contacted a social worker for assistance to prepare
to cross-examine Expert. The social worker informed counsel
that Peraza needed his own expert witness for rebuttal, and
counsel requested an “emergency [telephone] conference” to
request a continuance to allow sufficient time to procure an
expert witness and to prepare for cross-examination.
Considering all of these efforts, we conclude that defense
counsel acted diligently.
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¶42 Second, Peraza likely could have been adequately
prepared to meet the expert testimony if the district court
granted his motion to continue the trial. He would have had the
opportunity to procure an expert witness to rebut Expert’s
generalized statement of the probability that a victim’s
recantation of an allegation does not mean that the abuse did not
occur. This expert might also have been able to testify about
whether the “effigy doll” treatment “could have led to the
allegations becoming more violent and much more pronounced
over the years.”
¶43 Third, Peraza’s “right to a fair trial outweighed any
inconvenience to the court [and] the opposing party . . . that may
have been caused by a continuance.” State v. Tolano, 2001 UT
App 37, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 400. “Although inconvenience to the court
and jury is one of the four factors considered, this court has
specifically held that such an administrative concern is
outweighed by the [defendant’s] right to a fair trial.” Id.
(quotation simplified). The district court’s concerns that Child
needed to be considered and that it had to “draw a line
somewhere” were outweighed by Peraza’s right to a fair trial.
¶44 Finally, “the extent to which [Peraza] might have suffered
harm as a result of the court’s denial . . . is the most important
among the factors.” Id. ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). As this court
explained in Tolano, because of the “difficult burden placed on
defendants to establish prejudice in cases such as these,” the
burden is on the State to persuade the court there is no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome would
have been more favorable to the defendant. Id.
¶45 The State has not met that burden here. First, it argues
that Peraza did not seek to continue the trial to procure an expert
witness to rebut Expert’s testimony but instead to discuss
Child’s therapy treatment. This mischaracterizes the type of
expert witness Peraza sought to procure. Defense counsel
argued that, based on Child’s therapy treatments, he needed an
expert witness to rebut Expert’s testimony and to inform the jury
that the type of treatment she received could have influenced her
withdrawal of her recantations and that this treatment “might
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have led to the allegations becoming much more violent and
much more pronounced as the years have gone on.” Essentially,
he argued that this type of treatment has been shown to affect
the description of the alleged abuse.
¶46 The State also argues that the motion’s denial did not
prevent Peraza from “‘put[ting] forward the only defense he
had’” or from putting on “‘the only testimony potentially
effective to his defense.’” (Quoting United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d
1352, 1361–62 (9th Cir. 1985).) It argues that Peraza “was able to
call [Child’s] credibility into question by highlighting
inconsistencies in her disclosures, including her recantation and
then withdrawal of the recantation.” But this argument is not
persuasive and we find no support for it in Utah case law.
Compare Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1361, with State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006
UT App 45, ¶¶ 18–22, 131 P.3d 292 (explaining that appellate
courts “must determine if the circumstances [in the present case]
are such that a continuance was necessary”). Instead, we
consider the circumstances related to defense counsel’s ability to
sufficiently prepare his defense strategy and to effectively crossexamine the State’s witnesses. See Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45,
¶¶ 18–22.
¶47
Although Peraza’s counsel was able to call a fact witness,
the private investigator that recorded one of Child’s
recantations, he was nevertheless “sufficiently prejudiced by the
denial of his . . . request for a continuance.” Id. ¶ 22. Defense
counsel was able to highlight inconsistencies in Child’s
testimony and was able to present recantations through the
private investigator. But this evidence was undercut by Expert’s
testimony, which should not have been permitted because it
“rehabilitated [Child’s] credibility, without challenge.” And the
harm to Peraza’s trial was compounded when he was unable to
present an expert witness whose testimony, arguably, would
have been given similar weight to Expert’s testimony. See id.
Although counsel was able to elicit some concessions from
Expert, the jury would have benefited from the opportunity to
weigh Expert’s testimony with a second expert from the defense.
Ultimately, Peraza’s ability to put forward his best defense was
materially hampered by the denial of the motion to continue to
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procure his own rebuttal expert. Under these circumstances, the
State has failed to meet its burden of persuading this court that
Peraza was not prejudiced by the denial of his motion to
continue.
¶48 We conclude the district court exceeded its discretion
when it denied Peraza’s motion to continue the trial to
adequately prepare to cross-examine the Expert and to procure
an expert witness to rebut her testimony. 10
CONCLUSION
¶49 We conclude the State failed to satisfy the notice
requirements under Utah Code section 77-17-13 when it failed to
provide an expert report or other written explanation
articulating the scope of Expert’s testimony and therefore the
district court exceeded its discretion when it admitted Expert’s
testimony at trial without sufficient information to satisfy rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The court also exceeded its
discretion when it denied Peraza’s motion to continue based on
10. Peraza also contends that the error in admitting Expert’s
testimony at trial, along with the erroneous denial of his motion
to continue, constitutes grounds for reversal under the
cumulative error doctrine because “[t]he close relationship
between these two rulings and the effect they had upon the
evidence presented” were prejudicial. Generally, a party will
invoke the cumulative error doctrine where “errors committed
during the course of [the] trial were harmless individually, [but]
were cumulatively harmful.” State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229
(Utah 1993). Under this doctrine, we will reverse only if “the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence that a fair trial was had.” Id. (quotation simplified). In
this case, both errors were independently prejudicial and each
warranted a reversal and new trial. Therefore, the cumulative
error doctrine does not apply. But viewing the two harmful
errors together, we are even more confident in our
determination that Peraza was denied a fair trial.
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the State’s failure to comply with section 77-17-13. Neither of
these errors was harmless. We therefore vacate Peraza’s
convictions and remand to the district court for a new trial
consistent with this opinion.
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Addendum C – Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702

https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ure/0702.htm

Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b)
Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert
testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods that are underlying
in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c)
The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying principles
or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the
facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.

2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style
and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic
only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE.
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule
702 as it appeared before it was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 amendment to the Rule added that
introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended rule does
not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many
respects the developments in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment
preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and federal approaches to expert
testimony.
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be
applied to all expert testimony. In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like its federal counterpart, Utah’s
rule assigns to trial judges a “gatekeeper” responsibility to screen out unreliable expert
testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert
testimony with rational skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied
only by scientific or other specialized principles or methods that are free of controversy or that
meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is receptive to any
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plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods
or techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the
trier of fact. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the
"scientific" and "technical", but extend to all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is
viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her
skepticism to the particular proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The
Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on the “work at hand”. The practitioner
should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the “work at
hand”, and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration.
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally
accepted principles and methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the
“work at hand” is especially important here. It might be important in some cases for an expert
to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply these principles
to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a
dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply
them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods
or techniques without offering an opinion about how they should be applied to a particular
array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case
specific opinion testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques
applied at a level of considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general
acceptance to merit admission under section (c).
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs.
non-novel dichotomy that has served as a central analytical tool in Utah’s Rule 702
jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting admission under section (c)
does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability
under section (b) must be shown by other means.
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the
federal rule. Unlike the federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the
testimony is required to make only a “threshold” showing. That “threshold” requires only a
basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible, not that
the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an
expert's testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert
testimony is unreliable. The amendment is broad enough to permit testimony that is the
product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise. Contrary and
inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile
- or choose between - the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to
provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every expert, and it is not
contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for the trial judge to
fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the
rule may be determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P.
26, deposition testimony and memoranda of counsel.
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Addendum D – Utah Code §77-17-13

Utah Code

77-17-13 Expert testimony generally -- Notice requirements.
(1)
(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a felony case at trial
or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or 10 days before the
hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and
one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give the opposing party
adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party on
reasonable notice.
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged by the expert for the
consultation.
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the results of any tests or
other specialized data, the party intending to call the witness shall provide to the opposing party
the information upon request.
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information concerning the
expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice
of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the
information required under Subsection (1)(b).
(4)
(a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a
continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the
part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of
exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately
violated the provisions of this section.
(5)
(a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing held pursuant to
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter
testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall provide the
opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial
or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an expert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of the state or its
political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on reasonable notice through general
discovery that the expert may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made available
to cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice.
Amended by Chapter 290, 2003 General Session
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20160302-CA

ROBERT PERAZA,
Defendant / Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
****
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(j), as a case transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to present opinion
testimony of Chelsea Smith. The court concluded “according to the rules of
evidence, this person would meet the criteria for being an expert, even -- but
again, I -- none of us can really tell until we get to the testimony -- … whether or
not she’s going to be needed.” R.548. “A decision to admit or exclude expert
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be
reversed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,

¶ 89, 137 P.3d 726 (citation omitted). “Our review of the district court's exercise
of its discretion includes review to ensure that no mistakes of law affected a lower
court's use of its discretion.” Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶ 5, 242 P.3d 762 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Mistakes of law include errors in interpreting rules of evidence because
such errors are not “within the limits of reasonability”. Id. at ¶5 (citing State v.
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶17, 127 P.3d 682).
This issue was preserved by Peraza’s renewed objection to the expert
witness evidence. Peraza initially objected in writing to the State’s first notice of
expert testimony, which the State later withdrew. R.190, 201. After the State later
gave notice of intent to call Chelsea Smith, the defense asked to have it’s earlier
“objection applied to this expert as well”. R.533.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Peraza’s request to continue
the trial. “A trial court’s decision to grant a continuance is a matter of discretion,
and [this Court] review[s] the decision for abuse of that discretion.” State v.
Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ¶8, 116 P.3d 360. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial
court denies a continuance and the resulting prejudice affects the substantial
rights of the defendant, such that a ‘review of the record persuades the court that
without the error there was ‘a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
the defendant.’” Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ¶8 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,
919 (Utah 1987)).
This issue was preserved by Peraza’s motion to continue trial in order to
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investigate and prepare for the State’s expert witness. R.589-91.
3. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to investigate and present expert testimony related to the State’s evidence
about the complaining witness’s multiple statements, her therapy records, and
the State expert testimony. Further, whether trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and consult with a medical expert
related to the complaining witness’s physical examination following disclosure of
alleged sexual abuse. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first
time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215, ¶9,
164 P.3d 1258.1
4. Whether the trial court erred providing the DVD of the CJC interview to
the jurors during deliberations. This claim depends upon an interpretation of
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, which is reviewed on appeal for correctness.
State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶34 (citing State v. Bosh, 2011 UT 60, ¶5, 266
P.3d 788). Peraza preserved this claim when he objected to the jury having access
to the CJC video during deliberations. R.814.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.

Because some facts supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims
are not currently within the record on appeal, Peraza has simultaneously filed a
Motion for Remand Pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to supplement the record with facts in support these claims. If, and
when, the remand takes place Peraza will seek to file a supplemental brief with
the additional evidence and argument.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Defendant, Robert Peraza, appeals from the judgment, sentence, and
commitment on four count of Sodomy Upon a Child, each a first degree felony.2
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
On August 15, 2013, Robert Peraza was charged by information with four
(4) counts of SODOMY UPON A CHILD, first degree felonies, and one (1) count
of AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, a first degree felony. R.001-02.
The case was assigned to Judge McDade who held a preliminary hearing on
September 4, 2014. At the preliminary hearing the State submitted a video
recorded interview of the complaining witness (K.C.) at the Children’s Justice
Center (CJC). R.091. During the CJC interview K.C. describes multiple incidents
of Peraza’s misconduct, some involving his causing K.C. to touch his penis with
her hands, and others where Peraza caused K.C. to perform oral sex upon him.
See State’s Exhibit 1.3 The trial court found sufficient evidence to bind over for
trial. R.152.
On November 24, 2014 the trial court held a hearing at which the parties

Peraza was also charged and bound-over on Count 5 for Aggravated Sexual
Abuse of a Child, but the State moved to dismiss that charge at trial after the
close of evidence. R.1199.
3 It should also be noted that the Information, which was not amended, charges
four counts of Sodomy upon a Child pursuant to Utah Code §76-5-403.1. The
probable cause statement within the Information and describes four instances of
oral sodomy. Nothing the case at that point suggested Peraza would need to
confront allegations of anal sodomy or vaginal intercourse.
2

4

disclosed that no resolution had been reached and the defense asked for a jury
trial. R.450. The Court scheduled trial for March 17-19, 2015. R.451. On March 2,
2015 the parties appeared at a pre-trial conference at which they discussed
Peraza’s written motion to continue the trial on the basis that facts had arisen
“requiring the exploration by the defense into a memory expert”, Peraza needed
access to therapy records, and to consult with an expert in relation to the State’s
proposed expert. R.164-167. At the hearing, counsel for the State acknowledged
that additional evidence was still being gathered (K.C. had disclosed additional
abuse by “another suspect” and had been interviewed again in California) so the
State did “not want to go forward on the case…” and would not object to the
continuance “on those grounds.” R.456. The trial court noted that the “case needs
to get moving” and scheduled a pretrial hearing to look for another trial date.
R.458-59.
At that pretrial hearing, April 27, 2015, the defense asserted that a new trial
could not be set because the State had still not provided the additional discovery
(new California interview) and because the matter of disclosing K.C.’s therapy
records had not been resolved. R.466-467. The State responded that it was in the
process of reviewing the new interview evidence and would provide it soon.
R.467-468. The court wondered why, in a case that had already been set for trial,
the evidence had not already been provided, to which the State responded that
the new evidence and the therapy records had only recently come to light. R.468469.
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On June 1, 2015 the parties stipulated to Peraza’s Rule 14(b) request for a
subpoena and in-camera review of K.C’s therapy records. R.478-479. The trial
court issued its subpoena duces tecum for the therapy records on June 19, 2015.
R.207-08. At the July 13, 2015 status conference the parties discussed the
progress of the 14(b) subpoena, but at that point the court had not yet received
the records. R.487. At the follow-up, August 10, 2015, hearing the court had still
not seen any records from K.C.’s therapist. R.494. The parties expected the
records to be provided shortly so they set a new trial for October 27-29, 2015.
R.495-497.
At the August 24, 205 status conference the trial court informed the parties
it had received the therapy records and was waiting for defense counsel to file
something about what information in the therapy records would be relevant.
R.504-06. On September 23, 2015 defense counsel filed that notice (R.217-18)
and at the September 28, 2015 reviewing hearing the court informed the parties it
intended to provide the redacted records “by the end of the week”. R512. Peraza
cannot find evidence in the record of when the redacted therapy records were
delivered by the court.
On October 19, 2015 defense counsel “ask[ed] to reset the trial” because it
had learned of a recorded recantation by K.C. in the possession of a private
investigator, and because, based on the therapy records, defense counsel believed
it was necessary to secure Dr. Matoon as a fact witness “for impeachment
purposes.” R.1330-31. The State was unaware of the recantation but did admit

6

that based on the records the “therapist is kind of a big deal”. R.1331. The State
wanted to “look at re-filing… expert notice”. R.1332. The State thought it would
“be better to continue the trial.” R.1331. The court was concerned about further
delay but noted that it didn’t “know that [it] ha[d] any choice”, struck the trial,
and set a new trial for February 9-11, 2016. R.1336, 1338.
On January 8, 2016 (32 days before trial) the State filed notice of expert
testimony for Chelsea Smith. R.282-83. The State intended to present evidence of
the “methodology and science related to forensic interviewing of suspected child
sex abuse victims; science and research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse
including identified factors related to delayed, partial and gradual disclosures
and recantation.” R.283.
By the January 25, 2016 pretrial conference the parties had agreed,
because they were having trouble subpoenaing Dr. Matoon out-of-state, that
Peraza could admit K.C.’s therapy records if her testimony was inconsistent with
her statements to Dr. Matoon. R.519. According to counsel, “With that
[stipulation] in mind, the defense is ready to go to trial.” R.520.
On January 28, 2016 the court held oral argument on Peraza’s objection to
the State notice of Chelsea Smith as an expert witness. Trial counsel objected
claiming that the expert notice did not include an adequate report so the defense
did not “really know exactly what this expert would be testifying to”, that the list
of articles cited within the notice were not explained how they would correspond
to Smith’s proposed opinion, and that the proposed testimony was not supported
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by any “actual statistical basis”. R.533-36. The State responded by claiming that
its notice of expert witness for Dr. Matoon was “a little bit different” from its
notice for Chelsea Smith because Smith would be called “to rebut the evidence
that [the prosecutor was] sure will come in at trial… that this child has changed
her testimony over time, at one point that there was a recantation”. R.536-37.
The State intended Smith to “explain as an expert that the science behind child -disclosures of children suspected of child abuse, recognizes that there are times
where children do not make a full disclosure initially, and that it’s a process.”
R.538. In support of that position the State cited to a 2015 Utah Supreme Court
case where the Court apparently recognized that “[c]ommon experience with rape
and child sexual abuse cases indicates that it is not unusual for a victim to
recant… or change their stories over time.” R.538.4
Defense counsel argued that the State’s notice was inadequate because it
did not provide “a thorough enough written explanation of the expert’s proposed
testimony” such that the defense did not “know which [studies] she’s specifically
Peraza assumes the prosecutor was referring to State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT 1204,
¶37, 356 P.3d 1204 (an appeal of a magistrate’s decision to dismiss after a
preliminary hearing where the Court found the magistrate exceeded its discretion
in disregarding the contradictory testimony of the complaining witness because
“there is at least a reasonable inference from the evidence that the victim was
telling the truth”). Peraza would note that the analysis and holding in Schmidt
has nothing whatsoever to do with the admissibility of expert testimony on the
behavior of complaining witnesses being consistent with abuse. The Court’s
mention of “common experience” cannot be interpreted as an indication that
such testimony is admissible under the rules of evidence. Defense counsel
accurately pointed out that Schmidt “was a case analyzing whether it was proper
for a case to have been dismissed at the preliminary hearing” so the Court was
“talking about a different standard”. R.539.
4
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relying on” and would “have no ability to cross examine her without having more
information”. R.548-49.
The trial court stated, “according to the rules of evidence, this person
would meet the criteria for being an expert…” R.548. After further discussion, the
court denied Peraza’s objection to the State’s proposed expert witness noting she
“qualified as an expert, looking at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of
things.” R.550.
Later that same day, January 28, 2015, the court held a phone conference
with the parties. R.589. Defense counsel informed the court that, based on a
conversation with the “director of the mental health and social work and
mitigation department at the Salt Lake legal defenders”, the defense needed an
expert to review K.C.’s therapy records. R.590. The defense, after acknowledging
the age of the case and denying any intent to delay, requested a continuance of
the trial to secure an expert. R.591. The State was “unhappy” with the prospect of
a continuance “but at the same time, I understand the basis of what they’re
asking for.” R.591-92. The court decided it had “to draw the line somewhere” and,
because “this information could’ve been determined much, much longer -- much
-- I mean, this is -- can't be something that could come up on the eve of trial”, it
denied the motion. R.592. The court “recognize[d] that this might be something
that could be used later, but [felt] like this is too late in the game, especially this
being the third time that we’ve set a trial. We have an obligation as well to this
victim -- alleged victim, that I have to consider. And so, weighing all things and
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hearing what I’m hearing today, I see no reason why this trial should not go here
in 10 days, whatever it might be.” R.592.
The case preceded to trial on February 9, 2016. R.599. The State called
Nina Peraza (Peraza’s wife and K.C.’s mother) as a witness. During her testimony
Nina testified that K.C. told her she wasn’t telling the truth and that Satan had
told her to say these things. R.996. K.C. wrote a note to that effect. R.997. Nina
testified that she contacted Peraza’s attorney and eventually took K.C. to an
interview with a private investigator where K.C. again recanted her allegations.
R.989. After the State closed its case the defense called Ken Bourne, the private
investigator who testified that he had interviewed K.C., that she had recanted
several times, and that he recorded the interview from which a transcript was
made. R.1109-11. On rebuttal the State called Chelsea Smith and the defense
objected claiming, if she was there to explain or rebut the evidence of recantation,
that she was not a rebuttal witness because that testimony came during the
State’s case in chief from the State’s witness, Nina Peraza. R.1133. The court
overruled the objection and allowed Smith to testify in rebuttal. R.1133-34.
Prior to giving the jury the closing instructions, the State moved to dismiss
Count 5 because the prosecutor wanted to “focus more on the evidence that I
think is most important, to dismiss that charge and simplify the instructions to
the jury…” R.1199. The court granted the motion and Count 5 was dismissed.
R.1200.
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During deliberations, the jury submitted a question asking the court to
provide a transcript or video of Peraza’s police interrogation. R.1289. The parties
discussed it and the court ruled that it would instruct the jury that “[a]ll the
evidence has been submitted that you need to use in making your decision.”
R.1292.5
Peraza was convicted on four counts of Sodomy on a Child. R.1292, 367-68.
At sentencing the court ordered Peraza to serve 25 years-to-life on each of the
four counts, each to run concurrent. R.1318. Peraza filed a timely notice of
appeal. R.392.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Testimony of George Scott –
K.C. (the complaining witness) is George Scott’s granddaughter. R.782.
Scott’s daughter, Nina Peraza, is K.C.s mother. R.783. Robert and Nina Peraza
“lived a number of years in [his] home.” R.785. “There were times that Nina and
her family -- they lived with [Scott] largely since [he] moved there [2005], but
there were times that they moved out and times -- and then moved back again.”
R.795. Scott believed K.C. lived with her family in two other apartments/homes
in Provo, and one place in California, over the years. R.800-01. Most recently,
K.C. and her two brothers had moved back in with Scott, and Nina moved in a
few days later. R.795. Peraza did not move in with them. R.795.

The record does not contain any evidence of exactly what or how the court
provided this additional instruction to the jury.
5
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One day in August of 2013 Scott was in his yard when Nina and K.C. drove
into the driveway. R.786. Scott spoke with Nina after K.C. ran into the house.
R.786. Scott thought “something appeared to be off.” R.806. After speaking with
Nina, Scott went in the house to speak with K.C. who appeared upset. R.789. The
police were then called, who provided Scott and Nina with some forms to write
statements. R.791-92.
After Nina was informed that Peraza would be arrested, Scott “started
perceiving quite a noticeable change in” Nina. R.1034. Nina told Scott she had
invested eight years in her marriage and she was going to lose those years.
R.1035. Scott believed Nina “was very concerned about the impact of it on her
family, on her becoming a single mother.” R.1041.
Scott’s opinion of K.C.’s reputation for truthfulness is that she “lied at
times to protect herself” but, as a “general rule”, “she was an honest child.” R.793.
Testimony of Carly Echols Carly Echols works for the Division of Child and Family Services at the
Children’s Justice Center (CJC). R.812. Echols conducted an interview with K.C.
on August 9, 2013 at the CJC, which was audio and video recorded. R.813-17,
State’s Exhibit 1.
Echols was trained to utilize the “Tom Lyon’s Forensic Interview Protocol”
to solicit the child’s “narrative or their story of what happened”. R.818. The
“protocol is based upon using open ended questions… allowing the child to
essentially access that memory and free recall all of the information about what
12

happened.” R.819. Interviewers ask “age appropriate” questions and set ground
rules to “assess the child’s ability to understand, [and] to see how the child
communicates”. R.819-20.
Echols interviewed K.C. a second time at K.C.’s school September 18, 2013.
R.826, 832. The second interview was conducted “to investigate whether [K.C.]
had been tampered with”. R833. K.C. told Echols that “the attorney had told her
that her mom couldn’t talk to her about it, and that hadn’t talked about it.”
R.833.
Testimony of K.C. At the time of trial K.C. was 12 years old and in 6th grade. R.835-36. K.C.
lived with Peraza for “a couple of years” but “stayed with [her] grandpa most of
[her] whole life.” R.840. Peraza and her mother, Nina, have been together most
of her life but she is not sure whether they were married. R.840-41. Peraza and
Nina had two children together, K.C.’s younger brothers, R.P. and A.P. R.841.
On more than one occasion something happened between K.C. and Peraza
that “made [K.C.] feel uncomfortable.” R.842. “He -- he made me do things that I
didn’t like, and he’d get -- he got mad at me a lot, and he used to hurt me.” R.842.
The first instance K.C. recalled was when they were living in an apartment,
Peraza woke her up late at night and showed K.C. “his body parts” and made her
touch his penis. R.843-44. It was winter, they had the heater on, and K.C. was
“sleeping in a long sleeve”. R.846. Peraza woke K.C. up, began comforting her,
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began taking his clothes off, and then “started taking off [her] clothes”. R.846.
Peraza showed K.C. “his body parts and touch[ed]” her. R.846.
This “happened a couple of nights” and “it started going where he made me
touch him.” R.846. He made K.C. touch him “[o]n his penis.” R.846. “He made
me do an up and down gesture on his penis.” R.847. Peraza’s penis “got hard”
and “then white stuff started coming out.” R.848. K.C. “felt violated and grossed
out.” R.848.
K.C. remembered that her mother “could’ve been at work or asleep” while
this was happening because she worked for “old people” during the day and
night. R.848. Peraza would watch K.C. while Nina was away. R.849. Her younger
brother, R.P., who would have been three or four at the time “would’ve been
playing his Xbox or playing outside with the dog.” R.849.
This happened “every week” until K.C. was seven, then “it started to
change.” R.849-50. Then Peraza made K.C. “do it longer, and put my mouth on
his penis”. R.850. “He would grab my hair and make me go up and down, like, it
felt like he was ripping my hair up”. R.850. The “white stuff” would go “[i]n my
mouth or on my face” and Peraza would say, “do you want some milk?” R.850.
This happened in other places, though not at Scott’s house. R.851. Once, when
K.C. was seven, it occurred in the car while Nina and K.C.’s brothers were in a
Denny’s restaurant. R.851.
The nature of the abuse changed several times. Initially it began with
having K.C. touch Peraza’s penis with her hands. R.853. One of these instances
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happened on the bed at Peraza’s mother’s house. R.936.
Then, after “[a] couple months” it changed to having K.C. use her mouth on
Peraza’s penis. R.853. One time while K.C.’s mouth was on Peraza’s penis her
“little brother came in, and then [Peraza] said that we were playing hide and
seek…” R.937-38.
Then, a month later, “things started to happen with [K.C.’s] bum”. R.854.
The first incident “involving your butt” happened when K.C. was five years old, at
her “very first house” in Provo. R.955-57.6 Peraza would “put a sock in my mouth
so I wouldn’t scream.” R.852, 928. “He put some stuff on my butt and stick his
penis in me.” R.852. During these incidents, Peraza was behind K.C. and she was
“[a]t a 90-degree angle on the bed.” R.932. Trial was the first time K.C. told
anyone about Peraza putting a sock in her mouth. R.968. Trial was the first time
K.C. told anyone about using “weird stuff” to make penetration easier. R.968.
Then, “[a] year after he started sticking his penis in my butt”, he “stuck his
penis in my vagina.” R.853. This happened two or three times, standing up, face
to face. R.933. This happened “[a] long time”, or a “couple months”, before her
interview at the CJC. R.934.
Peraza would talk to K.C. “about not telling anyone while this abuse was
going on” “[a]lmost every time.” R.926. “Sometimes he would push me to do
more, and it hurt, and I said, ‘I don’t want to do this’, like five times, and then he
But see R.957-59 (K.C. recalls telling “Courtney that the first time anything
involving your butt took place was on your -- when you were eight years old”, on
her birthday, with family members gathered at the house).
6
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said, ‘I don’t care’.” R.927-28. One time K.C. told Peraza she didn’t “want to, he -and then he had choked me and lifted me off the floor and threw me.” R.928. The
abuse stopped when K.C. was nine and Peraza moved in with his mother, before
K.C. reported it to Nina. R.853.
Once, when she was eight, K.C. saw Peraza and Nina engaging in sex when
she has slept in their room, she “woke up to them doing that, and then I had tried
to ignore it, I didn’t want to leave the room because they would’ve known that I
was awake the whole time.” R.929, 962. On two other occasions K.C. “walked in
the door when I thought my brothers were in there…, so I walked in there and
then I saw him naked.” R.930.
K.C. observed a pornographic video which was playing on the TV. She
watched about 30 seconds and then went upstairs. R.938. It was a movie
involving a man and a woman doing sexual things. R.960. K.C. went upstairs to
find Peraza was upstairs asleep. R.961. She woke Peraza up, and questioned him
about the video, but he said “nothing, nothing, nothing.” R.961. Peraza was
embarrassed that he had forgotten to turn the video off. R.961. Another time,
Peraza was on the computer watching videos involving sex, “[t]wo guys, four
girls”, and he wanted K.C. “to do what they were doing on the computer.” R.939.
K.C. reported being abused by Peraza to her mother, Nina, “[o]nly twice.”
R.855. “I told my mom when I was five or six. She believed me for a couple
minutes, and then she turned away from it.” R.855. K.C. said “Daddy’s really
hurting me in a way that I don’t like it.” R.855. Then again, when K.C. was seven,
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she told Nina, and K.C. thinks Nina told Scott because they fought about Nina
K.C. R.855. K.C. told her mother “that ‘he’s sticking his pee-pee in me, and I -- it
hurts, and I don’t like it.’” R.855.
K.C. was interviewed by Echols at the CJC on August 9, 2013. R.813, see
State’s Exhibit 1. During the interview K.C. told Echols she promised her
grandmother she wouldn’t do these things with Peraza on Sundays. R.922. K.C.
felt like it “was her fault because I let him do it…” R.922. K.C. also told Echols
that nothing like this has happened with anybody else, other than Peraza. R.923.
Echols asked K.C. to describe Peraza’s penis and K.C. told her it was just like my
mom said.” R.962.7 K.C. had asked her mother about Peraza’s penis because she
was curious about it. R.962-63. K.C didn’t tell Echols about “more abuse with
[her] dad that involved things like [her] butt and [her] vagina” because she “was
afraid.” R.926, 964 (Echols asked “numerous times if it had happened in any
other way” and K.C. told her “nothing else”).8
After the CJC K.C. spoke with Nina and told her that she missed Peraza,
and that she wanted to live with him again. R.945. Nina was confused about why
and asked K.C. whether the things she had said about Peraza actually happened.
R.946. K.C. told Nina that they did not happen. R.946. K.C. acknowledged that
these things did not happen “all on [her] own”. R.946.

See State’s Exhibit 1 at 36:15 (Q: Tell me what his pee-pee looks like. A: It was
like my mom said.”).
8 See State’s Exhibit 1 at 35:57 (Q: Has your dad ever touched you anywhere on
your body? A: No.).
7
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A couple months after she was first interviewed at the CJC K.C.’s mother
took her to an appointment to talk with a private investigator. R.917, 920-21. K.C.
told the investigator she felt bad that Nina and Peraza might be getting divorced.
R.941. She wasn’t sure who she would stay with, Peraza or Nina. R.942. The
investigator asked K.C. about Peraza having her touch him and she said he had
not done that. R.942. She told the investigator Peraza didn’t touch her and she
didn’t touch Peraza. R.942. The investigator asked K.C. about what she said in
her CJC interview she said she said those things because she “had to”. R.943, see
State’s Exhibit 2 at 6-7.9 K.C. told the investigator that an evil voice in her head
told her what to say. R.943. Nobody, but the little voice, told her what to say.
R.944. K.C. told the investigator she had never told Nina about the abuse before.
R.944. The investigator asked K.C. many times about the alleged abuse and every
time she said they did not happen. R.944.
At trial K.C. said her statement to the investigator “wasn’t true, because I
didn’t want our family to get split up.” R.915. “And I had lied and said that there
was a little voice in my head that told me to lie.” R.915.
K.C. has talked a lot about these incidents with her counselor, Dr. Matoon.

“Q. Did you tell her that Robert had you do things with him that you didn’t want
to do and that weren’t right? A. Yes. Q. And why did you tell her that? A. Because
I had to. Q. Why did you have to? A. Because that’s why I was there for. Q. And
why did you have to -- was it because it was true or was it for some other reason?
A. I don’t know. Q. Well, did those things happen, or didn’t they? A. Didn’t. Q.
They didn’t happen? A. Huh-uh. Q. Then why did you tell the lady they did? A.
Because that little voice went in my head. Q. A little voice went in your head? A.
Uh-huh.”
9
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R.844. K.C. didn’t tell Dr. Matoon everything about the abuse when they first met
because she didn’t know Dr. Matoon, “[s]he felt like a stranger”. R.975. During
her sessions with Dr. Matoon, K.C. made dolls of Peraza and Giovanni, which she
killed and ran over with a car. R.959. K.C. made a doll of Cassie and killed it too.
R.960. K.C. learned the words penis and vagina from her grandma her therapist
who “had been preparing” her. R.925.
After she moved to California, K.C. would call her mother on the phone.
R.970. K.C. “kept telling [Nina] in those conversations that [Peraza] didn’t do
anything to” K.C. R.970-71. K.C. told her mother that nothing happened with
Peraza but that Giovanni had done things to her. R.972.
K.C. was interviewed again, in California, by “Courtney” and asked about
Giovanni. R.954. K.C. said that Giovanni’s girlfriend, Cassie, had heard K.C. and
Giovanni “doing things”. R.954. Cassie had also heard when Peraza “was doing
things to you on your butt”. R.954-55. K.C. told Courtney that Giovanni had
kissed her but “nothing else”. R.955. K.C. told Courtney that Cassie had been mad
at K.C. and had accused K.C. of begging Giovanni to abuse her. R.959.10
Testimony of Nina Peraza –
Nina Peraza is K.C.’s mother and Peraza’s wife. R.983. On the day of the
football game, Nina and Peraza had been involved in a physical fight. R.985. Nina
assaulted Peraza. R.1018. Then Nina took K.C. to the football game and she

But see Defense Exhibit 1 at 34 (K.C. tells Courtney Lee that Giovanni’s
girlfriend said K.C. was begging Peraza to “do that” on her birthday).
10
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explained she and Peraza would not be staying together. R.985. That was the first
time Nina had “heard [K.C.] claim that Robert had abused her”. R.985, 1002.11
Nina came home and immediately told her dad as much as she could “get out
without… dry heaving”. R.1004. Nina then spoke to the police, and cooperated
with having K.C. interviewed at the CJC. R.1004. At that time, Nina believed what
K.C. had said. R.1004-05. She thought there was no way K.C could make
something like that up. R.1005.
Nina took K.C. to the CJC, and took her for a physical examination. R.1005.
The doctor told Nina that K.C.’s hymen was still intact, and that she had no
injuries. R.1005.
Nina was conflicted, she did not know whether to believe K.C. R.987. While
Peraza was in jail K.C. “would cry for Daddy, she’d ask for Daddy as we would go
visit Daddy at the jail. She’d want to go, but she couldn’t because they said she
couldn’t go… It was just always Daddy, and she was crying for him.” R.1007. Nina
sensed that something was wrong with K.C. R.996-97.
Eventually, Nina asked K.C. whether these things really happened and K.C.
said they didn’t happen. R.1007. Nina remembered that K.C. “wrote on a piece of
paper what had happened, and she said that it was -- that she wasn’t telling the
truth, that it was Satan that told her.” R.996. Nina was confused and hurt.
R.1007. Nina considered K.C.’s history of getting in trouble as school for talking
K.C. did not tell Nina about these kinds of things in kindergarten. Nina is
confident that if her daughter had said something like that before she would
remember, she would be traumatized and sickened. R.1002-03.
11
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with other children about sex. R.1010-11. She considered times when K.C. would
initially blame the boys in the neighborhood for kissing and then later say they
didn’t do it. R.1011. Nina was concerned that her daughter had a character for
fabricating charges against people. R.1012-13. Eventually, as time went on and
Nina considered what she knew about K.C., and the history, and her husband she
concluded K.C.’s allegations were not true. R.988-89.
Nina arranged with Peraza’s attorney for K.C. to meet with a private
investigator for an interview. R.990. Nina took K.C. “to the private investigator
only after she recanted to me.” R.995. Nina did not call the police to report that
K.C. had recanted her allegations. R.990-91. Nina called Peraza’s attorney, not
the police or DCFS, because the attorney “was on our side, so… I knew that he
was the one that need to know.” R.996. Nina assumed the attorney “would then
pass it on to the prosecution.” R.1018.
K.C. continued to live with Nina for “about a year after everything came
out” but then, based on a court’s order, K.C. moved to California. R.992-93. After
K.C. moved to California Nina learned from K.C.’s biological father that K.C. had
claimed Peraza had sodomized her anally. R.1013. Nina wondered why K.C.
would say these things when Nina knew there had not been any injuries. R.101314.
Nina recalls several times when K.C. walked in on Nina and Peraza having
sex. R.1016. In one instance, she observed Nina performing oral sex and later
K.C. asked about it, about why Nina was making “those sounds.” R.1016. K.C. also
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asked Nina about pornography. R.1017. Nina recalls that K.C. might have had
access to the pornography on Nina and Peraza’s iPad’s and phones. R.1017.
Nina recalled the apartment where K.C. alleged the allegations occurred.
R.1019. She wasn’t working while they lived there because she was pregnant.
R.1019. Robert was working and for a time he was gone to New York to work.
R.1020. It was a small apartment, all on one floor, with thin walls. R.1019. If
“something was being done in another room against someone’s will” Nina would
have heard it. R.1020. She would check on her kids all the time at night. R.1020.
Testimony of Matt Pedersen –
Matt Pedersen was the lead detective on this case. R.1042. Pedersen
interviewed Peraza. R.1045. Pedersen informed Peraza about K.C.’s allegations of
“oral sodomy and things like ejaculation of semen” and Peraza initially offered a
denial, then blamed others, and “then later on in the discussions, he talked about,
if he was possibly drunk, it could have happened or may have happened.” R.1046.
Peraza said these allegations were made up or coached by his wife (Nina) or by
the grandfather (Scott). R.1046. Peraza also said K.C. may have walked in on him
while he was viewing pornography or she may have viewed it herself. R.1047.
Peraza told Pedersen that K.C. “walked in on his wife giving him oral sex”
numerous times, and that she observed them having sex, including in the shower.
R.1047.
Pedersen asked Peraza about his alcohol use and posed a hypothetical
about the possibility that something happened with K.C. while he was drunk or
22

passed out. R.1048. Peraza stated that “if he was really drunk he could do that
[mistake K.C. for his wife], he could imagine that.” R.1048. Peraza described a
situation where he “drank and passed out on the couch” and someone was
shaking him. R.1049. Peraza “assumed it was his wife, so he grabbed the head of
that person, guided it to his genital area, there was oral sex… he thanked them,
and fell back asleep.” R.1049-50. The next day Peraza thanked his wife for the act
and she didn’t know what he was talking about. R.1050. Peraza admitted he
thought “it could’ve been [K.C.].” R.1050.
When Pedersen asked Peraza about how K.C. might know about sexual
matters Peraza suggested she may have walked in on him while he was watching
pornography, while he was having sex, while he was in the shower, and when he
was passed out and naked. R.1057, 1059-60. The stipulated that Peraza’s
statements were made in the form of instances where “it could’ve happened.”
R.1075.
Testimony of Ken Bourne –
Ken Bourne is an independent private investigator who was retained by
original defense counsel to help investigate this case. R.1105, 1108. Bourne
interviewed K.C. R.1109. Numerous times during that interview K.C. recanted the
allegations she had made against Peraza. R.1110-11. See State’s Exhibit 2.
Rebuttal Testimony of Chelsea Smith –
Chelsea Smith works at the Utah County CJC as a forensic interviewer.
R.1131. Smith has a bachelor’s degree in “marriage, family, human development”
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and a master’s degree in social work. R.1132. She received training in “the Tom
Lyons 10 step” protocol, which is used in Utah County. R.1132. She has gone to
“advanced forensic interview training, and extended forensic interview training”
and other conferences and trainings reviewing forensic interviewing. R.1132.
Smith did not interview or make an assessment on K.C., she did not read the
transcript of Bourne’s interview of K.C, and she did not review any medical
records or counselling records. R.1148, 1154.
There is more scientific research relating to interviewing children than
there used to be. R.1134. The research suggests the “kind of question types that
we use in forensic interviews.” R.1134. Smith opined that Bourne’s questioning of
K.C., based on what she heard in court (because she had not seen the transcript of
the interview), was that “we don’t use yes, no questions.” R.1135. Smith described
a system of questioning that encourages the child to use their own words. R.1135.
Interviewers should use very simple language, and one question at a time. R.1136.
Smith has performed “[a]round 1,900” forensic interviews. R.1141. In her
experience, the fact that a “child recants does not mean that it did not occur.”
R.1142. The research about the frequency of recantations “varies between four
percent to 20 percent of cases, so it’s not something that’s typical, but it’s not
unheard of that it does happen.” R.1141-42. “Sometimes when a child recants, it
may be feeling pressure from family members.” R.1142. “It may be feeling
pressure from family members.” R.1142. A child may “also recant because they’re
feeling guilty or something” about making a false allegation to begin with. R.1148.
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When people in the “sexual abuse community” disclose it is often delayed
“until they’re an adult”, so “when they do disclose as a child, even then, the
disclosure can be delayed.” R.1143. Sometimes disclosure comes gradually where
“kids will just give a little bit of information to test the waters, to see how it is
received.” R.1143-44. “Sometimes the children are supported and then they feel
more comfortable talking about things. Sometimes it’s not that well by the person
who receives it, and then the child will kind of shut down and not talk about
things a lot.” R.1144. “Other times, children will say the information that they can
think about that time, but just often times, we don’t remember all of the
information about an experience when someone’s asked us about that experience,
and so when someone’s asked us about that experience, and so sometimes later
we’ll think, oh, I forgot to tell them that part, or the more we talk about things,
the more we remember different experiences.” R.1144.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Chelsea
Smith because the State did not present any evidence upon which the court could
have concluded that Smith and her testimony satisfied the requirements of Rule
702. The court did not analyze or even examine the reliability of the scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge that served as the basis for the expert’s
testimony.
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Peraza’s motion to
continue the trial. The court did not consider the factors relevant to whether a
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continuance was warranted. The court only noted that other continuances had
already been granted the court decided to ‘draw the line somewhere’. That
reasoning, focusing on irrelevant facts, was an abuse of discretion.
Trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
adequately investigate and consult with expert witnesses in the areas of child sex
abuse disclosures and medicine. These failures constitute deficient performance
because they fell below the basic standards of reasonable counsel. Counsel knew
there was reason to question the K.C.’s inconsistent statements and to reason to
doubt her claims based on the results of her physical examination. Even so,
counsel did not consult with any experts and proceeded to trial unprepared to
confront the State’s evidence or present counter evidence. Because expert witness
testimony in both these areas would have served to undermine K.C.’s credibility,
and because the case depended entirely upon her testimony, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result.
The trial court erred when it submitted the DVD of K.C.’s CJC interview to
the jury for them to consider during deliberations. Testimonial-like evidence,
submitted at trial, is not the kind of exhibit that the jury should be taking back
into deliberations to review.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING
THE STATE TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY
“A decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is left to the discretion of

the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed unless it constitutes an
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abuse of discretion.” Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 89. “Our review of the district court's
exercise of its discretion includes review to ensure that no mistakes of law
affected a lower court's use of its discretion.” Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ¶ 5. Mistakes
of law include errors in interpreting rules of evidence because such errors are not
“within the limits of reasonability”. Id. (citing State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶17).
The trial court here abused its discretion because it incorrectly applied Rule 702.
A. Rule 702
Rule 702, of the Utah Rules of Evidence, outlines 3 basic steps a trial court,
acting as a gatekeeper, needs to take before admitting expert testimony.12 Step
one, the court must determine “whether expert testimony is necessary to assist
the trier of fact”. Eskelson, ¶9 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702(a)). In other words, is
there something about the facts of the case that may need to be explained by an
expert? Next, the court should consider “whether the proposed expert has the
necessary ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ to provide such
assistance to the trier of fact.” Eskelson, ¶9 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702(a)). In other
words, is the witness qualified to help the jury understand specialized
information?

12

In a more recent case the Utah Supreme Court has characterized the 702
analysis as a “two-part analysis” essentially eliminating (or at least omitting) the
question of whether the proposed expert has the necessary knowledge or
experience. See State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶72, 322 P.3d 624 (citing State v.
Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶31, 233 P.3d 1103). Whether this omitted factor has
actually been removed from the 702 analysis is beside the point for this case,
because the two remaining steps articulated in Perea are the factors that Peraza
claims were not satisfied in this case.
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Finally, the “court then turns to the reliability of the ‘scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge’ that serves as the basis for the expert’s testimony.”
Eskelson, ¶9 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702(b)). In this step the court must ask
whether the “principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are
reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably
applied to the facts.” UTAH R. EVID. 702.
B. The State did not meet the threshold for admitting expert
evidence
At the hearing on Peraza’s objection to Smith’s proposed expert testimony
the defense asked to have it’s earlier “objection applied to this expert as well”.
R.533.13 Peraza objected that the State’s notice, which did not include a report,
didn’t show what Smith would actually be testifying to. R.534, 536. The defense
complained that “identified factors related to delay, partial and gradual
disclosure and recantation” were merely “topics”, and were insufficient to identify
what the expert opinion would be, and insufficient to allow the defense to crossexamine the witness or prepare for the proposed testimony. R.534-35. The
defense also argued that any testimony about the statistical prevalence of
recantation in child sex allegation cases could not be supported by scientific
studies. R.534-35.

Defense counsel was referring to its April 26, 2015 Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony of State’s Expert Lyssabeth Mattoon. R.190. In that motion the
defense claimed the State’s notice was too vague to provide fair notice, and that
statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis were
inappropriate to be provided to the jury. R.190-94.
13
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The State responded by claiming that its purpose in calling Smith as an
expert was to “rebut the evidence… brought forth by the defense that this child
has changed her testimony over time, at one point that there was a recantation,
and then, you know, making arguments to the jury that this is a reason that they
should… disbelieve the child.” R.537. The State wanted Smith to “explain as an
expert that the science behind child -- disclosures of children suspected of child
abuse, recognizes that there are times where children do not make a full
disclosure initially, and that it’s a process.” R.537-38. The State’s response did
not present Smith as a witness to demonstrate the scientific validity of the basis
of her testimony, or provide any details about what her testimony would be so
that the defense could investigate whether such testimony could be supported by
the scientific literature.
Defense counsel argued that the studies he presumed14 Smith was relying
upon, were directed mainly at therapeutic standards, rather than forensic
circumstances. R.540. Defense counsel claimed that allowing the State to present
expert testimony about “why a child might recant, when that therapist hasn’t
actually interviewed and assessed this alleged victim” “gives weight and
credibility to [the alleged] victim without a scientific basis for that.” R.542.
Presumed because the defense was not provided access to the studies, nor did
Smith prepare a report about how the conclusions of these studies could be
applied to the facts of this case. The State’s notice merely contained a list of
“Areas of Inquiry” with accompanying list of “Research Literature Support” and
then a list of “References for Court Testimony”. R.288-301. Nothing within the
notice, or the State’s discussions at the hearing disclosed how the cited support
and references related to Smith’s proposed testimony.
14
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The trial court ruled, at least for the “purposes of today” that the defense
motion in limine would be denied, but allowed the defense to make further
objections at trial. R.550. According to the court, all it could do “is look at her
criteria, figure out for myself whether or not she’s qualified as an expert, looking
at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things.” R.550. After the court
looked at ‘those kinds of things’ and found Smith did qualify as an expert, the
court denied the defense motion in limine. R.550.
The absolute dearth of support provided by the State, the complete lack of
any actual content about what Smith’s testimony would be and how it was
reliable, was not a sufficient showing to satisfy the threshold for Rule 702.
C. The trial court abused its discretion
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Eskelson, even though the trial
court has discretion on questions of whether or not to admit expert testimony,
trial courts must apply the correct test in exercising that discretion. See Eskelson,
¶5. And if the trial court erred in interpreting Rule 702, “it did not act within the
limits of reasonability”. Id. In this case it is clear, the trial court did not apply the
correct test, therefore it abused its discretion.
When the trial court concluded that Smith could testify because she had
sufficient “skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things” (R.550) it
completely failed to examine whether her testimony and opinions were based
upon principles and methods that were reliable, that they were based upon
sufficient facts or data, and had been reliably applied to the facts. UTAH R. EVID.
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702(b). Nor could the court have made any such conclusions because the court
had no idea what Smith’s testimony was going to be, or what her opinions or
conclusions were based upon. The State presented no report containing her
opinions and proposed testimony, nor did the State produce Smith at an
evidentiary hearing. Instead, and over defense counsel’s objection and implicit
request for a hearing (R.542, 548-49), the trial court proceeded upon Peraza’s
motion in limine with only the State’s one paragraph explanation in its notice and
its oral assertions about why it wanted to call Smith to rebut Peraza’s evidence.
The trial court, just like Peraza, had no idea what Smith’s testimony would be,
whether her methods or principles were reliable, whether they were based upon
sufficient facts or data, and whether those methods and principles had been
reliably applied to the facts in this case. The trial court did not consider any of
these question, each of which is required under Rule 702.15
The only question the court considered was if Smith “qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”. UTAH R. EVID. 702(a).
This is not sufficient to establish that Smith was admissible as an expert to testify
about anything and everything related to the “methodology and science related to
forensic interviewing of suspected child sex abuse victims” and the “science and
research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse including identified factors
related (sic) delayed, partial and gradual disclosures and recantation.” R.283. The

The court also completely neglected to consider whether the testimony would
assist the jury.
15
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information provided by the State left all the important questions unanswered.
What methodology? What science? What factors? None of these questions were
even address by the State or asked by the court. The trial court’s failure to
properly apply Rule 702 and require the State to present evidence under the
other steps constitutes an error in interpreting Rule 702 and exceeds the limits of
reasonability.
It’s possible the State will assert now that the list of articles and studies
attached to the expert notice was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule
702. This Court should not accept this potential argument. None of the content or
conclusions of any of these sources is in the record, nor was any of it made known
to the trial court. As trial counsel put it, without a report and without an
explanation of the proposed testimony we “don’t know what those studies say.”
R.534. The trial court had no idea what was contained within the documents
listed in the notice. With respect to the adequacy of the State’s proposed expert
testimony, this Court stands in the same position as the trial court, without any
idea what Smith’s testimony would be or what scientific basis it is based upon.
This Court should reject any attempt to use the content of those listed documents
to supplement the record, and should conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by not requiring the State to comply with Rule 702.
D. The admission of Smith’s testimony was prejudicial
Not every abuse of discretion constitutes reversible error, but in this case,
the improper admission of Smith’s testimony, and its effect of bolstering K.C’s
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trial testimony, prejudiced Peraza’s case. “When Utah appellate courts reverse for
improper bolstering, the usually do so not only where a case hinges on an alleged
victim’s credibility and there is no physical evidence, but also where the
bolstering was done by an expert witness.” State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ¶46,
248 P.3d 984.16 In this case the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony
directed specifically at rehabilitating and bolstering K.C.’s uncorroborated
testimony which had been impeached by her multiple inconsistent statements,
her delayed and partial disclosures, and her recantations. This kind of error is
exactly the kind that Utah courts have found to be prejudicial because they go the
very heart of what the jury had to decide, was K.C. credible in spite of the
impeaching evidence.
“The Utah Supreme Court has continued to condemn anecdotal ‘statistical’
evidence concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as
See e.g. State v. Stefanik, 900 P.2d 1094 (Utah App 1995) (a caseworker
testified that when the child was interviewed she was open and candid in her
responses, which was found to be improper bolstering and because the State’s
case hinged on the victim’s credibility, the error was prejudicial); State v.
Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, fn.4 (Utah App 1996) (a prosecutor erroneously testified
to lay the foundation for a handwriting expert in a prescription fraud case, and
although the erroneous testimony was not itself expert evidence, because it paved
the way for the expert’s evidence, which was “the single most incriminating part
of the State’s case, the error was prejudicial); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 942
(Utah App 1990) (where no physical evidence corroborated the victim’s
allegations and the case hinged on credibility, the deputy’s testimony was
designed to bolster the victim’s credibility by “assuring the jury no credibility
problem was presented by the delay[ed]” report and therefore the erroneous was
prejudicial); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) (case hinged on
victim credibility and her version was bolstered by four experts who testified the
victim’s reports were truthful based on their expertise, therefore the errors were
prejudicial).
16
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witness veracity, as one of the categories of evidence leading to undue prejudice.”
State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah App 1990) (citing State v. Dibello, 780
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989)). In Iorg the defendant was charged with sexual
abuse of a child where the victim testified that the defendant “entered a tent
where she and her cousins were sleeping and touched her breasts.” Iorg, 801 P.2d
at 939. The defendant acknowledged entering the tent to check on the children
but denied the illegal touching. The victim reported the incident two and a half
years later and the State presented evidence from the deputy who interview the
victim. The deputy testified that at least half of the victims “she had interviewed
delayed reporting for over a year.” Iorg, 939. The deputy testified “it was not
unusual for [the victim] to wait from age eleven to fourteen to report the
incident” and that “based on her experience, the fact that [the victim] delayed
reporting was not an indication she was not telling the truth.” Iorg, 939. This
Court found the deputy’s statements to be erroneously admitted and prejudicial
because the entire case “hinged on credibility”
This is exactly the kind and significance as the evidence Smith presented.
Smith presented evidence that between four to 20 percent of victims recant.
R.1141. She testified that “because a child recants does not mean that it did not
occur. R.1142. Smith testified that, in her experience, victims may recant based
on family pressures and other personal concerns, irrespective of the validity of
the allegations. R.1142. Smith testified that the majority of people who have been
sexually abused as a child delay disclosure. R.1143. She testified that gradual
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disclosure occurs for a number of reasons. R.1143-44. Each of these statements
were admitted to bolster K.C.’s testimony and rebut impeachment based on the
generally held belief that inconsistent statements, recantations, changing
allegations, could undermine a witness’s credibility. Because, like Iorg and the
other case cited in the footnote above, this case depended entirely upon K.C.’s
credibility, which had been impeached, but for the erroneous admission of
Smith’s bolstering evidence there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result. This is a prejudicial error and this Court should reverse.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED PERAZA’S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to
continue because: 1) defendant was prejudiced as he was not given sufficient time
to procure an expert witness and 2) there was a reasonable likelihood that the
outcome of the case would have been different if the continuance would have
been granted. The grant or denial of a continuance is within the trial court’s
discretion. State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993). An appellate court
will not interfere with the judge's decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.
However, as general principle, a district court abuses its discretion when it denies
a continuance and the resulting prejudice affects the substantial rights of the
defendant, such that ‘a review of the record persuades the court that without the
error there was a “reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant.” State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ¶8, 116 P.3d 360.
There is no formulaic test that appellate courts apply in deciding whether
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the denial of a continuance is so arbitrary or unreasonable as to constitute an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, ¶5, 118 P.3d 97, 100.
The appellate court must review each case on its own facts and circumstances. Id.
Moreover, the abuse of discretion inquiry should emphasize the reasons
presented to the trial court when the motion to continue was sought. Id., ¶5.
Here, Peraza asserts that the facts and circumstances, and the trial court’s stated
reason for denying the motion, should persuade this Court that the trial court
abused its discretion.
Utah courts utilize a four factor test to determine whether the reasons
presented warranted a continuance: (1) the extent of appellant’s diligence in his
efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that
the need for a continuance could have been met if the continuance had been
granted; (3) the extent to which granting the continuance would have
inconvenienced the court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which
moving party might have suffered harm as a result of the court's denial. State v.
Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ¶20, 131 P.3d 292.
Under the first factor, a defendant shows sufficient due diligence where he
demonstrates a reasonable or competent trial strategy that includes timely
objections prior to trial so that he could not have reasonably anticipated a last
minute development in light of his preparation. Id. For example, in Arellano, this
Court held that “it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all
potential, yet undisclosed, expert witnesses” State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167,
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1171 (Utah App 1998). In short, the inquiry focuses on totality of a circumstances
approach where defendant ought to demonstrate that he could not have
anticipated the “last minute” development. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 531
(Utah App 1997).
A defendant satisfies the second factor where he shows that the
continuance would have provided him with sufficient time to procure his own
expert testimony or additional evidence to incorporate new information into the
defense strategy. Arellano, 964 P.2d at 1171. In simpler terms, defendant can to
prove that the motion to continue would have enabled him to adequately prepare
for trial by procuring new witnesses or presenting new evidence to counteract the
last minute development. Id.
The third factor focuses primarily on whether the inconvenience to the
court and the involved is justified in light of the state’s actions. Begishe, 937 P.2d
at 530–31. Several courts have ruled that where a defendant is surprised by a
crucial last minute ruling or development that was primarily caused by the state,
Defendant's right to a fair trial outweighs the administrative concern of delaying
or postponing a trial. Id; Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ¶21.
As to the fourth factor, courts place emphasis on the degree of harm caused
to the defendant as a result of the denial of the motion to continue. Courts
analyze the strength of the evidence that was admitted and how prejudicial it was
for defendant’s case. Id. In cases where the unanticipated evidence was pivotal to
the state’s case, a motion to continue is warranted. Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530–31;

37

Torres-Garcia, ¶21.
Typically, an accused who is surprised by some unexpected occurrence or
by the introduction of unexpected evidence which, by reasonable diligence, he
could not have anticipated, may have a legitimate basis to move for a
continuance. State v. Jensen, 30 P.2d 203, 204 (1934). Accordingly, Utah courts
have held that where a defendant shows that is so taken by surprise due to the
introduction of new evidence or unforeseen circumstances so that he does not
have adequate time to prepare, a continuance or postponement should be
granted. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 575. Begishe,
529; Jensen, 30 P.2d 203, 204.
For instance, in Begishe, this Court held that a denial of a continuance
constitutes an abuse of discretion where the defendant is not provided with
sufficient time to procure an expert witness to examine newly introduced
evidence. Id., 528. There, after having reiterated to defense counsel that all the
testing was completed prior to trial, the state unexpectedly sought to introduce
the report of human blood tests results performed on a sexual abuse victim’s
underwear on the second day of trial. Id. Defendant moved for a continuance, but
the trial court denied his motion. Id. This Court applied the four-factor test
articulated above and concluded that the denial of the continuance was a clear
abuse of discretion because: “[defendant] needed the continuance to fully analyze
the new data submitted by the State”. Id., 530. The court also noted that in light
of the state’s tardiness in submitting the new evidence, the defendant should have
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been allowed additional time to procure an expert witness to conduct additional
testing and rebut the newly introduced evidence. Id.
This court has been consistent with this line of reasoning and has ruled
several times that a motion to continue should be granted where defendant is
unprepared due to unanticipated evidentiary rulings. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT
App 45, ¶24. There, the trial court excluded the testimony of the state’s expert
witness, as the state had not complied with the 30-day notice requirements. Id.,
¶11. Both parties stipulated that if the state’s expert witness were to testify at trial,
defendant should be granted a continuance. Id. Thus, the state decided to move
forward with the trial and opted to forgo the testimony from the expert witness.
Id. However, the state moved again to have the expert witness testify during the
second day of trial under the state employee exception to Rule 26. Id., ¶11. The
court reconsidered its prior ruling, denied defendant’s motion to continue, and
allowed for the state to introduce its expert witness. Id., ¶6.
Applying the four-factor test, the appellate court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by the denying the defendant a reasonably opportunity to
prepare in light of the unanticipated admission of the state’s expert testimony.
Id., ¶23. The court noted that “the effective administration of justice requires that
discoverable evidence be provided much sooner than “moments” before trial,’
much less during the course of trial”. Torres-Garcia, ¶23. Finally, the court also
alluded that the unanticipated admission of the expert testimony prejudiced the
defendant, as the credibility of defendant’s case in chief was significantly
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impaired. Id., ¶ 22.
This case is very similar. Mr. Peraza was prejudiced by the unanticipated
ruling of the court allowing the state’s expert witness to testify at trial as she
bolstered the credibility of the state’s main witness. (R.589). Also, like TorresGarcia, Peraza relied on the prosecutor’s assertions that he was not going to seek
to introduce the testimony of Dr. Matoon, the alleged victim’s therapist, as an
expert witness. R.201. Even though Peraza was properly notified of the state’s
expert witness pursuant to Rule 26(b), the admission of the state’s expert witness
still constitutes an unanticipated development that defendant did not have
adequate time to prepare for. The trial court did not rule on Peraza’s objection to
Smith serving as an expert until ten calendar days before trial. R.592. Prior to
that hearing Peraza had no reason to suspect that the court would allow Smith to
testify, since the State had not produced anything which could allow the court to
find her testimony was admissible under Rule 702. See expert witness argument
supra. Consequently, the motion to continue was warranted in order to allow
Peraza to re-organize his trial strategy and consult with an expert in light of the
newly introduced evidence.
Additionally, all four discretionary factors weigh in favor of a finding that
the trial court abused its discretion. First, defendant demonstrated sufficient due
diligence as he properly requested several continuances and made timely
objections to the admission of the state’s expert witness. R.201-202, 592.
Defendant even requested an emergency telephone conference the same day the
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court ruled in favor of admitting the state’s expert witness in order to request a
continuance. R.589. Second, if the motion had been granted, defendant would
have been able to consult with or retain an expert witness to confront the Smith’s
testimony regarding the alleged victim’s recantation, and her delayed and partial
disclosure. In the alternative, defendant could have prepared an additional
defense strategy in light of the newly admitted testimony.
As to the third factor, despite the fact that the trial had already been
continued two times, Peraza’s right to a fair trial far outweighed the
administrative inconvenience of granting a continuance, especially in light of the
nature of the charges and minimum mandatory sentence of 25 years in prison.
R.375. The trial court was aware of this; it even suggested that denying the
motion to continue alone could constitute valid grounds for an appeal. The court
stated “I recognize that [denying the motion] is something that could be used
later”. R. 592.
The State, although it made it known it would not be ‘happy’ if a
continuance were granted, did recognize how important the continuance would
be and admitted that it believed defense counsel was doing “his best to deal with
the case.” R.591-92. The State did not object based on a concern about the
availability of the witnesses or the threat of disappearing evidence, or any other
legitimate concern. In reality, the State was not objecting to the motion.
Furthermore, the court did not take into consideration the potential prejudice of
his ruling against the defendant as it is required by this Court’s jurisprudence.
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The court didn’t even consider what would happen if the State were allowed to
produce expert testimony to bolster K.C.’s testimony and the defense could not
present any counter evidence. The trial court based his decision entirely upon the
fact that the trial had already been continued twice. R.592.17 That was not a
sufficient reason to deny a legitimate and timely motion to continue.
Finally, defendant was prejudiced by Chelsea Smith’s testimony as it
bolstered the credibility of the state’s main witness, the alleged victim. During
trial, the alleged victim was confronted with incomplete and inconsistent
statements; however, the state’s expert witness rehabilitated her testimony by
providing scientific explanations relating to K.C.’s inconsistencies. For example,
K.C. was confronted with her inconsistencies between her CJC interview and her
statements to Bourne. R.942-45. K.C. was confronted about her statements to her
mother, Nina, where she admitted to Nina that these things didn’t happen at all.
R.946. K.C. was confronted about the fact that she had had many opportunities to
disclose allegations of vaginal penetration, including over a year of therapy with
Dr. Matoon, but yet only at trial had it been disclosed. R.951-52. K.C. was
confronted about her claims that she had falsely accused Peraza because she had
been told to lie by Satan’s voice in her head. R.943-44. K.C. was confronted about
“Well, I'm not inclined to continue this trial. If it had not been the third time
that we've set this, I have to draw the line somewhere. And I think that this
information could've been determined much, much longer -- much -- I mean, this
is -- can't be something that could come up on the eve of a trial. I just don't see it,
and I'm not going to allow a motion to continue. I'm going to proceed as is.”
R.592.
17
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her conflicting statements about Giovanni, telling Dr. Matoon about sexual abuse
involving his penis and then telling the Califonia CJC it was only kissing. R.955.
At every stage of the case K.C.’s claims have changed, including several
recantations, and defense counsel was able to present these statements to the jury
in an attempt to challenge her credibility. But, because of the court’s denial of
Peraza’s motion to continue, the State’s expert witness rehabilitated K.C.’s
credibility, without challenge, by explaining that often children make partial or
gradual disclosures, make inaccurate disclosures, and even recant, none of which
means the allegations weren’t true.
None of this would have come as a surprise to the trial court, because all of
these issues were raised the first time the State tried to call an expert witness at
an earlier scheduled trial. On November 24, 2014 the court scheduled a trial for
March 17-19, 2015. R.153, 451. On February 18, 2015 (27 days before the
scheduled trial) the State filed notice of expert witness for Dr. Matoon. R.157.
Apparently, the State was in the habit of waiting until the last minute to give
expert notice. On February 27, 2015 the defense filed a motion for a continuance
citing the serious nature of the crimes and possible punishments, the lack of
physical evidence and significance of K.C.’s credibility, the conflict between K.C.’s
subsequent allegations of anal penetration and the Sexual Assault Examination
report, K.C.’s additional allegations against Giovanni and the need for a memory
expert, the need for access to the therapy records, and need to consider
challenging the State’s expert’s qualifications. R.165-66. The court was also
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informed that in deciding the motion to continue the court must consider the
factors found in Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655 (Utah App 1997).
Compare to the factors in Begishe.
In sum, the state’s expert witness was able to rehabilitate the testimony of
the state’s main witness and therefore prejudiced the defendant only because the
court denied the motion to continue. If the court had allowed the defendant time
to procure an expert witness or adequately prepare cross-examination strategy
prior to trial, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Thus,
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to
continue.
Cumulative Error
If the Court is not convinced that either the 702 error or the continuance
error are prejudicial in their own respects, Peraza asserts that the cumulative
prejudice in incorrectly admitting the State’s expert witness evidence and
denying Peraza time to respond to that evidence should qualify. The close
relationship between these two rulings and the effect they had upon the evidence
presented at trial are evident. Peraza asserts that the combination constitutes
prejudice and should satisfy the prejudice requirement.
III. PERAZA WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Peraza asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (IAC) in several ways. First, counsel
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failed to investigate and present expert witness evidence related to the reliability
of K.C.’s multiple and conflicting statements. Second, counsel failed to investigate
and present expert witness evidence related to the medical evidence collected
when K.C. was subject to a physical examination after her disclosure. To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that
trial counsel's “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”
and that the defendant was prejudiced by the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88.
Cases reviewing IAC claims based on failing to investigate and secure expert
testimony have established that questions of deficient performance are reviewed
in light of “prevailing professional norms”, which include “an important duty to
adequately investigate the underlying facts of the case… ‘because investigation
sets the foundation for counsel’s strategic decisions about how to build the best
defense.’” State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, ¶27 (citing State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,
¶96, 152 P.3d 321). Reviewing courts “attempt to ‘eliminate the distorting effects
of hindsight’ by adopting [trial counsel’s] perspective at the time of the decision
to limit their investigation”. Hales, ¶70.
23B and the record in its current state
Because these IAC claims depend heavily upon evidence not currently in the
record, and appellate courts will only consider extra record evidence to determine
the propriety of remanding on 23B (State v. Jaramillo, 2016 UT App 70, ¶27, 327
P.3d 34) Peraza cannot fully brief his IAC claims at this time. However, in order
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to prepare for supplemental briefing that will occur after the 23B remand, and to
give important context to Peraza’s non-IAC claims, Peraza now outlines the IAC
claims he intends to fully brief when additional evidence is added to the record.
A. Trial counsel did not investigate and present expert witness
evidence related to the reliability of K.C.’s interviews and
disclosures
1. Deficient performance
When the record has been supplemented with additional evidence, Peraza
will show that his trial counsel provided IAC because it failed to consult with an
expert in the science of children’s disclosures of sexual abuse and forensic
interview techniques. Peraza will be able to point to evidence that shows trial
counsel did not consult or even contact any expert witnesses in this field (or any
other field) and failed to investigate whether there were scientific reasons to
question the reliability of K.C.’s multiple and contradictory disclosures. When the
record is supplemented, Peraza will also be able to demonstrate that, from the
perspective of trial counsel at the time he was preparing for trial, there was good
reason to do such investigation and consultation, such that professional norms
would have required him to fully investigate the issue before making a strategic
choice about whether or not to present such expert testimony. See Hales, 2007
UT 14, ¶69 (“strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation) (citing Strickland, 46 U.S. at 690-91).

46

2. Prejudice
When the record has been supplemented Peraza will be able to show how
an expert witness’s testimony could have had an impact on how the jury viewed
K.C.’s testimony, how much relevance they would have placed on her prior
inconsistent statements, the weight they would have placed on her recantations,
and her credibility overall. The prejudice analysis for this evidence will depend
heavily upon the specific details of the expert evidence that is added to the
record. However, it is clear that if the supplemental expert evidence is relevant to
K.C.’s credibility (which it will be) then the is a substantial likelihood of a more
favorable outcome.
B. Trial counsel did not investigate and present expert witness
evidence related to available medical evidence
1. Deficient performance
When the record is supplemented, Peraza will show that trial counsel did
not consult with or contact any medical expert with respect to the medical report
written by Katherine Koller and provided in discovery to investigate whether the
medical evidence there was consistent with the allegations, especially the later
allegations, made by K.C. about Peraza’s actions.
The record already contains evidence that shows trial counsel was aware at
the time that the medical records were not consistent with at least some of the
allegations made by K.C. In an earlier filed motion to continue, trial counsel
acknowledged that, based on the new “allegations of anal penetration, and under
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information and belief the physical examination report contradicts such
allegations, this case may become extremely complex because of the necessary
medical expert testimony on both sides of the matter.” R.167. And later, during
argument regarding the State’s request to present expert medical evidence
through Katherine Koller, trial counsel disclosed that it was the defense’s
intention to show that K.C.’s allegations of anal sodomy (and surprise allegation
of vaginal penetration) were “unbelievable” based on the results of the physical
examination report and the finding of evidence of anal or vaginal injury. R.109495. Defense counsel made it known that he “could bring in an expert to rebut” the
proposed expert testimony “that it’s still possible for the anal and vaginal sex to
occur”. R1095. These comments demonstrate both that trial counsel was aware of
the potential for favorable defense evidence from a medical expert, and the need
for the evidence. This awareness, without having actually conducted any
investigation or consultation, cannot meet the standard of what a reasonable
professional would be obliged to do. Adequate representation, under the
circumstances, required trial counsel to consult with a medical expert, to
thoroughly investigate the facts and the evidence, in order to determine what the
best strategy would be when confronted with this medical evidence.
2. Prejudice
When the record is supplemented, Peraza will be able to show that if trial
counsel had consulted with a medical expert about the medical records and been
prepared to call an expert, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
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result. Peraza will be able to point to evidence that demonstrates if an expert
witness had been at trial to testify evidence would have been presented to cast
serious doubt on the possibility that K.C.’s allegations of anal sodomy and vaginal
intercourse could have occurred. Not only would this have directly challenged the
validity of part of the State’s theory of the case, but it would have been a serious
blow to K.C.’s credibility. There should be little doubt that the jury would have
concerns about the truthfulness of a witness who claims certain sexual acts
occurred repeatedly in the face of an impartial medical professional testify that,
given her physical condition, those acts did not occur.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROVIDING THE DVD OF K.C.’s
CJC INTERVIEW TO THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS
Rule 17(l) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as
evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be
in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons
or contraband.

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to prevent the jury from
taking some kinds of exhibits into deliberations. See State v. Carter, 888 P.2d
629, 643 (Utah 1995). This issue recently reviewed by this Court in State v. Cruz,
2016 UT App 234. There this Court recognized that CJC recordings which were
admitted at trial are “testimonial in nature and thus should not be allowed in the
jury room.” Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶37. The CJC interviews are admissible in
the first place because they are considered “recorded testimony” and the
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unfettered jury’s access to it during deliberations poses a “danger of undue
emphasis”. Cruz, ¶¶38-39. If the jury were to replay the video it would be as if the
State were allowed to have K.C. “testify a second time” without affording the
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a second time. Id.
Trial counsel, after losing his motion to exclude the CJC interview
completely, moved to prevent the jury from having access to the video during
deliberations. R.814. The court declined to rule on that question, in front of the
jury, and asked to “defer that issue for a minute.” R.815. The time for that
argument apparently never came and it was not addressed again. Then, prior to
swearing the bailiff and sending the jury to deliberate the court mentioned that it
had “two exhibits for the state, and two exhibits for defense in this case. So, we
have four total.”

18

“They’re all right here. They’ll all go back. As far as the DVD,

would it be alright if Pona sets that up? I think we’ll use the same TV that we have
been using and just put that in there, and they can figure out how to do it after
that.” R.1287.
The record clearly demonstrates that (1) defense counsel objected to having
the CJC DVD provided to the jury during deliberations, (2) the court ruled that all
the exhibits, including the CJC DVD would “go back”, and (3) the judge ordered
the bailiff to provide the jury with the same TV that was used during trial to show
the video.

See State’s Exhibits 1 and 2, Defense Exhibits 1 and 2. The video recording of
the of K.C.’s Provo CJC interview was State’s Exhibit 1.
18
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Ultimately, this Court concluded the error in Cruz was harmless because
the defendant had not contradicted or cross-examined the victim about her
statements, and the defendant was largely spared conviction for the counts
described in the video. Id., ¶¶44-45. Such a result is not likely in this case. K.C.’s
credibility and the accuracy of her statements at the CJC (and other statements)
were the focus of the defense. Peraza was able to demonstrate through crossexamination and other evidence that K.C.’s statements at the CJC were later
added to, changed, recanted, reaffirmed, and changed again, including as late as
trial. Furthermore, although there is a possibility that the jury convicted Peraza
based on K.C.’s later allegations of anal sodomy, as opposed to the oral sodomy
initially disclosed in the CJC video, it is far from clear what facts the jury’s
verdicts were based upon. If, as the Cruz opinion makes clear, the threat is that
the jury will overemphasize the testimonial evidence in the video at the expense
of other contradictory evidence presented, then there is a significant chance that
Peraza’s convictions were based entirely upon the jury’s repeated review of the
statements made at the CJC. This significant threat satisfies the need to show a
“reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.” Cruz, ¶49.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chelsea Smith’s testimony
under Rule 702 without applying adequate gatekeeping analysis. The trial court
then abused its discretion by denying Peraza’s reasonable and necessary motion
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to continue the trial in order to prepare for Smith’s testimony. For these abuses
the Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
properly investigate and produce expert witness evidence. For this the Court
shou;ld reverse and remand.
The trial court erroneously send the CJC DVD into the jury room during
deliberations causing the jury to place undue emphasis on that evidence. For this
the Court should reverse and remand.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of December, 2016.
________________________
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I herby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief
postage prepaid to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division, P.O. Box
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 on this 14th day of December, 2016.
_________________________
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Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for four counts of sodomy on a
child, first-degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
section 78A-4-103(2)(j).

INTRODUCTION
Robert Alonzo Peraza sexually abused his stepdaughter, K.C., over a
period of four years beginning when she was about five. The abuse began
with Peraza making K.C. masturbate him and give him oral sex, but it
progressed to him anally sodomizing her and even vaginally raping her.
K.C. tried disclosing the abuse a couple times but was not taken seriously
until she was nine years old. She detailed the oral sodomy in an interview
with the Children’s Justice Center (CJC). But when she saw the effects of her

disclosure on her family, K.C. recanted, both to her mother and to a private
investigator. After K.C. began living with her biological father in California,
she withdrew her recantation, and in her therapy sessions she began
disclosing more details, including anal sodomy. K.C. detailed this abuse in a
second interview at California’s equivalent to the CJC.
Before trial, the State notified the defense that it may call a rebuttal
witness to discuss reasons a witness may make partial disclosures or even
falsely recant allegations. Peraza objected fifteen days before trial based on
inadequate notice, arguing that he could not tell whether there was a
scientific basis for the expert’s testimony because the State did not provide
sufficient information. The trial court ordered the State to provide more
information and tentatively ruled that the expert could testify, though
Peraza was free to object at trial. The trial court’s tentative ruling prompted
Peraza to reexamine his trial strategy, and he decided to try to call an expert
to explore problems with K.C.’s therapy that could have impacted her
allegations. But when he sought a continuance to do so—his third requested
continuance of the trial date and fifteenth request in the case—the trial court
denied it.
At trial, K.C. reiterated her allegations and for the first time accused
Peraza of vaginally raping her. When the private investigator testified for
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Peraza that it was rare to see recantations in these types of cases, the State
called its rebuttal witness, who agreed that it was rare, stated that a
recantation itself may be true or false, and provided some explanations for
why a child may either truthfully or untruthfully recant.
The jury was allowed to take a DVD of the CJC interview into its
deliberations. It also took a transcript of the California interview—
submitted by Peraza—and a transcript of the private investigator’s
interview where K.C. recanted. The jury convicted Peraza of four counts of
sodomy on a child.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Did the trial court plainly abuse its discretion by admitting expert
testimony under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence?
Standard of Review. Review is for abuse of discretion. Eskelson ex rel.
Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶5, 242 P.3d 762.
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Peraza’s motion
for a continuance made on the eve of trial?
Standard of Review. Review is for abuse of discretion. State v. Taylor,
2005 UT 40, ¶8, 116 P.3d 360.
III. Did the cumulative effect of the trial court’s rulings on Points I &
II prejudice Peraza?
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Standard of Review. None applies.
IV. Did Peraza invite error by approving of the jury taking the
recording of the CJC interview into deliberations? Alternatively, did the
trial court plainly abuse its discretion under rule 17(l), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, when it allowed the jury to take a recording of the CJC
interview into deliberations along with transcripts of two other interviews?
Standard of Review. While interpretation of a rule of procedure is
reviewed for correctness, State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶34, 387 P.3d 618,
appellate courts review the application of that rule deferentially when the
rule explicitly gives the trial court discretion, as rule 17(l) does, see State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.11 (Utah 1993).
V. Absent a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, can Peraza establish his ineffective-assistance claim based on
failure to consult or call expert witnesses?
Standard of Review. None applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rules are dispositive of this appeal:
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(l):
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them
the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the
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opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as
exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are
entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes
with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on
taking and using notes.
Utah Rule of Evidence 702:
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who
is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may
serve as the basis for expert testimony only if there is a
threshold showing that the principles or methods that are
underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is
satisfied if the underlying principles or methods, including
the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their
application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves several challenges to the trial court’s
discretionary rulings leading up to and during Peraza’s jury trial for
sodomy on a child.
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A. Summary of facts.1
1. The abuse.
When K.C. was about five years old, her stepfather, Peraza, came into
her bedroom one night, woke her up, removed his and K.C.’s clothes, and
began showing K.C. his penis and having her touch it. R843, 846; SE1 at
34:00–45.2 Peraza repeated this almost nightly; then one night he started
having K.C. wrap her hand around his penis and move it up and down
until he ejaculated. R846–48; SE1 at 24:24–30. Later, Peraza showed K.C.
pornography on the computer and told her to mimic it. R939; SE1 at 34:00–
45. K.C. protested, but Peraza forced her to perform oral sex on him. SE1 at
24:00–40;
Peraza forced K.C. to masturbate him and perform oral sex several
times a week. R850; SE1 at 46:47–49:05; SE2 at 9. When she said she did not
want to do it, Peraza would say, “I don’t care.” R927–28. Sometimes when
she protested, Peraza would slap her face. R927–28; SE1 at 38:50–39:50. Or
he would grab her hair and force her mouth onto his penis and move her

1

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶3, 299 P.3d
892.
2

In citing to the video of the CJC interview (SE1), the State indicates
how far into the video the reference occurs; the time does not refer to the
video recorder’s digital clock as displayed on the screen.
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head up and down. R850. Once, he grabbed her by the throat, lifted her, and
threw her back. R928; SE1 at 37:20–30; DE1 at 21–22.
Because protesting did not work, sometimes K.C. would try to hurry
through the process to get it over with, but Peraza would make her slow
down, telling her it would take longer if she went fast. SE1 at 38:30–45.
Other times, he would say, “Hurry, hurry, it’s gonna be right there. If [you]
stop, it’s gonna go all the way down and [you] have to start over.” SE1 at
49:05–25. Sometimes Peraza would stop K.C. while she was performing oral
sex, masturbate himself, say, “Do you want some milk?” and then wipe the
semen on K.C.’s face. R850; SE1 at 34:40–50, 49:20–40. Other times he would
ejaculate into her mouth and tell her she had to swallow it; she pretended to
but would then go to the bathroom to spit it out. R850–51; SE1 at 49:40–
50:20.
K.C. was able to explain male anatomy and physiology in detail. She
described Peraza’s penis as starting out soft and getting “really hard,” and
she said she could see veins on his penis when it was erect. SE1 at 36:10–
37:05. K.C. could also describe the color and consistency of semen,
describing it as “mostly whitish” with the look of amoxicillin. SE1 at 34:50–
35:20.
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K.C. was not sure of the timing, but about the time she was seven
years old, the abuse changed: Peraza began anally sodomizing her. R850,
853–54; DE1 at 19. Peraza would force a sock into K.C.’s mouth so others
would not hear her scream. R852, 928–29. If she did say “ow,” he would tell
her to shut up. DE1 at 39. Peraza would put lubricant on himself or K.C.,
and he would cover his penis with what K.C. described as “a bag”; the bag
would be wet when Peraza was done and he would throw it in the garbage.
R852, 929; DE1 at 43. On K.C.’s eighth birthday, Peraza came into her room;
said, “This is a birthday present”; then anally sodomized her. DE1 at 32.
K.C. identified five different locations where Peraza anally sodomized her:
her bedroom, Peraza’s bedroom, the bathroom, the living room, and a hotel.
DE1 at 43–44. He did this about once a week until sometime after K.C.’s
ninth birthday. DE1 at 27.
Several months after K.C.’s ninth birthday, the abuse changed again:
Peraza put his penis in K.C.’s vagina. R854, 933–35. He did this on two or
three occasions. R933–35. The abuse stopped only when K.C.’s family
moved out of their house in June 2013; Peraza moved in with his mother,
and the rest of the family moved in with K.C.’s maternal grandfather. R794–
96, 853, 933–35; DE1 at 27.
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Almost every time Peraza abused K.C., he threatened her not to tell.
R926; SE1 at 40:50–41:15. He threatened to kill K.C. and her mother,
brothers, and grandfather. SE1 at 41:15–42:10; DE1 at 54. Peraza offered to
buy K.C. gifts to convince her to do what he wanted, but she refused them.
SE1 at 35:20–35; DE1 at 24. Although K.C. acknowledged that she could not
stop Peraza, she blamed herself for letting Peraza abuse her. R922. She
repeatedly promised her deceased grandmother that she would not let him
do it anymore, especially on Sundays—but she repeatedly felt like she let
her grandmother down for not stopping Peraza. R922; SE1 at 54:00–56:15.
Peraza was not K.C.’s only abuser. Peraza’s brother, Giovanni, also
abused K.C. every time he stayed overnight—almost on a weekly basis. DE1
at 51. Giovanni would come into her room at night, pull his pants down, lie
down with K.C. on top of him, kiss her in sexualized ways, and rub his
penis on her vagina. R953; DE1 at 49–52. Giovanni stopped abusing K.C.
when he got a girlfriend named Cassie. DE1 at 51. But Cassie did nothing
more to protect K.C.: She once heard K.C. saying “ow” behind a closed door
when Peraza was anally sodomizing K.C., but later Cassie simply said to
K.C. that K.C. “was begging him to do that to [her].” DE1 at 34.
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2. The disclosure process.
K.C. tried to tell her mother, Nina, about the abuse when she was five
and again when she was seven. R855; SE1 at 41:15–42:10; DE1 at 19, 23. K.C.
thought she had been fairly explicit in what she told Nina, but Nina did not
recall ever learning about the abuse until August 2013, when K.C. was nine.
R786, 855. Nina and K.C. were watching a football practice, and Nina
mentioned that she and Peraza were talking about separating. R856, 985.
K.C. said she was glad. R856. After some prodding, K.C. explained that
Peraza made her suck on his penis. R1164.
When they returned home, K.C. uncharacteristically ran into the
house without acknowledging her grandfather, who was outside working
in the yard. R786–87, 856. He could tell that she was emotional and that
something was wrong. R786–87, 790. Although Nina had favored her sons
over K.C., she was distraught at the news and could hardly tell K.C.’s
grandfather what K.C. had said. R787, 805–06, 984, 986. After speaking with
K.C, the grandfather called the police. R791. Nina was not cooperative and
would not answer questions, but she gave a written statement recounting
what K.C. told her. R792, 1051. At some point that day, Nina told K.C., “It’s
gonna get ugly, [K.C.] It’s gonna get really ugly.” SE1 at 40:20–30. But K.C.
was glad that Peraza would be in jail. SE1 at 40:20–50.
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The next day, K.C. was interviewed at the CJC, where she disclosed
the details of Peraza repeatedly forcing her to masturbate him and perform
oral sex. R814; see generally SE1. A medical examination revealed no injuries
to K.C.’s vagina or anus. R1005.
Peraza was arrested after the CJC interview, and an officer
interviewed him after obtaining a Miranda waiver. R1034, 1053. In two
interviews over two days, the officer told Peraza seven or eight times to stop
talking with him and get an attorney “if you didn’t do this at all,” but to
keep talking so they could “get to the bottom of this” if he did do it. R1054,
1060. Peraza kept talking, asking at one point how he could get the charges
reduced. R1054, 1056, 1060.
During the interviews, Peraza first suggested that Nina or the
grandfather were behind the allegations. R1046–47. He then suggested
several ways K.C. could have obtained her sexual knowledge: Peraza
passed out naked on his couch on occasion and K.C. could have seen him;
she could have walked in on him viewing pornography or accessed it
herself; he remembered K.C. walking in on Nina giving him oral sex a
number of times—“in the double digits”; and, “because they never locked
their doors,” K.C. had walked in on Nina and Peraza having sex in the
shower once and in their room a number of times. R1047, 1059.
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Peraza also began the first interview saying that he and K.C. had a
great relationship, but as the interviews progressed and the officer told
Peraza more details about K.C.’s allegations, Peraza gradually changed his
characterization of the relationship until, by the end of the second interview,
he was saying, “I don’t spend much time with her at all.” R1051–52.
Peraza said he would never intentionally do any of the things K.C.
alleged, but he said it “could have” happened when he was drunk. R1065,
1075. He said he remembered passing out on his couch once after drinking,
and when someone who he assumed was Nina came to shake him awake,
he grabbed the person’s head and “guided it” to his penis, letting go only
after the person “finished” performing oral sex on him. R1049–50. He fell
back asleep, but when he thanked Nina the next day, she did not know
what he was talking about. R1050. Peraza said this happened “a few times,”
and he wondered if it “could have” been K.C. or one of his sons. R1050,
1068–69, 1075.
K.C.’s grandfather saw “a noticeable change” in Nina when Peraza
was arrested. R1034. She became “very concerned about the impact of it on
her family, on her becoming a single mother.” R1041. Over the next several
weeks, she began to disbelieve K.C.’s allegations. R987–89. She thought it
“didn’t feel right” that K.C. missed Peraza and even cried “for Daddy.”
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R945, 996–97, 1006–07. Nina also believed K.C. had a “reputation” for
“fabricating charges against someone,” though the only example she gave
was a vague reference to how K.C. would “blame boys for doing things and
then later tell you that they actually didn’t do it.” R1011–13, 1024.
In September 2013, the woman who interviewed K.C. at the CJC
conducted a follow-up interview at K.C.’s school to determine whether
anyone was pressuring K.C. to recant. R833. K.C. said an attorney told her
not to talk about the case with Nina, so she had not done so. R833.
But soon after that, Nina confronted K.C. and asked if the allegations
against Peraza were really true. R1007. In response, K.C. wrote a note saying
that Satan had told her “in a little voice” that K.C. would die if she did not
tell Nina at the football practice. R996–97; DE2. Nina interpreted that as a
recantation, and she told Peraza’s defense counsel. R989–90, 996. Defense
counsel arranged for a private investigator to speak with K.C. in October
2013. R997; SE1. During the interview, K.C. began by reaffirming what she
said in the CJC interview: Peraza “didn’t touch me but he just made me do
it.” SE2 at 6. She then changed her statements and said Peraza did not make
her do anything she did not want to do. SE2 at 6. When asked why she told
the woman in the CJC interview that Peraza had made her do things she did
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not want to do, K.C. said it was because an “evil,” “little voice” in her head,
named Lucifer, told her to say those things. SE2 at 7, 11, 13.
K.C. later explained that she was lying when she recanted. R915, 945.
She lied to the private investigator because she “didn’t want [her] family to
get split up.” R915.
In about May 2014, K.C. moved to California to live with her
biological father. R810, 991–92. She attended therapy there, and as therapy
progressed, additional details about the abuse emerged—specifically, that
Peraza would anally sodomize her, and that Peraza’s brother, Giovanni,
would abuse her as well. R844–45, 971–72. One technique the therapist used
was to have K.C. make effigy dolls of Peraza and Giovanni and have her kill
the dolls by running over them with a (presumably toy) car. R959–60.
Although K.C. was disclosing more details about the abuse to her therapist
and family in California, throughout the time K.C. was living in California
she continued to tell Nina when they spoke over the phone that Peraza did
not abuse her. R952, 970–72, 1014–15.
In February 2015, K.C. was interviewed at California’s equivalent to
the CJC. DE1 at 2. In the California interview, K.C. reaffirmed that Peraza
started abusing her by having her masturbate him and perform oral sex on
him. DE1 at 25–26. She then detailed how Peraza later began to anally
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sodomize her on a weekly basis, and how Giovanni would also abuse her.
DE1 at 27–44. In December 2015, she told her aunt that Peraza had also put
his penis in her vagina. R951–52, 973. She had not disclosed anything about
anal or vaginal penetration earlier because she was afraid. R926, 972–75.
B. Summary of proceedings.
The State charged Peraza with four counts of first-degree-felony
sodomy on a child, and one count of first-degree-felony aggravated sexual
abuse of a child. R1–3; see Utah Code Ann. §76-5-403.1 (West 2015); id. §76-5404.1 (West 2015).
1. Pre-trial Proceedings.
Leading up to the preliminary hearing, defense counsel requested
eleven continuances. R16–19, 23–32, 37–38, 44–47, 76–77, 422, 439–41, 1324–
25. A few resulted from Peraza switching from a public defender to a
private attorney back to a public defender. R20–21, 37–38, 1324–25. After the
case was bound over, defense counsel sought another continuance of a
pretrial conference. R141–42. Trial was then set for March 2015. R152–53,
450–51.
The State filed a notice stating that it intended to call K.C.’s therapist
as an expert witness to testify about “the psychological symptoms,
reactions, and behaviors common in children that report having been
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abused sexually” and whether she observed any symptoms or behavior in
K.C. that were consistent with that. R157. The notice added that the
therapist “may also provide corroborative evidence to rebut any defense
claims of fabrication, coaching, etc.” R157.
Eighteen days before trial, Peraza filed a motion to continue the trial.
R153, 164–68. The motion was based in part on the State’s expert notice.
R165–66. Peraza argued that because the State was going to call the
therapist to testify about “her observations of K.C., her motivations for
recanting, then recanting the recantation, etc.,” he needed access to the
therapist’s records, and he needed time to file objections to the admissibility
of her testimony. R165–66. But the request was also based on the discovery
of new evidence: K.C.’s recent allegations of anal sodomy, and abuse by
Giovanni. R164–66. Defense counsel believed that the allegations of anal
sodomy were inconsistent with the results of K.C.’s medical examination,
which he had not yet received. R165. And he believed that the involvement
of another perpetrator required “the exploration by the defense into a
memory expert.” R166.
The State did not object, and the trial court granted the motion,
though it stated, “This case needs to get moving.” R456, 458. The parties
later agreed to have the trial court review the therapist’s records in camera.
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R478. Peraza filed an objection to having the therapist testify as an expert,
R190–95, but the State withdrew its notice because there was no trial date
set and the court’s in camera review could change whether it intended to call
the

therapist,

R201,

479.

Peraza

waived

any

speedy-trial

claim,

acknowledging that “[t]he delay is ours,” and trial was set for October 2015.
R212–13, 497–98.
Although it took longer than expected to get the therapist’s records,
R494–95, the trial court had them by August 24, 2015, R502. Peraza then
filed a notice asking the court to review the records for all descriptions of
the alleged abuse, any recantations, and any statements bearing on K.C.’s
ability to tell the truth. R217–18. At a status conference held September 28,
2015, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the records and by the
end of the week would present the parties with copies of the records they
could use. R512.
Peraza had the records at the latest by October 19, 2015, when Peraza
moved for a continuance eight days before trial. R213, 1330–32. Defense
counsel explained that he wanted to call the therapist as an impeachment
witness, but she had not been responding to his attempts to contact her.
R1331. Defense counsel also explained that he had just learned about the
recorded interview with the private investigator, which had taken place
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before he was on the case. R1330. That interview was being transcribed so
he could give it to the prosecutor, who was aware that K.C. had allegedly
recanted but was not aware that there was a recording of it. R1330–31. The
State said it was willing to go forward with trial but did not object to a
continuance. R1331–32. It stated, however, that because it had not yet seen
the therapist’s records, it would need Peraza to waive any notice objection
to the State possibly calling the therapist as an expert, which Peraza did.
R1332–33.
The trial court did not want to continue the case because it was two
years old, and the court recognized the dangers inherent in waiting to put
witnesses on in “this type of a case.” R1331. It suggested skepticism that a
recantation justified continuing trial, because it would be better just to get
K.C. on the stand and let Peraza cross-examine her. R1332. But the court felt
it had no choice. R1332. Trial was reset for February 2016. R278.
A month before trial, the State filed a notice stating that it intended to
call a Ms. Smith as an expert witness. R282. The notice stated that Smith
would testify about forensic interviewing methodologies and about the
“science and research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse including
identified factors related [to] delayed, partial and gradual disclosures and
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recantation.” R283. No report was attached. A list of articles Smith would
rely on was attached, though the articles themselves were not. R288–92.
Fifteen days before trial, Peraza certified that he was ready for trial.
R519–20. Peraza and the State had reached a stipulation that neither side
would call the therapist, but her notes could be admitted for impeachment
purposes. R519. Peraza stated that he still had an outstanding objection to
the State’s notice regarding Smith. R520. Although he had not actually filed
an objection, the trial court set a hearing for January 28, 2016, twelve days
before trial, to allow Peraza to argue his objection. R520–21.
At the objection hearing, the State clarified that it would call Smith, if
at all, as a rebuttal witness to respond to evidence about K.C.’s recantation.
R537, 545. Peraza objected that he did not have enough notice of what she
would be testifying about to adequately challenge the scientific basis of her
testimony. R534, 548. He also argued that if Smith was going to testify about
statistics of children recanting, such statistics have been rejected as
unscientific; furthermore, there is no scientific basis for any studies
suggesting why children recant. R534–35.
The trial court agreed that without more information, it could not say
what Smith would testify about or whether her testimony would be helpful
for the jury. R547–48. But it ruled that she was qualified as an expert. R548,
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550. The court stated that “at this point in time,” it was going to let Smith
testify. R550. But it clarified that Peraza could raise future objections to
Smith’s testimony, and “maybe [Smith] doesn’t come in.” R550. At the end
of the objection hearing, Peraza asked if he could get a copy of the studies
Smith would be relying on to effectively prepare his cross-examination.
R570. The court ordered the State to provide the studies, and it reiterated
that if Peraza objected at trial, Smith’s testimony “may not come in.” R572.
The State complied with the court’s order to give copies of relevant studies
to Peraza. R746.
Following the trial court’s tentative ruling that Smith’s testimony
would be admitted, Peraza moved to continue trial. R591. The trial court
held a telephone conference that same day, January 28, 2016. R589. Peraza
stated that after speaking with a mitigation expert on staff at the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association, he decided to get an expert to discuss the
therapist’s practices and how those practices could have influenced K.C. to
falsely withdraw her recantation or to describe the abuse in more violent
terms than were true. R589–90.
The trial court denied the continuance. It pointed out that this was the
third time it had set the case for trial, and the court “had to draw the line
somewhere.” R592. The court explained that issues arising out of
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information in the therapist’s records could have been dealt with much
earlier. R592. The court also noted that it had an obligation to the alleged
victim as well. R592. It was thus “too late in the game” to continue trial.
R592. After the trial court’s ruling, the State offered to stipulate to evidence
that some of the therapist’s techniques could have negatively influenced the
accuracy of K.C.’s allegations, if Peraza was able to “marshal something” to
that effect. R594–95. No such evidence was presented at trial.
2. Trial.
At trial, K.C.—now twelve years old—testified about the abuse. R835.
Her testimony was inconsistent on dates, contradicting her multiple pretrial statements. Compare, e.g., R849–50, with SE1 at 34:00–45, and R852, with
DE1 at 31. She also added several details in describing the abuse, such as
Peraza’s use of a sock to muffle her screams during the abuse and Peraza’s
use of lubricant. R968–69. Other details contradicted her earlier denials,
such as her earlier statements that the abuse was limited to masturbation,
oral sex, and anal sodomy, or that no one other than Peraza abused her. SE1
at 35:55–36:05, 55:50–55; DE1 at 44. And although K.C. had told her aunt
that Peraza had put his penis in her vagina, neither the prosecutor nor
defense counsel was aware of that allegation until K.C. testified about it at
trial. R854, 951–52, 973.
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However, K.C. was consistent in describing a progression of abuse.
R846–47, 849–50, 852–54. And she explained why she had not told others all
the details of the abuse earlier. R926. She also explained her recantation,
which she said was false. R915.
Nina testified for the State. On cross-examination, defense counsel
used Nina to adduce evidence about the results of K.C.’s medical
examination. R1005. Nina also stated that she was confused by K.C.’s later
allegations of anal and vaginal penetration because of the lack of injuries.
R1013–14.
Peraza had the private investigator testify. In addition to discussing
K.C.’s recantation, the investigator stated that he “[n]ot very frequently”
comes across cases where the alleged victim recants. R1130.
The State called Smith as a rebuttal expert. Smith first testified about
interview techniques and potential flaws in the recantation interview,
though she conceded that she had not reviewed a transcript of the
recantation interview. R1134–38. The State also used Smith to respond to the
investigator’s testimony about recantation. Smith testified that recantations
were “not something that’s typical,” though it was “not unheard of.”
R1141–42. She testified that between 4–20% of cases of child abuse involve
recantations. R1141. Smith stated that recantation does not necessarily mean
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the initial accusation was false. R1142. She identified two reasons a child
might falsely recant: pressure from family members; and seeing negative
results from disclosing the abuse, such as incarceration of someone they still
love and the financial stress that often accompanies that. R1142.
Peraza did not object to Smith’s testimony at trial under rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence. But on cross-examination, he got Smith to
acknowledge that the figure she presented of the frequency of recantations
included both sexual as well as physical abuse. R1147. Peraza also got Smith
to concede that a child may honestly recant, and that an allegation is not
true just by virtue of its having been made. R1147–48. Smith identified one
reason a child might truthfully recant: she feels guilty for lying about the
allegations in the first place. R1148.
Earlier in the trial, the State had offered a DVD of the first CJC
interview as evidence and played it for the jury. R815, 861. The State also
offered a transcript of the recantation interview with the private
investigator. R920. Peraza offered a transcript of the California interview,
along with the note K.C. wrote to her mother saying Satan told her to make
the allegations at the football practice. R969, 1105. All four exhibits were
admitted into evidence and sent with the jury into deliberations. R1287. The
trial court also said the bailiff would provide a TV for the jury to watch the
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CJC interview. R1287. Peraza had objected earlier in the trial to sending the
CJC recording in with the jury. R814–15. The trial court deferred ruling on
the issue, telling Peraza he could argue it later outside the presence of the
jury “since we’re not going to be sending it back . . . right now.” R815.
Peraza did not renew his objection when the trial court made arrangements
to send the DVD in with the jury along with the other transcripts. R1287–88.
The State moved to dismiss the aggravated sexual abuse charge. R363,
1199–1200. The jury then found Peraza guilty of all four counts of sodomy
on a child. R367–68. The court later sentenced Peraza to four concurrent
terms of twenty-five years to life. R380–81.
Peraza timely appealed, filing a simultaneous motion for remand
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R392.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Peraza contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting Smith’s expert testimony. He argues that no foundation was
provided to establish the reliability of the principles and methods on which
Smith relied.
Peraza never objected based on rule 702. Rather, he objected only
based on inadequate notice. Or at most, he abandoned his objection. Peraza
focuses on the trial court’s tentative denial of his pre-trial notice objection,

-24-

but he ignores what happened at trial. The prosecutor gave Peraza the
studies on which Smith’s testimony would be based, and Peraza never
raised a rule 702 objection at trial.
Peraza cannot show plain error because Smith testified that she based
her opinion on several studies that were generally accepted in her field.
That established the minimal threshold showing the State was required to
make. In any event, admission of Smith’s testimony was harmless because
Peraza was able to effectively undermine it through cross-examination.
II. Peraza contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for a continuance twelve days before trial. Peraza argues
that a continuance was required because he had diligently prepared for trial
but could not have foreseen the trial court’s denial of his objection to
Smith’s testimony.
In reality, Peraza had requested fifteen continuances in this case, three
of which involved continuing trial after it had already been scheduled.
Although Peraza casts his continuance argument in terms of responding to
Smith’s testimony, the continuance was really about getting an expert to
testify about K.C.’s therapist’s techniques. The trial court rejected the
request because that issue could have been raised earlier. Peraza does not
address that fact on appeal. Peraza had access to the therapist’s records
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three months before he moved for a continuance. The trial court also
correctly considered the fact that continuing trial would be detrimental to
the State’s ability to put on evidence given that this case deals with a child–
victim who would already be testifying about abuse that occurred between
three to seven years in the past. Furthermore, Peraza was not prejudiced by
the ruling because he was able to effectively cross-examine Smith.
III. Peraza contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s
admission of Smith’s testimony and denial of a continuance rendered the
two errors prejudicial. In support, he relies on the intertwined nature of the
two rulings.
In fact, the two rulings were not as intertwined as Peraza suggests.
Although the denial of his objection prompted him to recalibrate his
strategy and ultimately ask for a continuance, Peraza sought the
continuance to get an expert to talk about K.C.’s therapy, not to challenge
Smith. Peraza thus has not shown how the two harmless errors work
together to create prejudicial error.
IV. Peraza next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the
jury to take the CJC recording into deliberations. He claims that the error
prejudiced him because it overemphasized K.C.’s allegations.
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Peraza invited any error because he affirmatively stated that he had
no issues to raise before the jury was sworn in, even though the trial court
explicitly stated that the CJC recording would be going back with the jury.
Alternatively, the claim is unpreserved because Peraza abandoned his
earlier objection. Peraza raised the issue with the trial court in the midst of
trial, but the court told Peraza to wait to argue it outside the presence of the
jury. The record does not indicate that Peraza ever did so, even when the
trial court stated at the close of the case that it would be sending the CJC
recording back with the jury. Peraza thus obtained no ruling on the record
for this Court to review.
This Court should not review for Peraza’s claim for plain error
because Peraza invited any error, or because Peraza’s objection is
unpreserved and he did not brief plain error on appeal. But Peraza could
not establish plain error in any event. At the time of trial, no controlling
precedent required the trial court to exclude the CJC recording from jury
deliberations. Furthermore, the trial court was not required to intervene
because strategic considerations supported Peraza’s decision not to object:
The CJC recording was sent to the jury along with transcripts of the
recantation interview and the California interview—neither of which Peraza
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challenges on appeal. Together, those three exhibits supported Peraza’s
theory that K.C.’s various allegations were inconsistent and thus incredible.
In any event, any error was harmless because the CJC recording was
not overemphasized. Because the jury had all three interviews in
deliberations, it could compare the three accounts, along with their memory
of K.C.’s more damning trial testimony, to determine what they believed.
Allowing the jury to have the CJC recording thus furthered Peraza’s
strategy of focusing on the inconsistencies across her various statements.
V. Peraza argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and call expert witnesses. But he concedes that he cannot
establish his ineffective-assistance claim relying solely on evidence in the
record. This Court therefore should deny his ineffective-assistance claim
absent a 23B remand.

ARGUMENT
I.
Peraza did not preserve his rule 702 objection and
does not argue plain error. In any event, the trial
court did not plainly abuse its discretion in allowing
the expert to testify.
Peraza contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Smith’s testimony. He argues that the trial court “did not apply the correct
test” under rule 702 because it “completely failed to examine” the threshold
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issue of reliability. Aplt.Br.30–32. But even if the court had addressed it, he
argues, the State presented no basis for a finding of reliability. Aplt.Br.28–
30. Lastly, Peraza argues that admitting Smith’s testimony prejudiced him
because “this case depended entirely upon K.C.’s credibility,” and Smith
bolstered K.C.’s problematic testimony. Aplt.Br.32–35. 3
Peraza never made a rule 702 objection. Rather, he objected pre-trial
on the basis of inadequate notice: He argued that he did not have enough
information to assess whether Smith’s testimony met rule 702’s reliability
threshold. But once he got the necessary information, he never raised a rule
702 objection. Instead, he cross-examined Smith on the limits of her
conclusions. And even if Peraza’s objection could be construed as a rule 702
objection, he abandoned that objection when he chose not to reassert it after
the State provided Peraza with the information necessary to assess the basis
for Smith’s testimony.
Furthermore, Peraza has not shown that the supporting evidence—
which the trial court was not privy to—was so plainly unreliable that the

3

Although Peraza emphasizes the prosecutor’s allegedly inadequate
notice in his argument, he disclaims any formal notice challenge. See
Aplt.Br.40 (“Peraza was properly notified of the state’s expert
witness . . . .”). Furthermore, he does not analyze or discuss any rule
delineating the notice requirements. Rather, his notice argument is
presented only as support for his rule 702 challenge.
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trial court should have excluded Smith’s testimony on its own initiative.
Finally, Peraza has not shown prejudice—trial counsel effectively
highlighted the limits of the testimony and elicited favorable testimony
from the expert.
A. Peraza raised only a notice challenge below, not a
rule 702 challenge; alternatively, Peraza abandoned
his challenge when the evidentiary picture changed
at trial.
Peraza’s rule 702 objection is unpreserved. “A claim is preserved
before the district court when it has been presented to the district court in
such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].” State v. Prater,
2017 UT 13, ¶27 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When Peraza objected to Smith’s testimony before trial, he did so on the
basis of inadequate notice. R534, 536, 548. He argued, “I don’t know exactly
what studies she’s drawing on, and what she’d be actually testifying to.”
R534. Peraza speculated about what her testimony might be, but he added
that “without having the report, I don’t know what her basis is.” R540.
Peraza presented several arguments about how Smith’s testimony might
lack “a scientific basis” and not meet the threshold. R535, 540–42. But by his
own admission, those arguments were all based on speculation as to what
Smith’s testimony would be. And the trial court essentially agreed and
stated that all it could do “at this point” is to decide whether Smith was
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qualified. R547–47, 550. The court directed the State to provide Peraza the
necessary information so that Peraza could object at trial if necessary. R572.
The State did. R746. But Peraza never objected at trial. Peraza thus never
gave the trial court an opportunity to rule on whether Smith’s testimony
met the reliability requirements of rule 702.
But even if Peraza’s pre-trial objection could be construed as a rule
702 objection, he abandoned that objection when the evidentiary picture
changed at trial. “A claim is not preserved for appeal if a party initially
objects but later, while ‘the wheel’s still in spin,’ abandons the objection and
stipulates to the court’s intended action.” In re Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT
App 179, ¶9, 381 P.3d 1179 (quoting Bob Dylan, The Times They Are A–
Changin’ (Columbia Records, 1964) (additional internal quotation marks
omitted)). Although the rules of evidence generally do not require a party to
renew an objection to preserve it, that rule applies only when “the court
rules definitively” on the issue. Utah R. Evid. 103(b). Furthermore, a party is
required to renew an objection even after a definitive pre-trial ruling when
the evidentiary picture changes. State v. Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, ¶28, 347
P.3d 433 (“[P]retrial rulings are subject to revision at trial as the evidentiary
picture unfolds, but a party must request such a reconsideration when
circumstances change.”). “Thus, ‘subsequent developments’ at trial can
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‘affect the continuing wisdom’ of an in limine order to the extent that a
defendant is ‘required to renew his request.’” Id. (quoting State v. Marks,
2011 UT App 262, ¶¶73–74, 262 P.3d 13).
In arguing that the State never presented a basis for the trial court to
determine the reliability of Smith’s testimony and that the court never ruled
on the issue, Peraza ignores what happened at trial, instead focusing
exclusively on his pre-trial objection. See Aplt.Br.28–32. But the trial court’s
pre-trial ruling that Smith could testify was expressly a tentative ruling—
not a definitive one. R550. And the court repeatedly said it may well
exclude Smith if an objection was raised at trial based on what she testified
to. R550, 572. Peraza did not take the court up on its suggestion. Thus, he
abandoned his objection by failing to raise it based on Smith’s testimony at
trial. See Utah R. Ediv. 103(b); Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, ¶28.
But even if the trial court’s ruling were treated as a definitive rejection
of Peraza’s objection, Peraza still needed to reassert his rule 702 objection at
trial because the evidentiary picture changed. Again, Peraza based his pretrial objection on the fact that he did not know what Smith would testify
about and thus could not challenge the reliability of her testimony. R534,
536, 540, 548–49, 570. But by the time Smith testified, Peraza had the studies.
R746. Peraza was apparently satisfied with the threshold reliability of
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Smith’s testimony based on those studies because he did not reassert his
objection at trial. R1140–46. Furthermore, Smith testified without objection
that the studies on which she relied were “generally accepted” within her
field “as being sources that were reliable.” R1140. And there is nothing in
the record to contradict that assertion.
Having received copies of those studies, it was incumbent upon
Peraza to alert the trial court if he thought they were insufficient to establish
rule 702’s threshold reliability requirements. Because he did not do so, his
rule 702 claim is unpreserved. See Matter of Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT App
179, ¶9; Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, ¶28. And because he has not argued any
exception to the preservation rule, this Court should not address the claim
further. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶45, 114 P.3d 551; Lintzen, 2015 UT
App 68, ¶29.
B. Because the expert testified without objection that
the studies on which she relied were generally
accepted in her field, the trial did not plainly abuse
its discretion in allowing her to testify.
Under the doctrine of plain error, an appellant must prove that the
trial court committed obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208–09 (Utah 1993). Peraza cannot do that here. Peraza has not
argued that the foundation for Smith’s testimony was so unreliable that it
plainly did not meet rule 702’s threshold reliability requirements. He
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therefore has not shown that the trial court should have excluded the
testimony under rule 702 even without a contemporaneous rule 702
reliability objection from him.
And Peraza could not meet that burden on this record because the
unchallenged testimony clearly met rule 702’s threshold. Expert testimony
must meet three threshold showings to be admissible: (1) the witness must
be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education”; (2) the testimony must “help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue”; and (3) the principles and methods
underlying the testimony must meet a “threshold showing” that they are
“reliable,” “based upon sufficient facts or data,” and “have been reliably
applied to the facts.” Utah R. Evid. 702. Peraza challenges only the third
requirement.4

4

Peraza expressly concedes that Smith was qualified to testify under
rule 702. Aplt.Br.27 n.12. He purports to raise a challenge based on whether
Smith’s testimony would help the jury, but he devotes to the issue only oneand-a-half sentences in two separate footnotes. Aplt.Br.27 n.12; 31 n.15.
Peraza has not even begun to carry his burden on appeal as to this issue,
and this Court should decline to address it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9);
State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶64, 366 P.3d 884. Furthermore, as with
Peraza’s reliability argument, this argument is also unpreserved. Because
Peraza does not analyze the issue under an exception to the preservation
doctrine, this Court should not address Peraza’s cursory challenge. See
Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶45; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶11, 10 P.3d 346.
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The threshold showing “will vary depending on the complexity of the
particular case.” Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT
59, ¶15, 242 P.3d 762. It can be satisfied “if the underlying principles or
methods . . . are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.”
Utah R. Evid. 702(c). Here, the evidence established reliability under that
standard.
As noted, Smith testified that the studies on which she relied were
“generally accepted” within her field “as being sources that were reliable.”
R1140. That testimony went unchallenged at trial. Smith also testified that
the studies were published in peer-reviewed publications, and she
explained that that meant other researchers had reviewed it “to make sure
that it’s accurate” and that “it represents the field.” R1140–41. On crossexamination, Smith clarified that the peer-review process does not require
other researchers to agree with the articles and it often leads to debate
within intellectual community. R1146. But Peraza never elicited any
testimony suggesting the articles—to which he had access—were
inaccurate. R1146. And he has not acknowledged that evidence on appeal.
Nor has he attempted to explain how the trial court, which did not have
access to the studies Peraza had access to, could have recognized that
Smith’s testimony was obviously insufficient under rule 702.

-35-

Smith’s uncontroverted testimony that the articles on which she relied
were generally accepted in the field is enough to satisfy the threshold
showing under rule 702. See State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶26, 345 P.3d 1195
(describing threshold showing as a “minimal” showing). Any further
assessment of the reliability of Smith’s testimony belonged to the jury. See
id. (stating that “‘the line between assessing reliability and weighing
evidence can be elusive,’” and “‘the factfinder bears the ultimate
responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability, and weight of the
testimony’” (quoting Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. Los Angeles Dep’t of
Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶47, 269 P.3d 980)); Majors v. Owens, 2015
UT App 306, ¶¶21–22, 24, 365 P.3d 165 (stating that proponents are
“required to make only a threshold showing,” and issues going to weight
are irrelevant to that showing because opponents “have the opportunity to
expose and probe such weaknesses once the opinions are admitted at trial”),
cert. granted, 384 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2016).
C. Any error in admitting the expert’s testimony was
harmless.
Peraza argues that admitting Smith’s testimony prejudiced him
because it bolstered K.C.’s testimony. Aplt.Br.32–35. He focuses his
prejudice analysis on two elements of Smith’s testimony: her discussion of
recantation and her discussion of delayed and partial disclosure. Aplt.Br.34–
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35. He argues that because the case “depended entirely on K.C.’s
credibility,” there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had
Smith’s testimony not been admitted. Aplt.Br.35.
Smith’s testimony did not bolster K.C.’s credibility. Unlike the cases
Peraza relies on to argue prejudice, Smith did not ever testify that K.C. was
telling the truth or otherwise presented as candid when she alleged that
Peraza abused her. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407–08 (Utah 1989),
superseded by Utah R. Evid. 702; State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 940–41 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).5 In
fact, Smith acknowledged that she never reviewed the specifics of this case,
and thus she offered no opinion as to K.C. R1148. And she offered no
“seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion” about whether someone who
recants was truthful when first she made the allegations. See State v. Rammel,
721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) (concluding that evidence about the statistical
probability of truthfulness is inadmissible).
Peraza’s

argument

takes

into

account

only

Smith’s

direct

examination. But Peraza ignores the inroads the defense made during cross5

In State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the
inadmissible and harmful testimony was not about a witness’s truthfulness,
but, like credibility, it was about the ultimate issue in that case—whether
the defendant forged certain documents. Id. at 900, 902–03 & n.4. Smith
presented no testimony as to the ultimate issue here.
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examination. Peraza also undermined the specific percentage Smith gave by
drawing out the concession that the study referred to both sexual and
physical abuse. R1147. Furthermore, Peraza’s own witness—the private
investigator—provided essentially the same testimony as Smith that
recantation is fairly uncommon. R1130.
After direct and cross-examination, the take-away from Smith’s
testimony was this: (1) recantations are uncommon, but they do happen,
R1141–42; (2) a child’s recantation may or may not be true, R1142, 1147–48;
(3) reasons a child may falsely recant include pressure from family members
and seeing negative results from disclosing the abuse, R1142; and (4)
reasons a child may truthfully recant include a feeling of guilt for lying
about the initial allegation, R1148. Again, Smith never offered any opinion
about whether K.C. was telling the truth when she accused Peraza of
sexually abusing her. Given the concessions Smith made, her testimony did
little, if anything, to bolster K.C.’s credibility.
Peraza’s prejudice argument also fails to take into account the total
evidentiary picture, including the circumstantial corroboration of K.C.’s
allegations. Although K.C. was inconsistent about the ages at which various
forms of abuse occurred, she fairly consistently described the locations
where the abuse occurred. R837, 843–44, 851, 853–54, 909–10, 935–36; DE1 at
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28–29, 43–44. Her grandfather and Nina corroborated her account not only
of where she lived at various ages, but also the fact that Peraza stayed at a
hotel for a short period—one of the places K.C. claimed the abuse had
occurred. R796–801, 998.
And K.C. had an uncharacteristically detailed knowledge of sexuality,
sexual processes, and male anatomy for a child five to nine years old. K.C.
acknowledged that she had seen her parents have sex once, when she was
sleeping in their room and woke up during the night. R929–30, 962. But that
single incident could not have accounted for the breadth and detail of her
knowledge. And Peraza’s and Nina’s testimony was too conflicting to
establish that K.C. had seen more than she testified to. Nina claimed that
K.C. had only walked in on them “a couple times,” and that she walked in
when Nina was performing oral sex on Peraza “maybe like once.” R1015–
16. Peraza on the other hand claimed that the number of times K.C. had
walked in on Nina giving him oral sex was “in the double digits,” and that
K.C. had walked in on them having sex “a number of times, and once in the
shower.” R1047. Nina acknowledged that K.C. could have accessed
pornography on their electronic devices, but she implied that the likelihood
was not great. R999–1000, 1017. Furthermore, she testified that K.C. never
asked her about pornography she had seen, but K.C. was “inquisitive”
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enough to ask Nina questions about when she saw Nina and Peraza having
sex. R1016–17.
Finally, Peraza did not completely deny that he and K.C. had any
sexual contact. Rather, he owned that it was possible, blaming drunken
stupor as the reason for the contact. Peraza admitted that he “could have”
forced K.C. to perform oral sex on him, allegedly not knowing it was her,
and that after realizing his mistake, he “could have” done it again “a few
times” after that. R1049–50, 1068–69, 1075. While K.C.’s various allegations
were not perfectly consistent, she was consistent in describing a progression
of abuse. R846–47, 849–50, 852–54. Thus, even if Smith’s testimony had been
as effective as Peraza argues it was, admitting the testimony was harmless
when viewed in the context of the evidence at trial.
II.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion not to
delay the trial further when, a year-and-a-half after
Peraza was bound over, Peraza requested his third
continuance to address a matter he had known about
for three months.
A trial court’s decision to deny a continuance will not be reversed
“[a]bsent a clear abuse” of discretion. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222
(Utah 1985). No definitive list of factors binds that discretion. Compare State
v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), with State v. Wallace, 2002
UT App 295, ¶37, 55 P.3d 1147. But relevant considerations include such
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things as “(1) the extent of appellant’s diligence in his efforts to ready his
defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a
continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted; (3)
the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced
the court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant
might have suffered harm as a result of the court’s denial.” Begishe, 937 P.2d
at 530.
Peraza argues that the trial court abused its discretion because each
factor cuts in favor of granting a continuance. But Peraza is mistaken.
First, Peraza argues that defense counsel diligently prepared for trial,
requesting several continuances, making timely objections to the State’s
proposed experts, and requesting an emergency hearing to request a
continuance the evening that the court denied his objection to Smith.
Aplt.Br.40. But Peraza had requested fifteen continuances throughout the
life of this case, three of which were requested after trial dates had already
been set. R16–19, 23–32, 37–38, 44–47, 76–77, 153, 164–68, 213, 422, 439–41,
591, 1324–25, 1330–32. The trial court was rightfully concerned about the
age of the case and the effect that would have on the evidence. R592, 458,
1331–32. By this point, the case was two-and-a-half years old and Peraza
had been bound over just shy of a year and a half earlier. R1–4, 80–81. While
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each prior continuance request may have been individually justified, the
combined effect of so many requests supports the trial court’s decision to
deny the final one. Cf. Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (indicating that prior continuance requests weigh against
granting a later continuance to find new counsel); Fishbaugh v. Utah Power &
Light, 969 P.2d 403, 408–09 (Utah 1998) (upholding denial of motion to
amend complaint where motion was filed following two different
continuances of trial date, and only forty-four days before third scheduled
trial date).
Furthermore, Peraza had the information necessary to obtain an
expert at least three months before he moved for a continuance. Peraza
sought a continuance not to get an expert to respond to Smith, but to get an
expert to address issues that arose in the therapist’s notes. R590. He wanted
an expert to testify that making effigy dolls during therapy sessions and
killing them could have influenced K.C. to falsely withdraw her recantation
or to exaggerate the violence of Peraza’s abuse. R590. But Peraza had those
therapy notes by October 19, 2015, at the latest. R1330–31. Thus, Peraza was
not “unprepared due to unanticipated evidentiary rulings” that came three
months later. Aplt.Br.39. The trial court recognized as much, stating that the
information Peraza sought was available much earlier. R592. Peraza does
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not address this basis for the trial court’s ruling. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT
5, ¶34, 20 P.3d 271 (holding appellant’s contention on appeal “irrelevant”
where “argument does not address the basis stated by the trial court for its
decision”).
Furthermore, even if Peraza had sought the continuance to respond to
Smith—which he did not—Peraza could have reasonably anticipated that
his “objection” to Smith would be denied. For one thing, he never actually
filed an objection. R520–21, 532–33. Rather, after receiving notice of the
state’s proposed expert a month before trial, he orally moved to exclude her
testimony fifteen days before trial. R520–21. This is not a case where a “last
minute development” was sprung upon defense counsel in the midst of
trial. See Begishe, 937 P.2d at 529, 531 (concluding that defense counsel count
not have reasonably anticipated prosecutor presenting new test results and
expert witness on afternoon of first day of trial). This factor thus weighs
strongly against a continuance.
Second, Peraza argues that a continuance would have given him time
to consult an expert to assist him in confronting Smith, or at least develop a
new trial strategy in response to the court’s ruling. Aplt.Br.41. But again, he
never asked the court for more time to respond to Smith’s testimony. R590.
And he has made not any argument as to how this factor weighs in his favor
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when applied to the reason for which he did seek a continuance: to find an
expert to address the therapist’s techniques.
But even if this Court ignored the reason for which Peraza sought a
continuance, this factor does not so favor granting a continuance that denial
was an abuse of discretion. Even without a continuance, Peraza may well
have been able to refine his trial strategy or find an expert—either to rebut
Smith or to address K.C.’s therapy. Peraza had twelve days between the
trial court’s ruling and the start of trial. He had already explored the
possibility of “the need for a memory expert.” Aplt.Br.43 (citing R165–66).
And even if finding an expert who was available to testify would have been
difficult, the State offered to stipulate to evidence about the possible effects
of the therapist’s techniques. R594–95. Peraza never took the State up on
that offer. Furthermore, he effectively cross-examined Smith and has not
shown that a continuance would have allowed him to adduce any more
evidence than what he was able to get Smith to concede. This factor thus
weighs against a continuance.
Third, Peraza argues that a continuance was warranted because the
State did not object, it recognized “how important the continuance would
be,” and Peraza’s rights are more important than “administrative
inconvenience” to the court. Aplt.Br.41. Peraza’s characterization of the
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State’s position is not fully accurate. The State said it was “unhappy with”
with prospect of another continuance, though it acknowledged that it could
“understand the basis” of Peraza’s request. R592. The State and the trial
court faced administrative inconveniences in continuing trial yet again. Cf.
R1331 (indicating at October hearing on Peraza’s earlier motion to continue
trial that State had already bought airline ticket for victim to attend trial); see
also United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 491 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[O]ther
considerations in any particular case, such as the interest in orderly
procedures or the interest in avoiding manipulation or subversion of the
process, may countervail a showing of prejudice and thereby justify the
denial of a request for continuance.”).
And further prolonging the trial posed more risk than a mere
administrative convenience. The State had a significant interest in moving
forward with trial to avoid the problem of witnesses’ memories fading as
time went on. That concern was particularly compelling here, where the
case was already two-and-a-half years old, and a child–victim would be
testifying as a twelve-year-old about abuse that started when she was five.
R592 (trial court identifying obligation to alleged victim as one reason for
denying continuance); cf. State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993)
(approving of consideration that elusive witnesses may not be available for
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trial if continuance was granted). Again, Peraza does not address this basis
of the trial court’s decision. This factor thus weighs strongly against a
continuance.
Fourth, Peraza argues that he was prejudiced because Smith
“rehabilitated K.C.’s credibility, without challenge.” Aplt.Br.43. Again, this
argument is irrelevant to whether the trial court abused its discretion
because Peraza never asked the court for a continuance to find an expert to
counter Smith. But even if it were relevant, it is simply not true that Smith
rehabilitated K.C.’s credibility without challenge. As explained in Point I.C.
above, Smith’s testimony did not go unchallenged, and the result was that
Smith did not appreciably bolster or rehabilitate K.C.’s credibility. And even
if Smith influenced the jury’s willingness to believe K.C., that is not enough
to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Peraza’s
continuance.
In theory, any denial of a continuance harms a defendant in the sense
that the defendant may have received some marginal boon from the delay
and the ability to put on more evidence. But in reviewing the trial court’s
discretionary decision to deny a continuance, the question is whether “the
result of the court’s refusal to grant a continuance was to deprive the
accused of the only testimony potentially effective to his defense.” United
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States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1361, amended, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis

added)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).6

Here,

the

continuance did not do that because Smith’s concessions were effective for
the defense. And he has not shown that an unidentified expert could have
given him more. This is not a case where the defendant was “not allowed to
put forward the only defense he had,” nor is it a case where denial of the
continuance prevented him from putting on “the only testimony potentially
effective to his defense.” Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1362. Rather, he was able to call
K.C.’s credibility into question by highlighting the inconsistencies in her
disclosures, including her recantation then withdrawal of the recantation.
While there were any number of ways he could have pursued that strategy,
Peraza was not precluded from putting on this defense.
In sum, each factor weighs against granting a continuance. And even
if this Court would weigh the factors differently, it cannot say that the trial
court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.

6

This Court relied on United States v. Flynt when it identified several
factors relevant to determining whether a continuance should have been
granted. See Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530.
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III.
Peraza has not shown cumulative error because he
did not request a continuance to respond to the
expert testimony he challenges on appeal.
Peraza argues that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the
trial court’s rulings admitting Smith’s testimony and denying the
continuance. Aplt.Br.44. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229 (“Under the cumulative
error doctrine, we will reverse only if ‘the cumulative effect of the several
errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.’”).
Peraza suggests two reasons these ruling worked together to
prejudice him: the “close relationship between the two rulings,” and “the
effect they had upon the evidence presented at trial.” Aplt.Br.44. Each
reason fails to establish cumulative error.
First, the two rulings were not as closely related as Peraza suggests.
Although the trial court’s preliminary denial of Peraza’s motion to exclude
Smith’s testimony prompted Peraza to speak with a mitigation expert, the
result of that conversation was a decision to call an expert to address the
therapist’s practices—not to challenge Smith’s testimony directly. R589–90,
593–94. Thus, there is no “close relationship between the two rulings” that
compounds the effect of each.
Second, while the trial court’s rulings obviously affected “the
evidence presented at trial,” Peraza does not discuss the aggregate of that
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effect. He points to nothing to explain how two alleged errors, each
harmless on their own, combined to affect the evidence produced at trial in
a way that prejudiced him. Peraza was able to present evidence of the
therapist’s practices and argue that they undermined the truthfulness of
K.C.’s allegations. R959–60, 780. Peraza does not address how excluding
expert testimony to bolster that argument combined with the inclusion of
Smith’s equivocal testimony on recantations to produce prejudicial error.
Thus, Peraza’s terse reference to the evidentiary effect of the trial court’s
two rulings fails to demonstrate that “the cumulative effect” of the alleged
errors undermines confidence in the verdict. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229
(internal quotation marks omitted).
IV.
Peraza invited any error, or at least he abandoned his
challenge to allowing the jury to take the recording of
the CJC interview into deliberations; in any event,
Peraza has not shown obvious, prejudicial error.
Peraza contends that the trial court erroneously sent the recording of
the CJC interview in with the jury. Aplt.Br.50. He argues that the error was
prejudicial because “K.C.’s credibility and the accuracy of her statements . . .
were the focus of the defense”; K.C.’s initial allegations were “added to,
changed, recanted, reaffirmed, and changed again”; and there was no way
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to tell whether the jury based its verdict on the allegations in the CJC
interview or at trial. Aplt.Br.51.
Peraza invited any error, or at least did not preserve his objection. But
even if this Court reviews for plain error, there was no obvious error here
because at the time of trial the law suggested the trial court had discretion
to decide whether the send the CJC recording with the jury. Furthermore,
any error here was harmless because the jury took not only the CJC
recording into deliberations, it also took a transcript of the recantation
interview and a transcript of the California interview. The jury thus had
several of K.C.’s accounts—some favoring the State’s theory and some
favoring Peraza’s. And the combination of all three inconsistent accounts
favored Peraza’s theory that K.C. was incredible. There was thus no risk
that the CJC recording would be overemphasized at Peraza’s expense.
A. Peraza invited any error when he agreed to sending
the CJC recording in with the jury; alternatively, he
abandoned his earlier, premature objection by not
reasserting it when the issue was ripe.
Peraza invited any error when he said he had no issues to raise before
the jury was sworn. Alternatively, he abandoned his earlier objection to
allowing the CJC recording into the jury room when he did not renew his
objection or at least demand a ruling on the record.
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A party invites error if it “led the trial court into committing the
error.” Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. Invited error requires some affirmative act or
statement, and not “mere silence.” State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ¶¶18–19, 21 &
n.2, 365 P.3d 699.
At the close of trial, the trial court identified the exhibits, which
included the DVD of the CJC interview, the transcript of the recantation
interview, and the transcript of the California interview. R1287. The trial
court then said, “They’ll go back. As far as the DVD, would it be all right if
[the bailiff] sets that up? I think we’ll use the same TV that we have been
using and just put that in there, and they can figure out how to do it after
that.” R1287. Peraza said nothing. While Peraza’s silence would not be
enough to invite error, the critical point came next: The bailiff was sworn in,
but before the jury was sworn, the trial court asked, “Counsel, anything
before we go ahead and allow the jury to take care of their work?” R1288.
Peraza said, “No, Your Honor.” R1288. In light of Peraza’s mid-trial
objection to allowing the DVD in with the jury and the trial court’s
instruction to Peraza to address the issue later, R814–15, Peraza’s
affirmative statement that he had no issues to raise qualifies as invited error.
The trial court was led to believe that Peraza wanted the jury to take the
DVD into deliberations along with the other transcripts.
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But if that were not enough to establish invited error, Peraza at least
abandoned his objection. Again, the rule that “a party need not renew an
objection . . . to preserve a claim of error for appeal” applies only “[o]nce the
court rules definitively on the record.” Utah R. Evid. 103(b). Here, the trial
court never ruled on Peraza’s mid-trial objection. Rather, when Peraza
objected during the CJC interviewer’s testimony, the trial court told Peraza
that it wanted to “defer that issue for a minute,” because the recording was
not going back with the jury yet, and it was not even going to be played at
that point. R814–15. The court thus asked defense counsel to wait to argue
the point until the jury was not around. R815.
Despite the trial court’s instruction to argue the issue later, the record
does not indicate that Peraza ever did. And if he did, he did not obtain a
ruling “on the record.” Utah R. Evid. 103(b).
That is not enough to preserve an objection for appeal. See id. Because
the trial court said Peraza’s objection was premature when he first raised it,
Peraza abandoned his objection by not reasserting it when the issue was
ripe. The trial court deferred ruing on Peraza’s objection, and Peraza had an
opportunity to renew the objection when the issue squarely presented itself.
Instead, he expressly stated that he had no issues to raise before the jury
began its deliberations. He thus abandoned his initial objection, never

-52-

obtaining a ruling for this Court to review. See id.; see also In re Estate of
Anderson, 2016 UT App 179, ¶9; Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, ¶28; cf. State v.
Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 15 (Utah 1984) (concluding that objection to sending
deposition transcript in with jury was “deemed waived” because no
“proper and seasonable objection” was made).
Because Peraza either invited error or abandoned his objection below,
he cannot succeed on appeal. If Peraza invited error, he is not entitled even
to plain-error review. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶14, 128 P.3d 1171.
Although plain-error review may normally be available when a party
abandons a claim of error below, Peraza does not argue plain error on
appeal. Thus, this Court should not address the issue further. See Pinder,
2005 UT 15, ¶45; Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, ¶29.
B. Peraza cannot establish obvious error because Cruz
had not been decided yet, and because testimonial
statements favoring each party were sent back with
the jury.
To establish plain error, Peraza must show that the error should have
been obvious to the trial court, such that the trial court should have
recognized sua sponte that allowing the jury to take the CJC recording into
deliberations would be an abuse of discretion. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208–
09. To establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
Peraza must show that “the law governing the error was clear at the time
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the alleged error was made.” State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶16, 95 P.3d 276.
“Thus, an error is not obvious if there is no settled appellate law to guide
the trial court.” State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶32, 311 P.3d 538 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Peraza cannot do so here.
After trial in this case, this Court issued State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App
234, 387 P.3d 618, in which it held that juries should not take CJC recordings
into deliberations because they are testimonial in nature and would
overemphasize one party’s evidence to the detriment of the other. Id. ¶¶33–
41. But the law was not so clear at the time of trial. In State v. Ashby, 2015 UT
App 169, 357 P.3d 554, this Court declined to decide “whether sending the
DVD of the CJC interview into jury deliberations was erroneous” because it
held that the any error was harmless. Id. ¶¶46–47. The Court cited only rule
17(l), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which this Court interpreted as
allowing the jury “to take jury instructions and ‘all exhibits which have
been received as evidence’ into deliberations with them,” and as giving the
trial court discretion “to withhold certain exhibits from deliberations unless
the jury requests it.” Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, ¶46 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P.
17(l)).
Prior precedent did not obviously dictate the result of Cruz. Several
prior cases have ruled that the jury may not take deposition transcripts or
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prior trial transcripts into deliberations, but those cases are all based on the
text of specific statutes or rules that prohibited the jury from doing so. State
v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 642–43 (Utah 1995), superseded by statute on other
grounds as recognized by Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶70, 267 P.3d 232;
Davis, 689 P.2d at 14–15; State v. Solomon, 87 P.2d 807, 810–11 (Utah 1939).
But as noted, rule 17(l) explicitly grants the trial court discretion to decide
which exhibits will be allowed to go with the jury. Utah R. Crim. P. 17(l).
Cruz’s expansion of rule 17(l) was not an obvious application of controlling
appellate precedent that should have been obvious to the trial court.
Furthermore, “[p]lain error does not exist when a conceivable
strategic purpose exists to support the use of the evidence.” State v. Bedell,
2014 UT 1, ¶26, 322 P.3d 697. Thus, the trial court is “not required to
constantly survey or second-guess [a] nonobjecting party’s best interests or
trial strategy and is not expected to intervene in the proceedings unless the
evidence would serve no conceivable strategic purpose.” Id. “Further, the
court should take measures to avoid interfering with potential legal
strategy . . . .” Id.; accord In re J.C., 2016 UT App 10, ¶20, 366 P.3d 867.
Thus, even if allowing the CJC recording into jury deliberations was
obviously erroneous at the time of trial, the trial court was not required to
intervene here because a conceivable strategy existed to support Peraza’s
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decision not to object. The harm to be guarded against in sending a
testimonial exhibit in with the jury is giving “undue advantage” to one
party over the other. Solomon, 87 P.2d at 811; accord Carter, 888 P.2d at 643;
Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶¶36, 39. But here, the trial court did not send one
party’s testimonial exhibit back with the jury. Rather, it sent both party’s
testimonial exhibits. And the trial court could have reasonably concluded
that Peraza did not object to it doing so for strategic reasons. Peraza’s
defense certainly would have been aided by allowing the jury to take the
transcript of the recantation interview into deliberations. But Peraza likely
would not have been successful at objecting to the other exhibits while
asking for the recantation transcript to go back. On the other hand, sending
all three interviews back with the jury—the CJC interview, the recantation
interview, and the California interview—would also have furthered
Peraza’s defense strategy of highlighting the inconsistencies among K.C.’s
allegations. In fact, Peraza needed the jury to review all three interviews to
complete the picture of his theory.
Thus, the trial court did not plainly abuse its discretion.
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C. Any error was harmless because the jury also had a
transcript of the victim’s recantation during
deliberations.
As noted, Cruz was concerned about the risk of overemphasis that can
come from sending one party’s testimonial exhibit with the jury. Cruz, 2016
UT App 234, ¶¶36, 39. But that risk was not present here. And when the
“danger of undue emphasis” is not present, any error in sending a CJC
recording in with the jury is harmless. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶¶39, 44.
For example, in Cruz this Court held that it was harmless for a CJC
recording to go in with the jury because, in part, the CJC recording did not
clearly favor one side or the other—the defendant had argued that the child
was coached, giving him an interest in having the jury review the CJC
recording. Id. ¶44. Likewise, in State v. Carter, the supreme court held that it
was harmless for the jury to review the transcript of a previous trial because
the transcript contained evidence that supported both parties. 888 P.2d at
643–44.
The likelihood of overemphasis is even weaker here than in Cruz and
Carter. The jury took into deliberations not only the CJC recording; they also
took the transcript of the recantation interview and the California interview.
R1287; SE2; DE1. Peraza does not challenge the trial court’s allowance of
either of those transcripts to go back to the jury. In fact, Peraza had
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submitted the California interview as an exhibit. R969; DE1. And that
transcript was sufficient by itself to establish guilt on each count. DE1 at 27–
44. Of course, Peraza submitted it to highlight the discrepancies between
K.C.’s account in the CJC interview and the California interview. But
Peraza’s defense would not have been furthered had the jury only taken
back the California interview. By allowing the jury to review the CJC
recording, the transcript of the California interview, and the transcript of
the recantation interview, Peraza was able to place his defense squarely
before the jury. “Thus, both sides had an interest in the jury’s scrutinizing
[the] interviews.” Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶44. Furthermore, the CJC
recording was more tame than the transcript of the California interview,
where K.C. described not only masturbation and oral sex but also repeated
anal sodomy, and it was more tame than K.C.’s trial testimony, where K.C.
described not only masturbation, oral sex, and anal sodomy, but also
gagging K.C. and vaginal intercourse. Thus, not only is the danger of
overemphasis not present here, but having the jury view all three interviews
furthered Peraza’s theory that K.C.’s allegations were inconsistent and thus
incredible. Therefore, any error here was harmless.

-58-

V.
Absent a 23B remand, this Court must reject Peraza’s
ineffective-assistance claim.
To support his ineffective-assistance claim, Peraza must point to facts
in the record. State v. Jaramillo, 2016 UT App 70, ¶27, 372 P.3d 34. He cannot
rely on facts proffered with his rule 23B motion. Id.; State v. Bredehoft, 966
P.2d 285, 290 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“We consider affidavits supporting Rule
23B motions solely to determine the propriety of remanding ineffective
assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary hearings.”). Peraza concedes as
much, briefing ineffective assistance only “to prepare for supplemental
briefing” in the event this Court grants his rule 23B motion. Aplt.Br.45–49.
Because he expressly premises his ineffective-assistance claim on extrarecord evidence, Peraza cannot succeed on his ineffective assistance claim
unless and until this Court grants his 23B motion, receives findings from the
trial court, and receives supplemental briefing from the parties. See Utah R.
App. P. 23B; Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 290.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20160302-CA

ROBERT PERAZA,
Defendant / Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
*******
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING
THE STATE TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Peraza preserved this argument below
The State alleges that Peraza cannot claim the trial court erred below by

admitting the expert testimony because “Peraza never objected based on rule
702” or “he abandoned his objection.” State’s Brief at 24. Neither of these excuses
are correct.
According to the State, Peraza’s only objection to Smith testifying as an
expert was to the lack of adequate notice, not Rule 702, therefore the trial court
was excused from performing the gatekeeper function and this Court should not
consider the 702 challenge. See State’s Brief at 30-31. For whatever reason the
State has neglected to consider the preservation explanation described in Peraza’s

opening brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 2 (“After the State later gave notice of
intent to call Chelsea Smith, the defense asked to have it’s earlier ‘objection
applied to this expert as well.’ R.533.”).

Peraza now replies to the State’s

arguments by pointing to the record to show that the defense’s objection the
State’s expert witness on 702 grounds was squarely raised to the trial court, the
court had the opportunity to consider it, and the objection was overruled.
Furthermore, nothing about Peraza’s conduct at trial, or the way the testimony
came out at trial, required Peraza to renew his 702 objection. Peraza did not
abandon his pretrial motion in limine to exclude Smith just because K.C.’s
allegations changed again at trial.
Preservation
According to Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, “[a] party may claim
error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a
substantial right of the party and… a party, on the record… (A) timely objects or
moves to strike; and (B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from
the context…” UT. R. EVID. 103(a)(1). When a party makes a pretrial objection to
proposed evidence and the trial court denies that objection, the party is “not
required to object during trial to evidence offered in accordance with the court’s
pretrial ruling.” State v. Domiguez, 2003 UT App 158, ¶18, 72 P.3d 127.
This was true in Domiguez, where the defendant objected prior to trial that
the court should not admit his status on parole and a prior incident at the prison.
At the pretrial hearing the defendant opposed admission of these pieces of
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evidence because it violated rules 404(b) and 403. Dominguez, 2003 UT App
158, ¶8. The trial court denied the objection and admitted the evidence at trial.
On appeal the State claimed the defendant did “not properly preserve this issue
for appeal because he failed to object on the same rule 404(b) grounds urged at
the pretrial proceeding.” Dominguez, at ¶17. This Court disagreed. “Although
Defendant’s objections could have been clearer, they were raised during the
pretrial hearing and provided the trial court with an opportunity to address the
objections.” Id., at ¶19. The objection was preserved for appeal because “the
pretrial hearing was held on the record, Defendant timely objected, the judge
made a definitive ruling on the motion, and the same judge presided at trial.” Id.,
at ¶19.
This is almost the exact scenario that occurred in this case. Defense counsel
filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony of the State’s proposed expert
“based on Utah Code of Criminal Procedure §77-17-13 and Utah Rules of
Evidence 702 and 403.” R.190-91. This pretrial motion was specifically directed
at the State’s intended use of Dr. Lyssabeth Mattoon, however, the objection
stated explicitly that the defense wanted the Court to “perform an important
gatekeeping function, intended to ensure that only reliable expert testimony will
be presented to the jury.” R.191 (citing Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. Los
Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, 269 P.3d 980). In that written
motion, Peraza objected to the State presenting expert testimony related to K.C.’s
status and behavior as a sexual abuse victim because it was “based on uncertain
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and invalid behavioral norms designed to improperly bolster K.C.’s claims of
sexual abuse.” R.195. Put plainly, the defense objected to the State calling an
expert witness to present scientific or other specialized evidence related to what a
normal sexual abuse victim looks like without establishing that it satisfied the
requirements of Rule 702.
Eventually, the State decided not to call Dr. Mattoon. But, as trial
approached, the State filed notice of intent to call Chelsea Smith as an expert.
R.282. At the January 28, 2016 hearing, where the State’s expert notice was
discussed, defense counsel reminded the trial court about the earlier motion in
limine:
“back in April of 2015, I actually filed a motion to exclude testimony
of state’s expert, who at the time was actually the actual therapist of
the alleged victim. My understanding was, she was going to testify
again for the same reasons and logic that the state wants to have Ms.
Smith testify. I’m assuming one of the reasons why Ms. Smith was
chosen was because Ms. Matoon, as I indicated before, has been very
difficult to get to communicate with, and it was indicated she didn’t
want to come. Again, I’m not sure exactly. But the same logic and -so -- is applied. So, I would ask to have my objection applied to this
expert as well, because it’s the same context that we -- the state is
asking to have an expert testify about behaviors.”
R.532-33. Defense counsel complained that Smith’s testimony would not meet
the expert witness requirements “for the same reasons and logic” that were
objected to before. Defense counsel asked to have the earlier “objection applied to
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this expert as well, because it’s the same context…” R.533. Counsel was again
concerned about “the science and research regarding child disclosures of sex
abuse, including identified factors related to delay, partial and gradual
disclosures and recantation.” R.534. Counsel asked the court to “incorporate the
objection that [he] filed before.” R.536. Counsel for the State even provided the
trial court with “a hard copy of Mr. Bautista’s motion that he’s referring to as the
objection…” R.536.
With a record this clear, there is no doubt that defense counsel was
objecting to Smith as an expert “under Utah Rules of Evidence 702 and 403.”
R.190-91. And the trial court understood the objection in terms of 702 when it
ruled that the State’s notice was timely “under 702, and all I can do is look at her
criteria, figure out for myself whether or not she’s qualified as an expert, looking
at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things.” R.550. According the
trial court’s incorrect or incomplete reading of 702, it found Smith did “meet
those qualifications,” so the court went “ahead and den[ied] a motion to exclude
this particular witness at this point in time.” R.551.
Peraza’s preservation is clear. He objected based on Rule 702 when the
State provided notice of Dr. Mattoon. He renewed that objection and
incorporated it into his objection when the State provided notice of Chelsea
Smith. When the trial court ruled that Smith could testify it found, without a
hearing where Smith’s qualifications could be revealed or challenged, without an
explanation of what her testimony would be, without requiring the basis for
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Smith’s opinions, that she “would meet the criteria for being an expert…” R.548.
Peraza’s objection to Smith under 702 was made clear to the trial court and the
court rejected it “according to the rules of evidence”. R.548. The issue is
preserved.
Abandonment
The State’s brief argues that even though trial counsel adequately raised
Peraza’s pretrial objection to Smith as an expert witness the defense abandoned
that objection when the “evidentiary picture changed” at trial. State’s Brief at 32.
According to the State, trial counsel was obligated to “reassert his objection at
trial”, after he had obtained the studies upon which the expert’s opinion was
based. State’s Brief at 32-33. The State suggests that Peraza abandoned his
objection to Smith’s testimony because “it was incumbent upon Peraza to alert
the trial court if he thought [the studies] were insufficient to establish rule 702’s
threshold reliability requirements.” State’s Brief at 33. This argument turns the
burden of admission on its head.
According to Rule 702 and the cases interpreting it, it is the party who
intends to present the expert testimony who bears the “threshold burden to show
the reliability of the principles that form the basis for the expert’s testimony and
the reliability of applying those principles to the facts of the case.” Eskelson v.
Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶11, 242 P.3d 762. It is the State who bore
the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of Smith’s expert testimony. It is
the State who completely failed to provide any support for its proposed expert.
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Nothing about the change in the evidentiary picture changed the rules of
evidence or the principles of preservation. Nothing about the fact that Peraza
may have later gained access to the studies attached to the State’s notice changed
that burden that was ignored by the trial court when it allowed Smith to testify.
The State cites two cases in support of its abandonment theory. Peraza
asserts these cases are inapplicable, and that this Court should reject the State’s
argument and find the 702 claim was preserved and not abandoned. The first
case cited by the State is Matter of Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT App 179, 381
P.3d 1179. The State would urge the Court to consider in isolation paragraph 9
where this Court found the appellant had “effectively withdr[rawn] her response
to [appellee’s] objection, and the trial court had no need to rule on that
response.” Anderson, 2016 UT App 179, ¶9. But the facts and circumstances of
Anderson are so different than this case. There the appellant initially intended to
present her own expert witness in opposition to the proposed expert retained by
the appellee. After “[e]ach party disputed some aspect of the other’s expert
designation… the trial court and the parties agreed that the court would appoint a
single expert witness to serve in the case, for whom the parties would share the
cost.” Anderson, ¶3. Later the appellant wanted her own expert’s opinion to be
admitted at trial, after she had stipulated that neither her nor the other party’s
expert would be used. It was the earlier stipulation, that she would not be
presenting her own expert testimony, which acted as an abandonment of her
request to use her own expert.
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But this case is nothing like Anderson and Peraza did nothing like abandon
his objection to the State’s expert. Here, the State gave notice of its intent to use
Smith as an expert. Then Peraza objected and incorporated his earlier objection
to the State’s first proposed expert. Then the trial court overruled the objection
and allowed Smith to testify. Then Smith testified at trial. What the State has
characterized as abandonment looks nothing like the examples of abandonment
in Anderson.
The second case the State cites to suggest Peraza abandoned his 702
objection is State v. Lintzen, 2015 UT App 68, 347 P.3d 433. There the defendant
was charged with sexually abusing his stepdaughter. During pretrial motion
practice the prosecutors gave notice of intent and request to admit evidence of
the defendant’s prior incidents of sexual abuse under rule 404(c) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. Lintzen, 2015 UT 68, ¶6. A significant portion of the victim’s
allegations, prior to trial, were that the earlier incidents and the charged
incidents both involved penetration of her vagina and anus. However, at trial the
victim’s testimony “seemed to imply, at least in the defense’s view, that no
penetration, either vaginal or anal, had ever occurred.” Lintzen, at ¶7. On appeal
the defendant challenged the trial court’s initial granting of the State’s 404(b)
request, arguing that the pretrial ruling was incorrect. Id., ¶¶12-25. On appeal the
defendant also claimed the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new
trial which was based in part upon the fact that the victim’s changed testimony
undermined the validity of the pretrial 404(b) in limine order. Id., at ¶27. In
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other words, the defendant was claiming that the Shickles factors used to find the
earlier incidents were probative and not unfairly prejudicial under the 403
analysis of 404(b) were wrong now that the victim’s changed testimony made the
balancing of factors different.
The relevant portion of the decision, for this case, is where this Court
analyzed the preservation rule. The Court recognized the importance of Rule 103,
where a party need not renew an objection to evidence after a court has ruled it
will or won’t be admitted,1 but because the defendant’s challenge to the 404(b)
evidence was now “based on circumstances arising after” the admissibility had
been decided the principle in Rule 103 did not apply. Id., at ¶28. “In other words,
pretrial rulings are subject to revision at trial as the evidentiary picture unfolds,
but a party must request such a reconsideration when circumstances change.” Id.
But that is only because the basis of the appellate challenge depends upon those
changed circumstances, circumstances that the trial court was never asked to
consider.
But the facts at issue in Lintzen are not present in this case. Peraza’s
appellate challenge to Smith’s admission as an expert is not based on
circumstances arising after the pretrial conference where the trial court found her
to have met the qualifications of Rule 702. Nothing about Peraza’s appellate
challenge to the trial court’s 702 ruling depends upon the changing evidentiary
See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on
the record — either before or at trial — a party need not renew an objection or
offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).
1
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picture at trial. As Peraza’s initial brief makes clear, his appeal is based upon the
trial court’s complete lack of support, at that pretrial hearing, to conclude the
State had met its burden to present Smith as an expert. See Appellant’s Brief at
28-32. The trial court abused its discretion on January 28, 2016, that is what this
appeal is about. The fact that K.C.’s testimony changed again at trial on February
9 and 10, and the fact that Smith’s testimony had to account for those new
changes makes no difference in the preserved issue before this Court. The State’s
argument that Peraza’s initial objection to Smith’s testimony was no longer valid
when K.C. changed her testimony at trial is unpersuasive. This Court should
ignore it and find Peraza’s 702 objection was adequately preserved.
B. The trial court abused its discretion
The State’s brief does not address the question of the trial court’s abuse of
discretion.2 The State does not even attempt to suggest that the trial court
properly conducted the 702 test prior to concluding Smith could testify as an
expert.3 This Court should interpret the lack of argument as an implied admission
But see State’s Brief at 33-36 where the State argues that the trial court “did not
plainly abuse its discretion”. There is an important distinction here that
undermines the State’s position. Peraza has not raised a plain error claim. Peraza
does not need to meet the higher standard of an unpreserved error. As his initial
brief demonstrates, the question for this Court to consider is whether the trial
court acted within the limits of reasonability in not applying the 702 test and
concluding the State’s notice of expert satisfied the threshold burden for Rule
702. See Appellant’s Brief at 30.
3 It is critical to note that the State’s citation to Smith’s testimony about the
reliability of her sources came at trial, not at the 702 hearing. See State’s Brief at
35-36. Whether this is merely an oversight or not, these citations are misleading
to the relevant question of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in applying 702
in ruling on Peraza’s pretrial objection.
2
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that the trial court did not have the discretion to incorrectly and incompletely
apply the Rule 702 test before the court ruled Smith could testify as an expert.
Instead, the State argues Peraza’s claim fails because he has not shown
“obvious, prejudicial error.” State’s Brief at 33. Because Peraza has not made a
plain error claim, this argument is unnecessary and unhelpful, and does nothing
to establish the trial court acted within its discretion by ignoring the plain
language of Rule 702.
C. Smith’s testimony was prejudicial
Finally, the State argues that even if the trial court abused its discretion in
finding the State met its 702 burden, any error “was harmless because Peraza was
able to “effectively undermine [Smith’s testimony] through cross-examination.”
State’s Brief at 25. The State also argues that the “total evidentiary picture”
corroborates K.C.’s allegations and, therefore, undermines the likelihood of
prejudice from Smith’s testimony. State’s Brief at 38-40.
As a preliminary matter, Peraza would like to point out that the State makes
no genuine attempt to distinguish this case from the prejudice cases cited in
Peraza’s initial brief. The State does cite to the cases following the claim that
Smith testimony was not used to bolster K.C.’s testimony. State’s Brief at 37.
Presumably, the State is claiming that the expert testimony in the cited cases was
prejudicial because in those cases the experts were testifying that the alleged
victims were “telling the truth or otherwise presented as candid”, distinct from
Smith’s unspecific rehabilitation testimony in this case. State’s Brief at 37. This
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argument does not hold up under any degree of scrutiny, perhaps that is why the
State did not actually analyze the cited cases in its brief. Peraza maintains that
because this case absolutely hinges on K.C.’s credibility, which was challenged by
evidence of her inconsistencies and recantations, the State’s erroneous use of
Smith’s expert testimony directed at rehabilitating K.C.’s credibility is
problematic and prejudicial.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED PERAZA’S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL
The State’s brief analyzes the factors laid out in Peraza’s opening brief from
State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ¶20, 131 P.3d 292. See State’s Brief at
41-47, and Appellant’s Brief at 36-44. Rather than rehash each of these factors
that are adequately address in Peraza’s initial brief, Peraza now only makes a few
comments in reply. The majority of the State’s response to this claim is that
Peraza was not seeking a continuance because of Smith’s unexpected testimony,
but instead only to deal with the mental health records. This is a misreading of
record and the context of the request for a continuance.
Perhaps the State believes it if repeats a half-truth enough times, it will
become a full truth. The State repeatedly claims that defense counsel’s expressed
desire to retain an expert was not “to respond to Smith, but to get an expert to
address issues that arose in the therapist’s notes.” State’s Brief at 42 (citing
R.590); see also State’s Brief at 48. And although trial counsel’s concern about
the therapist’s treatment was real and justified, it was not his only concern. If the
Court reads trial counsel’s statements to the judge in their entirety it is clear that,
12

“after this morning’s rulings… that the state’s LCSW expert, Ms. Smith, would be
allowed to testify”, counsel “spent the afternoon… getting advice on how to
prepare a cross examination of Ms. Smith, and talked about the mental health
records…” R.589 (emphasis added). Counsel was not only concerned about the
mental health records, his discussions with Ms. Swickert were not only about
controversial effigy therapy. Counsel made it clear he was concerned about Smith
too.
Furthermore, if and when the record is supplemented with evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel through 23B remand, the impact of a defense
expert witness, both with respect to Smith’s testimony and the mental health
records, will be evident.
Cumulative Error
The State argues that Peraza cannot demonstrate cumulative error between
the combination of the trial court’s erroneous granting of the State’s request to
present Smith as an expert witness and the trial court’s denial of Peraza’s request
for a continuance. See State’s Brief at 48-49. What falls short in the State’s
argument is that it ignores the record and misapprehends the function of a
cumulative error claim.
The State briefly argues that there is no relationship between these two
rulings because the result of the 702 ruling “was a decision to call an expert to
address the therapist’s practices—not to challenge Smith’s testimony directly.”
State’s Brief at 48. According to the State, because there is no relationship
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between the trial court’s ruling that the State’s proposed expert could testify and
trial counsel’s motion to continue the trial in order to retain a defense expert,
there can be no accumulation of the prejudice that results from the two rulings.
The State argues that trial counsel’s request for time to retain an expert was not
aimed directly at Smith, as the timing and language of the request explicitly
describes, but instead was only to address the therapist’s practice of using effigy
dolls. State’s Brief at 48. First, there is a strong relationship between the two
rulings, and second, this is not how cumulative error works.
In the motion to continue trial counsel explained that he had spoken to Ms.
Swickert “after this morning’s rulings… that the State’s LCSW expert, Ms. Smith,
would be allowed to testify on rebuttal, and discussed “how to prepare a cross
examination of Ms. Smith…” R.589-90. Counsel also explained his discussions
with Ms. Swickert included the topic of K.C’s controversial treatment methods
and the fear that it “could give grounds for the recantation of the recantation…”
R.590. Clearly, trial counsel’s intent, expressed directly to the trial court in his
motion to continue, was prompted by and directed at a concern about Smith’s
testimony which was expected to be aimed at explaining away K.C.’s recantation.4
The State’s suggestion, that the motion to continue was not to seek a defense
See R.545 (The prosecutor explains that his purpose in presenting Smith’s
expert testimony was to “be able to rebut what clearly they’re going to say, which
is, she’s changed her story, she’s changed her story.”). See also R.549-50 (The
prosecutor explains that his intent in using Smith as an expert will be to rebut the
defense evidence that K.C. had repeatedly recanted her allegations against
Peraza. Defense counsel made it clear, the defense would be “presenting evidence
that [K.C.] has recanted both to her mother and a private investigator.).
4
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expert “to challenge Smith’s testimony directly”, is misdirection and not
supported by the record. State’s Brief at 48. The record makes it perfectly clear,
the court ruling allowing Smith’s expert testimony and the motion to continue to
time to consult with and retain a defense expert directly related. The one
prompted and justified the other.
Cumulative error is a matter of prejudice. The cumulative error doctrine is
used “when a single error may not constituted grounds for reversal, but many
errors, when taken collectively, nonetheless undermine confidence in the fairness
of a trial.” State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶97, 322 P.3d 624.5 If the Court disagrees
with Peraza and finds the error in allowing Smith testify as an expert is not
sufficiently prejudicial on its own, the results of that error can be combined with
the results of the error in denying Peraza’s motion to continue trial in order to
retain an expert in response to Smith’s opinion. These two errors are intertwined
leading to a natural inclination to combine the prejudice.
It is one thing for the trial court to have allowed Smith to testify as an
expert without performing any of the gatekeeping functions under Rule 702. That
on its own was significantly damaging to Peraza’s defense. And when, as a result
of that decision, defense counsel’s requested a continuance to the trial in order to
consult with an expert to respond to Smith’s testimony was denied, that was still
another. But taken together these two errors led to a situation where the State
was allowed to admit inadmissible expert evidence without any chance of
5

See also State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2017 UT App 13, ¶¶77-81.
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admitting expert testimony to test and try it. The combination of these errors,
taken collectively, undermines the confidence this Court should have in the
fairness of Peraza’s trial.
III. PERAZA WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The State’s brief correctly points out that, unless and until the Court grants
Peraza’s pending Rule 23B motion for remand on the question of ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC), this Court cannot grant his IAC claims which depend
upon non-record evidence. Peraza has asked the Court, consistent with its
discretion authorized by the Revised Order Pertaining to Rule 23B, to adjudicate
the motion prior to its treatment of the merits of other issues presented on
appeal. The Court has declined to do so. Therefore, Peraza, to the extent possible,
wants to encourage the Court to keep in mind that the IAC claims raised in his
23B motion are intricately related to the preserved issues raised in this brief. The
resolution of the claims raised in this brief, prior to any decision about the 23B
motion, in Peraza’s mind would be premature. Peraza maintains that his trial
counsel’s failure to consult with and present expert witnesses constituted
deficient performance which prejudiced his case, especially given the fact that the
State was allowed to present Smith as an expert witness and Peraza was denied a
motion to continue to be prepared with his own experts.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROVIDING THE DVD OF K.C.’s
CJC INTERVIEW TO THE JURY DURING DELIBERATIONS
A. Peraza objected timely and did not invite any error
The State claims the “trial court was led to believe that Peraza wanted the
16

jury to take the DVD into deliberations” because, after the trial court told the
parties that the jury would be given the exhibit to view, he did not re-raise the
objection. State’s Brief at 51. There would be no reason the trial court would have
believed Peraza wanted the exact opposite of his earlier objection. In fact,
although the trial court said it intended to “argue that later”, the only mention of
whether the exhibit should be given to the jury on the record was defense
counsel’s objection. R.814-15. Initially, trial counsel argued to keep the CJC video
out of the trial completely, under Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R.270-75; R. There trial
counsel makes it very clear, the exhibit should “not go back into the jury room
during deliberations.” R.814.
The State’s argument depends upon an inaccurate understanding of the
rules of preservation. According the State, after trial counsel had already
objected, when the trial court ruled that the DVD would “go back” and arranged
to have the bailiff set-up the television so the jury could view it, Peraza was
obliged to re-raise his objection. That is not correct.
As discussed in section I above, Rule 103 provides that “[a] party may
claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a
substantial right of the party and… a party, on the record… (A) timely objects or
moves to strike; and (B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from
the context…” UT. R. EVID. 103(a)(1). Despite the fact that trial counsel squarely
raised the issue, and made his objection known to the court, the court did not
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explicitly rule on the issue. Instead, when the time for deciding what to do with
the exhibit came, the court simply ruled that it would go back with a TV for
deliberations. Peraza was not obligated to repeatedly object, especially after the
trial court had ruled that all four exhibits would “go back.” R.1287. Analogous to
the rule that once a party makes a pretrial objection to evidence, it need not
object again at trial (see Domiguez, 2003 UT App 158, ¶18), once Peraza objected
to the jury having access to the CJC video during deliberations he didn’t need to
re-object when the judge was ordering the bailiff to provide that access.
The objection was timely, made at the time the evidence was offered, and
the objection gave sufficient grounds, that admission of such evidence was
distinct from whether it should “go back into the jury room during deliberations.”
R.814. Peraza’s objection was properly preserved and counsel’s failure to
continue to object over and over did not invite any error.
B. The timing of the Cruz decision is irrelevant
The State claims that because State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, 387 P.3d
618 was not issued until after the trial in this case, the trial court’s decision to
send the CJC video to the jury for deliberations was not obvious. See State’s Brief
at 53-54. Because Peraza’s challenge to the CJC exhibit being provided to the jury
is based on a preserved, uninvited, and not abandoned error, he need not prove
the error was obvious. Peraza does not attempt to do so here.
C. The error is prejudicial
The State’s position is that this error is harmless because the judge also
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ordered the jury to take other prejudicial and erroneous exhibits into
deliberations. This is a strange argument indeed. The State argues that even
though the jury should not have been allowed to review the video of K.C. making
allegations against Peraza in her CJC interview (State’s Exhibit 1) during
deliberations, because the jury was also allowed to review another transcript of
K.C. making even more prejudicial allegations against Peraza (Defense Exhibit 1),
there was no harm done. State’s Brief at 58.
This makes no sense. Sure, the two sets of allegations are not consistent,
and K.C. makes contradictory statements between the two statements, but they
are both horrible for Peraza’s case. Each of these two statements, incorrectly
characterized and treated by the court as exhibits, show K.C. accusing Peraza of
sexually abusing her. Neither of these two statements contains any crossexamination or challenge to K.C.’s allegations. And each of these statements was
used by the State in its closing argument demonstrating what it characterized as
evidence that K.C. was as consistent as a girl her age would normally be. The
prosecutor, after reading pages and pages from a transcript of the CJC video and
then giving the “Reader’s Digest version” of the second CJC transcript, and tells
the jury to refer to specific things within the video and specific pages in the
transcript.6

The prosecutor spent 33 pages of his closing argument almost exclusively
quoting from the CJC video or CJC transcript. The State repeatedly refers to
times on the video or pages in the transcript and encourages the jury to refer to
them in their deliberations.
6
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At least three of the four exhibits which the judge sent back with the jury
were should not have been provided for deliberations.7 And if trial counsel had
preserved an objection to any of these other exhibits, they would be raised in this
appeal. But, because there was no objection, those errors are unpreserved and
not raised on appeal. That lack of preservation should not have a negative impact
on the prejudice analysis of the preserved error. And it especially should not be
used, as the State attempts to do, to show incorrectly providing K.C.’s recorded
CJC interview to the jury in deliberations helped Peraza’s case.
As Peraza asserted in his opening brief, this case begins and ends with
K.C.’s credibility. See Appellant’s Brief at 33-34, 40, 42, 43, 47, 49, 51. In this case
there is a real and dangerous threat that the jury’s verdicts were based on
overemphasis of the testimonial evidence in the video at the expense of other
contradictory evidence. This real threat is sufficient to show a reasonable
likelihood that the trial court’s error affected the outcome of the trial. See Cruz, at
¶49. There is a real threat that the jury’s credibility determination was
significantly impacted by the fact that the jury could watch and re-watch K.C.
make allegations at the CJC. This makes the trial court’s error prejudicial.

As the State points out, juries are not permitted to take video recordings of
statements or transcripts of statements that are testimonial in nature into
deliberations. See State’s Brief at 54-55; see also State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 15
(Utah 1984), Shoreline Development Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 201
(Utah App. 1992), State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 643 (Utah 1995). Arguably,
K.C.’s handwritten note, Defense Exhibit 2, about “santin” [sic] telling her she
would “die if you don’t tell at his football” was not akin to testimonial evidence
and thus not prohibited under Rule 17 and the cases interpreting it.
7
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chelsea Smith’s
testimony under Rule 702 without applying adequate gatekeeping analysis, this
Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
Because the trial court abused its discretion by denying Peraza’s reasonable and
necessary motion to continue, the Court should reverse and remand for a new
trial.
Because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to properly investigate and produce expert witness evidence, this Court should
reverse and remand for a new trial.
Because the trial court erroneously sent the CJC DVD into the jury room
during deliberations, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
Because the cumulative prejudice of these errors combine to undermine
the fairness of Peraza’s trial, this Court should reverse and remand for a new
trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of June, 2017.
/s/ Douglas Thompson
Appointed Appellate Counsel
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UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
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ROBERT ALONZO PERAZA,
Defendant/Respondent.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari
INTRODUCTION
A child (Child) accused Robert Alonzo Peraza of sexually abusing her. She
later recanted, but by the time of trial she had withdrawn her recantation. Over a
month before trial, the State gave notice that it would call an expert witness to talk
about recantation, but it did not provide an expert report or a description of what the
expert’s opinion would be. Peraza objected to the adequacy of the notice, and he
argued that he suspected that the testimony would be inadmissible under rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court directed the State to provide Peraza copies of
the studies on which the expert would rely. The court also ruled that the expert was
qualified under rule 702 and tentatively ruled that the expert could testify, but it
emphasized that Peraza could raise his objections again at trial once he had received
the studies and once the details of the expert’s testimony were more apparent. Peraza

also asked for a continuance, but the court denied it. The State provided the relevant
studies before trial, and Peraza never renewed his notice or rule 702 objections.
Rather, he used the studies to draw out concessions from the expert.
The statute governing notice of expert witnesses requires a party to give notice
thirty days before trial sufficient to allow a party to prepare to meet the testimony,
and it specifies a continuance as the remedy for not substantially complying with the
statute. Expert testimony is excludable under the statute only for deliberate notice
violations. In contrast, rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony by
establishing a threshold reliability standard, implicitly requiring only that the
threshold be met at some point before the evidence is admitted at trial.
On appeal, Peraza argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the expert’s testimony under rule 702 without sufficient evidence of reliability from
the State and without explicitly conducting a full rule-702 analysis at the pre-trial
hearing. Peraza did not raise any argument based on the expert-notice statute. Yet the
Court of Appeals stated that it was asked to decide whether the State violated the
expert-notice statute.
Without any briefing or argument from either party addressing that waived
issue, the Court of Appeals held that compliance with the expert-notice statute was a
prerequisite to admissibility under rule 702. This conflicts with the limits this Court
has set on appellate consideration of unbriefed claims. Further, the Court of Appeals
held that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible under rule 702 because the State’s
timely notice lacked sufficient detail under the statute—writing a notice requirement
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into rule 702 that is not in the plain language of the rule, and writing out of the expertnotice statute the explicit requirement that evidence may be excluded only on a
showing of bad faith.
The Court of Appeals also addressed Peraza’s argument that he was entitled to
a continuance to respond to the expert’s testimony. Contrary to the language of the
expert-notice statute and contrary to this Court’s precedent governing non-statutory
continuances, the court held that the State bears the burden of disproving prejudice
and concluded that the State did not meet that burden.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by conflating the standards and
remedies under the expert-notice statute and rule 702.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals violated this Court’s opinion in State v.
Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443, when it reversed based in part on an issue the
appellant waived on appeal and the appellee did not have the opportunity to brief or
argue.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by placing the burden on the appellee
to disprove prejudice arising from the denial of a continuance.

OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals opinion sought to be reviewed is State v. Peraza, 2018
UT App 68.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition under Utah Code
Section 78A-3-102(3)(a), (5) (West 2009). The Court of Appeals issued its decision
on April 19, 2018. A petition for rehearing was not filed. On May 30, 2018, this Court
granted the State’s motion for a 30-day extension to file its petition, extending the
time to June 20, 2018.

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Section 77-17-13, and rules 104 and 702, Utah Rules of Evidence,
are reproduced in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Relevant Facts
A child (Child) disclosed to her mother (Mother) that Robert Alonzo Peraza
was sexually abusing her. R855–56,1164. In an interview at the Children’s Justice
Center, Child disclosed the details of Peraza repeatedly forcing her to manually
stimulate him and perform oral sex on him. R814; SE1.
Peraza was arrested, and an officer interviewed him after obtaining a Miranda
waiver. R1034,1053. In two interviews over two days, the officer told Peraza seven
or eight times to stop talking with him and get an attorney “if you didn’t do this at
all,” but to keep talking so they could “get to the bottom of this” if he did do it.
R1054,1060. Peraza kept talking, asking at one point how he could get the charges
reduced. R1054,1056,1060.
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Peraza began the first interview saying that he and Child had a great
relationship, but as the interviews progressed and the officer told Peraza more details
about Child’s allegations, Peraza gradually changed his characterization of the
relationship until, by the end of the second interview, he was saying, “I don’t spend
much time with her at all.” R1051–52.
Peraza said he would never intentionally do any of the things Child alleged,
but he admitted it “could have” happened when he was drunk. R1065,1075. He said
he remembered passing out on his couch once after drinking, and when someone who
he assumed was Mother came to shake him awake, he grabbed the person’s head and
“guided it” to his penis, letting go only after the person “finished” performing oral
sex on him. R1049–50. He fell back asleep, but when he thanked Mother the next
day, she did not know what he was talking about. R1050. Peraza said this happened
“a few times,” and he wondered if it “could have” been Child or one of his sons.
R1050,1068–69,1075.
Mother, who favored her and Peraza’s sons over Child, later confronted Child
and asked if the allegations against Peraza were true. R806,946,987–88,1007. Child
said they were not. R946,1007. Mother told Peraza’s defense counsel, because he
“was on our side,” and he arranged for a private investigator to speak with Child.
R989–91,995–96,1006–07. Child recanted to the private investigator. SE2.
Child moved to California to live with her father. R810,991–92. She started
therapy, where she disclosed more details of the abuse, including anal sodomy, and
alleged that Peraza’s brother also sexually abused her. R844–45,971–72. One
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technique the therapist used was to have Child make effigy dolls of Peraza and his
brother and have her kill the dolls by running over them with a (presumably toy) car.
R959–60. Although Child was disclosing more details about the abuse to her therapist
and family in California, throughout the time she was living in California she
continued to tell Mother when they spoke over the phone that Peraza did not abuse
her. R952,970–72,1014–15.
Child later explained that she lied when she recanted because she did not want
her family to get split up. R915.
B.

Summary of Proceedings and Disposition of the Court
In August 2013, the State charged Peraza with four counts of sodomy on a

child and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. R1–3.
Pretrial Proceedings. Leading up to the preliminary hearing, defense counsel
requested

eleven

continuances.

R16–19,23–32,37–38,44–47,76–77,422,439–

41,1324–25. After the case was bound over, defense counsel sought another
continuance. R141–42. Trial was then set for March 2015. R152–53,450–51. But in
February 2015, Peraza moved to continue trial because Child had made new
allegations earlier that month and neither party had a copy of the new forensic
interview, and because Peraza wanted to subpoena Child’s therapy records. R164–
68,456. The State agreed to the continuance and the court granted it. R456,458.
Trial was later set for late October 2015. R212–13. Defense counsel received
Child’s therapy records, after in camera review, by early October. R512,1330–32.
After reviewing the records, Peraza moved to continue trial so he could call the
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therapist as a witness. R201,1330–31. Peraza also needed a continuance because he
needed more time to transcribe the recantation interview and get it to the State.
R1330. The State said it was ready to proceed but did not object to the continuance,
and the court granted it, setting trial to start February 9, 2016. R1331–38.
Thirty-two days before trial, the State filed notice saying it intended to call
Chelsea Smith as an expert witness. R282. The notice stated that Smith would testify
about, “The methodology and science related to forensic interviewing of suspected
child sex abuse victims; science and research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse
including identified factors related [to] delayed, partial and gradual disclosures and
recantation.” R283. No report was attached, but the notice was accompanied by
Smith’s curriculum vitae and a list of over 130 articles Smith would rely on, though
the articles themselves were not attached. R288–92.
Fifteen days before trial, Peraza certified that he was ready for trial, though he
objected to Smith’s testimony without identifying why. R519–20. Twelve days before
trial, the court held argument on the objection. R520–21,532. Peraza argued under
the expert-notice statute that the notice was insufficient to allow him to prepare to
meet the testimony. R534,548–49. He also argued that he expected that the testimony
would be inadmissible under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, though he was basing
that argument on an assumption of what Smith’s testimony might be. R534–35.
The trial court ruled that Smith was qualified as an expert, but it agreed that
without more information it could not say what Smith would testify about or whether
her testimony would be helpful for the jury. R547–48,550. The court stated that “at
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this point in time,” it was going to let Smith testify. R550. But it clarified that Peraza
could raise future objections to Smith’s testimony, and “maybe [Smith] doesn’t come
in.” R550. The court also directed the State to narrow the studies to “a reasonable
amount” and provide copies to Peraza, cautioning that if Smith testified about
something based on studies Peraza had not been given, her testimony may not come
in. R570–72. The State complied, providing copies before trial. R746.
The same day as the hearing, Peraza asked for a telephone conference and
moved to continue trial. R589,591. After speaking with an in-house mitigation expert
about Smith and other aspects of the case, defense counsel had decided to get an
expert to discuss the therapist’s practice of killing effigy dolls and how that practice
could have influenced Child to falsely withdraw her recantation or to describe the
abuse in more violent terms than were true. R589–90.
The trial court denied the continuance. It pointed out that this was the third
time it had set the case for trial, and it “had to draw the line somewhere.” R592. The
court explained that the issue of the therapist’s practices could have been dealt with
much earlier. R592. The court also noted that it had an obligation to the alleged victim
as well. R592. It was thus “too late in the game” to continue trial. R592.
Trial. Child testified at trial about the masturbation, oral sodomy, and anal
sodomy. R842–53. She also testified that Peraza raped her—an allegation that neither
the prosecutor nor defense counsel had heard before. R854,951–52,973.
Among other witnesses, the State called Smith. Before Smith testified
generally about recantations, she testified without objection that the studies on which
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she would base her testimony were “generally accepted” within her field “as being
sources that were reliable.” R1138–40. Smith testified that recantations were “not
something that’s typical,” though it was “not unheard of.” R1141–42. She testified
that between 4–20% of cases of child abuse involve recantations. R1141. She stated
that recantation does not necessarily mean the initial accusation was false. R1142.
She identified two reasons a child might falsely recant: pressure from family
members; and seeing negative results from disclosing the abuse, such as incarceration
of someone they still love and the financial stress that often accompanies that. R1142.
Peraza did not object to Smith’s testimony at trial under rule 702 or renew a
notice objection. Instead, he used the studies the State had provided to draw out
concessions from Smith. R1146–48. He got Smith to acknowledge that the figure she
presented of the frequency of recantations included both sexual as well as physical
abuse. R1147. Peraza also got Smith to concede that a child may honestly recant, and
that an allegation is not true just by virtue of its having been made. R1147–48. Smith
identified one reason a child might truthfully recant: she feels guilty for lying about
the allegations in the first place. R1148.
The State withdrew the aggravated sexual abuse charge, and the jury convicted
on all four counts of sodomy on a child. R363,367–68,1199–1200.
Appellate Proceedings. On appeal, Peraza did not renew his notice objection.
Br.Aplt.1–3,25–52. Instead, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting Smith’s testimony under rule 702 without requiring the State to present
evidence of the reliability of Smith’s testimony and without conducting a complete
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rule-702 analysis. Br.Aplt.1–3,25–35. He also argued that the court abused its
discretion when it denied his third motion to continue trial. Br.Aplt.35–44.1
Even though Peraza did not raise the notice issue, the Court of Appeals stated
that it was “asked to determine whether the State sufficiently complied with the notice
requirements under Utah Code section 77-17-13 and, if not, whether the district court
erred in admitting Expert’s testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.”
State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, ¶2. The court held, as a matter of first impression,
that “the first step” in meeting “the requirements of rule 702” “involves giving notice”
according to the terms of the expert-notice statute. Id. ¶28 (citing Utah Code §77-1713). The court concluded that, in the absence of an expert report, the State’s “singlesentence description of the broad subject upon which Expert would testify” and its
failure “to provide meaningful access to the articles upon which Expert relied” was
inadequate under the statute. Id. ¶¶31,37. “Without this information the requirements
under rule 702 were not met … .” Id. ¶37 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court
held, the trial court “exceeded its discretion in admitting Expert’s testimony at trial
because the State failed to comply with Utah Code section 77-17-13.” Id. The court
further held that the admission of the testimony was prejudicial because “there was
no ‘other evidence supporting [the] conviction’” besides Child’s testimony, and

1

Peraza advanced other arguments on appeal, one of which the Court of
Appeals declined to consider as invited error and the others it declined to consider
because doing so was unnecessary given its ruling. See State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App
68, ¶¶2 n.1, 23 n.6.
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Smith’s testimony “was ‘clearly calculated to bolster [Child’s] believability.’” Id. ¶36
(alteration in original).
The Court of Appeals did not apply or even acknowledge this Court’s
restrictions in State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443, on an appellate court’s
ability to dispose of unbriefed issues.
Next, the Court of Appeals addressed “whether, based on the lack of expert
report, Peraza’s third motion for a continuance should have been granted.” Id. ¶2.
Considering Peraza’s diligence, the potential efficacy of a continuance,
inconvenience to the court and opposing party, and the extent of any prejudice from
denying a continuance, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the continuance. Id. ¶¶40–43. The Court of Appeals placed the burden on the
State to disprove prejudice. Id. ¶44. Without discussing the totality of the evidence,
the court concluded that the State did not meet this burden because Smith
“‘rehabilitated [Child’s] credibility, without challenge,’” and “Peraza’s ability to put
forward his best defense was materially hampered” because he could not call a
competing expert. Id. ¶47. The court thus vacated Peraza’s conviction. Id. ¶49.

ARGUMENT
I.
The Court of Appeals decided an important issue of first
impression in a way that conflates the standards and remedies
applicable under rule 702 and the expert-notice statute.
The Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression that satisfying the
requirements of the expert-notice statute is an element of admissibility under rule
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702, and that failure to satisfy the statute makes expert testimony inadmissible under
rule 702. This Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review this important issue of
first impression because the Court of Appeals’ decision renders superfluous the
statute’s provisions governing remedies, it conflicts with the plain language of rule
702 and the statute and with another decision from the Court of Appeals, and it creates
confusion as to the controlling standards and remedies in cases involving expert
witnesses. See Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(2), (4).
The expert-notice statute requires a proponent of expert testimony to give
notice at least thirty days before trial, accompanied by either a report or “a written
explanation of the expert’s proposed testimony sufficient to give the opposing party
adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony.” Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(1)
(West 2017). The statute allows two possible remedies, each conditioned on a specific
showing. If a proffering party does not “substantially comply” with the statute, and if
a continuance is “necessary to prevent substantial prejudice” to the opposing party,
the opposing party is “entitled” to a continuance. Id. §77-17-13(4)(a). The court may
also exclude the expert testimony, but only as a sanction for a “deliberate[]” or “bad
faith” violation. Id. §77-17-13(4)(b). In short, because the expert-notice statute is
about preparation for trial, its requirements must be met before trial, and the default
remedy is a continuance.
In contrast, rules of evidence are generally about reliability, not notice. A
party’s inability to satisfy an evidentiary rule’s requirements entitles the opposing
party to a specific remedy: the evidence is excluded. See, e.g., State v. Guard, 2015
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UT 96, ¶62, 371 P.3d 1 (concluding that testimony not meeting reliability standard of
rule 702 was inadmissible). Some evidentiary rules expressly incorporate pre-trial
notice requirements into the rule. See Utah R. Evid. 404, 609. But rule 702 does not.
Absent explicit notice requirements in the rules of evidence, admissibility under the
rules may be determined during trial, and it may generally be done through
preliminary questioning to lay foundation even in front of the jury. See id. R.104(a),
(b), (c).
That is what happened here, where Smith testified at trial and without
objection that the studies on which she relied were “generally accepted” within her
field “as being sources that were reliable.” R1138–40. Despite the State having
satisfied the requirements for admissibility under the plain language of rules 104 and
702, the Court of Appeals read additional requirements into rule 702 by injecting the
expert-notice statute into it. The Court of Appeals held that “the first step” in meeting
the admissibility requirements of rule 702 “involves giving notice” under the statute.
Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, ¶28. The court did not cite rule 702 or any case interpreting
it to support this new rule. See id. But the court concluded that because the notice was
insufficient under the statute, neither Peraza nor the court had the necessary
information “from which to determine the principles or methods that would form the
basis of Expert’s testimony, or whether her opinions were based upon sufficient facts
or data.” Id. ¶31.
This holding conflicts with the plain language of both the statute and rule 702.
The statute is clear: exclusion of expert testimony based on a violation of the statute
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is only available upon a showing of bad faith. Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(4)(b).
Indeed, three months before issuing its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals
held in State v. Roberts, 2018 UT App 9, 414 P.3d 962, that under the expert-notice
statute trial courts have “no discretion” to exclude expert testimony “absent a finding
that the State deliberately violated its obligation under the statute.” Id. ¶37; see also
id. ¶38. The Court of Appeals issued an opinion in direct conflict with Roberts and
the plain language of the expert-notice statute when it held—absent a showing of bad
faith—that the trial court “exceeded its discretion in admitting Expert’s testimony at
trial because the State failed to comply with Utah Code section 77-17-13.” Peraza,
2018 UT App 68, ¶37. But that holding cannot be grounded in the text of rule 702
either. Exclusion under rule 702 depends on scientific reliability or whether the
evidence will assist the fact finder. See Utah R. Evid. 702. Notice is irrelevant under
the plain text of the rule.
By importing additional requirements into rule 702 that do not appear in the
text of the rule, and then excluding evidence based on a violation of those
requirements, the court has either written the bad-faith limitation out of the expertnotice statute or, at the very least, created confusion as to when it applies. Going
forward, litigants will not know when bad faith must be shown (or rebutted), let alone
when substantial compliance and substantial prejudice are at issue. Indeed, whether
a violation triggers the statutory remedies or qualifies as a violation of rule 702 may
well turn on the predilections of a particular judge or panel. This Court should grant
review to resolve the confusion this opinion creates.
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II.
By vacating based on an issue that Peraza never raised on appeal,
the Court of Appeals violated this Court’s directive in Johnson and
significantly departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings.
This Court recently specified the circumstances in which appellate courts may
reverse based on issues that were raised before a lower court but waived on appeal.
In State v. Johnson, the Court held that raising such issues sua sponte is only
appropriate when, among other things, “the issue is ‘astonishingly erroneous’” and
“neither party is unfairly prejudiced by raising the issue at that point in the litigation”
2017 UT 76, ¶49. The Court also held that appellate courts “should typically allow
some form of argument from the parties to ‘test a notion of [the court’s] own
invention before using it to justify a reversal.’” Id. ¶45.
In this case, the Court of Appeals reversed, without supplemental briefing or
argument, based on an objection that Peraza waived on appeal. And it did so without
even acknowledging Johnson. Peraza objected to the inadequacy of the notice before
trial, R534,548–49, but he abandoned that argument on appeal, Br.Aplt.1–3,25–52.
Although he argued that the State failed to present evidence to meet its burden to
establish the admissibility of Smith’s testimony and, implicitly, that the State had an
obligation to meet that burden sometime before trial, Peraza based his appellate
arguments exclusively on rule 702. Br.Aplt.1–3,25–35. He never cited the expertnotice statute, let alone claimed that the State violated it.
The Court of Appeals violated Johnson by addressing a waived issue sua
sponte where that issue was not “‘astonishingly erroneous.’” 2017 UT 76, ¶49. In
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fact, as shown above, the court adopted a new rule that conflicts with the plain
language of both the expert-notice statute and rule 702. But even if the court’s
interpretation of the statute and rule were correct, its application to this case was not
obvious. Peraza’s counsel asserted during oral argument that the State had not put on
any evidence of reliability “other than providing this notice [of expert witness],”
which he then quoted. Oral Argument at 7:25–8:00 (Feb. 21, 2018). The Court asked,
“But isn’t that sort of summary ordinary or usual?” Id. at 8:00–8:07. Peraza responded
by agreeing and clarifying that his objection went to rule 702, not the inadequacy of
notice: “It’s ordinary for notice, but it’s not ordinary to explain what the science is,
whether or not it’s reliable, and whether or not this person has the experience.” Id. at
8:05–8:15. The commonplace nature of the State’s notice demonstrates that even if it
technically violated the statute, it was not “astonishingly erroneous.” Further, the
showing of an “astonishingly erroneous” violation is even more difficult when the
statute requires only substantial compliance. See Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(4)(a).
The Court of Appeals also violated Johnson because the State is “unfairly
prejudiced” by the decision to vacate on this basis. 2017 UT 76, ¶49. When Peraza
objected before trial to the inadequacy of the notice, the trial court tentatively ruled
that Smith could testify but told the State to provide copies of the relevant studies that
Smith would be relying on. R550,570–72. The State did so. R746. And after the State
provided copies of the studies, Peraza did not renew any notice or rule 702 objection.
Rather, he effectively used the studies to cross-examine Smith at trial. See R1146–48.
The State could thus reasonably rely on its compliance with the trial court’s order and
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Peraza’s lack of further objection at trial or on appeal to conclude that it had cured
any notice defect. Had Peraza believed that the studies were inadequate to cure any
statutory notice defect, the State may have been able to provide further detail about
Smith’s potential testimony to allow Peraza “to prepare to meet the testimony.” See
Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(1)(b)(ii); see also Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶49 (“[U]nfair
prejudice exists when ‘a party demonstrates that it would have presented additional
evidence or that it otherwise would have proceeded differently if the claim had been
raised at trial.’”). But by raising no further objection, Peraza led the State and the trial
court to believe that his notice objection had been resolved.
True, the Court of Appeals’ violation of Johnson is not apparent from the face
of the opinion. But review is still appropriate because the opinion “so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings … as to call for an exercise
of [this] Court’s power of supervision.” Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(3). Despite Peraza’s
complete abandonment of the notice issue on appeal, the Court of Appeals said it was
“asked to determine whether the State sufficiently complied with the notice
requirements under Utah Code section 77-17-13.” Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, ¶2. And
it explicitly said it was “not asked to determine whether … the Rule 702 requirements
could be met with respect to [the substance of] Expert’s testimony,” id. ¶37—despite
the State’s explicit argument that it laid sufficient foundation at trial to satisfy rule
702. See Br.Aplt.25–35; Br.Aple.33–36.
Having relied on Peraza’s waiver of the issue on appeal, the State was never
given the opportunity to address what the Court of Appeals believed the dispositive
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issue to be. The State was never given the opportunity to address—and the Court of
Appeals never addressed—whether the State’s notice “substantially compl[ied]” with
the expert-notice statute, let alone whether any deficiency was astonishingly
erroneous. See Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(4). Nor was the State able to address—
and the Court of Appeals never addressed—whether a continuance was “necessary to
prevent substantial prejudice,” which is the controlling test for providing a remedy
for a violation of the statute. See id. And the State never had the opportunity to address
the issue the Court of Appeals eventually found dispositive—whether insufficient
notice without bad faith can be a basis for excluding expert testimony under rule 702.
This Court should therefore exercise its supervisory powers to ensure that the Court
of Appeals honors Peraza’s strategic choice to waive the statutory issue on appeal, or
at the very least gives the State the opportunity to address the issue as the Court of
Appeals has reframed it.
III.
By placing the burden on the appellee to disprove prejudice from
the denial of a continuance, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion
that conflicts with the expert-notice statute and this Court’s
precedent governing non-statutory continuances.
This Court should also grant review because the Court of Appeals placed the
burden of disproving prejudice from the denial of a continuance on the State. That
holding conflicts with the expert-notice statute and this Court’s precedent governing
non-statutory continuances. See id. R.46(a)(1), (4).
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), this Court held that the State
bears the burden of disproving prejudice when it violates discovery rules—if “the
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defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor’s errors have impaired
the defense.” Id. at 921. The Court of Appeals has previously held that Knight should
be extended to violations of the expert-notice statute. See State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d
1167, 1171 (Utah 1998). The Court of Appeals followed that precedent here. Peraza,
2018 UT App 68, ¶44.
This Court has never addressed this issue. See Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(4). But it
should because the Court of Appeals’ holding conflicts with the expert-notice statute.
The statute implicitly places the burden on the movant to show that he is entitled to a
continuance: “the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice,
be entitled to a continuance of the trial … .” Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13(4)(a). The
Court of Appeals has held that the statute’s use of the word “entitled” places the
burden on the party desiring a continuance to request it. State v. Perez, 2002 UT App
211, ¶41, 52 P.3d 451. Likewise, the word places the burden on the party desiring a
continuance to prove that he is “entitled” to it.
But Peraza’s appeal was never about the expert-notice statute. And this Court’s
precedent governing non-statutory continuances forecloses placing the burden of
proving prejudice on the non-moving party. See Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ¶33,
387 P.3d 986 (placing on movant burden of proving prejudice for denial of
continuance to secure attendance of witness); see also State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474,
476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“[O]n appeal, the moving party must show that it was
materially prejudiced by the court’s denial of the continuance … .”).
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The placement of the burden made a difference in this case, as it will in many
others. Peraza could not have proven prejudice in light of the equivocal nature of
Smith’s testimony and the totality of the evidence supporting Peraza’s guilt. Smith’s
testimony amounted to nothing more than an acknowledgement that recantations
happen, and an identification of some reasons children may recant truthfully or
falsely. R1141–42,1147–48. Further, Child’s account was corroborated by significant
circumstantial evidence—including the evidence of Mother’s motive to side with
Peraza, R806,983–84,989–91; SE1 at 40:20–30; inconsistencies between Mother’s
and Peraza’s stories, R1015–16,1047; and Peraza’s statements to police, which
included his changing story, his weak denial, and his acknowledgement that he could
have sodomized Child a few times when he was drunk, R1049–50,1068–69,1075. Yet
the Court of Appeals did not address the totality of the evidence because its analysis
proceeded on a presumption of prejudice. See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶56, 299
P.3d 892 (stating that prejudice analysis requires review of whole record).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted on June 20, 2018.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
/s/ William M. Hains
WILLIAM M. HAINS
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Petitioner
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Appellate Case No. 20180487-SC

IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT PERAZA,
Defendant/Respondent.
Response to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. By deciding that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted expert
testimony without applying the 702 gatekeeping analysis, did the Utah Court of Appeals
decide an important issue of first impression?
2. By responding to the State of Utah’s claims that Peraza’s challenge was to notice,
and not 702, did the Court of Appeals reverse on a waived issue?
3. Did the Court of Appeals’ decision place an improper burden on the State to
disprove prejudice in conflict with the expert-notice statute?
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals’ opinion sought to be reviewed is State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App
68, __ P.3d __.

1

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on April 19, 2018. The Court granted the
State’s motion for extension to file its petition, extending the time to June 20, 2018. The
Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition under Utah Code §78A-3-102(5).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of the Facts from Trial
At the time of trial K.C. was 12 years old and in 6th grade. R.835-36. Peraza and K.C’s
mother, Nina, have been together most of her life but she is not sure whether they were
married. R.840-41. K.C. alleged that years before Peraza woke her up late at night and
showed K.C. “his body parts” and made her touch his penis. R.843-44. This “happened a
couple of nights” and “it started going where he made me touch him.” R.846. “He made me
do an up and down gesture on his penis.” R.847. This happened “every week” until K.C. was
seven, then “it started to change.” R.849-50. Then Peraza made K.C. “do it longer, and put
my mouth on his penis”. R.850.
Then, a month later, “things started to happen with [K.C.’s] bum”. R.854. Peraza
would “put a sock in my mouth so I wouldn’t scream.” R.852, 928. “He put some stuff on
my butt and stick his penis in me.” R.852. During these incidents, Peraza was behind K.C.
and she was “[a]t a 90-degree angle on the bed.” R.932. Trial was the first time K.C. told
anyone about Peraza putting a sock in her mouth. R.968. Trial was the first time K.C. told
anyone about using “weird stuff” to make penetration easier. R.968.
Then, “[a] year after he started sticking his penis in my butt”, he “stuck his penis in
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my vagina.” R.853.1 This happened two or three times, standing up, face to face. R.933. This
happened “[a] long time”, or a “couple months”, before her interview at the CJC. R.934.
The abuse stopped when K.C. was nine and Peraza moved in with his mother, before K.C.
reported it to Nina. R.853.
K.C. was interviewed by Echols at the CJC on August 9, 2013. R.813, see State’s
Exhibit 1. K.C. told Echols that nothing like this has happened with anybody else, other
than Peraza. R.923. Echols asked K.C. to describe Peraza’s penis and K.C. told her it was
just like my mom said.” R.962.2 K.C. had asked her mother about Peraza’s penis because she
was curious about it. R.962-63. K.C didn’t tell Echols about “more abuse with [her] dad that
involved things like [her] butt and [her] vagina” because she “was afraid.” R.926, 964 (Echols
asked “numerous times if it had happened in any other way” and K.C. told her “nothing
else”).3
After the CJC K.C. spoke with Nina and told her that she missed Peraza, and that she
wanted to live with him again. R.945. Nina was confused about why and asked K.C. whether
the things she had said about Peraza actually happened. R.946. K.C. told Nina that they did
not happen. R.946.
A couple months after she was first interviewed at the CJC K.C.’s mother took her to
an appointment to talk with a private investigator. R.917, 920-21. The investigator asked
Peraza was not charged with conduct involving vaginal rape because K.C.’s trial testimony
was the first time she had made these allegations, to anyone other than her aunt a few
months before trial, despite being interviewed repeatedly and attending years of therapy.
R.951-955.
2 See State’s Exhibit 1 at 36:15 (Q: Tell me what his pee-pee looks like. A: It was like my
mom said.”).
3 See State’s Exhibit 1 at 35:57 (Q: Has your dad ever touched you anywhere on your body?
A: No.).
1
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K.C. about Peraza having her touch him and she said he had not done that. R.942. She told
the investigator Peraza didn’t touch her and she didn’t touch Peraza. R.942. The investigator
asked K.C. about what she said in her CJC interview she said she said those things because
she “had to”. R.943, see State’s Exhibit 2 at 6-7.4 K.C. told the investigator that an evil voice
in her head told her what to say. R.943. The investigator asked K.C. many times about the
alleged abuse and every time she said they did not happen. R.944.
After she moved to California, K.C. would call her mother on the phone. R.970. K.C.
“kept telling [Nina] in those conversations that [Peraza] didn’t do anything to” K.C. R.97071. K.C. told her mother that nothing happened with Peraza but that Giovanni, Peraza’s
brother, had done things to her. R.972.
K.C. was interviewed again, in California, by “Courtney” and asked about Giovanni.
R.954. K.C. said that Giovanni’s girlfriend, Cassie, had heard K.C. and Giovanni “doing
things”. R.954.
Chelsea Smith works at the Utah County CJC as a forensic interviewer. R.1131. Smith
did not interview or make an assessment on K.C., she did not read the transcript of Bourne’s
interview of K.C, and she did not review any medical records or counseling records. R.1148,
1154.
Smith has performed “[a]round 1,900” forensic interviews. R.1141. In her experience,

“Q. Did you tell her that Robert had you do things with him that you didn’t want to do and
that weren’t right? A. Yes. Q. And why did you tell her that? A. Because I had to. Q. Why
did you have to? A. Because that’s why I was there for. Q. And why did you have to -- was it
because it was true or was it for some other reason? A. I don’t know. Q. Well, did those
things happen, or didn’t they? A. Didn’t. Q. They didn’t happen? A. Huh-uh. Q. Then why
did you tell the lady they did? A. Because that little voice went in my head. Q. A little voice
went in your head? A. Uh-huh.”
4
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the fact that a “child recants does not mean that it did not occur.” R.1142. The research
about the frequency of recantations “varies between four percent to 20 percent of cases, so
it’s not something that’s typical, but it’s not unheard of that it does happen.” R.1141-42.
“Sometimes when a child recants, it may be feeling pressure from family members.” R.1142.
When people in the “sexual abuse community” “disclose as a child, even then, the
disclosure can be delayed.” R.1143. Sometimes disclosure comes gradually where “kids will
just give a little bit of information to test the waters, to see how it is received.” R.1143-44.
“Sometimes the children are supported and then they feel more comfortable talking about
things. Sometimes it’s not that well by the person who receives it, and then the child will
kind of shut down and not talk about things a lot.” R.1144. “Other times, children will say
the information that they can think about that time, but just often times, we don’t remember
all of the information about an experience when someone’s asked us about that experience,
and so when someone’s asked us about that experience, and so sometimes later we’ll think,
oh, I forgot to tell them that part, or the more we talk about things, the more we remember
different experiences.” R.1144.
B. Summary of the Proceedings
Peraza was charged by information with four (4) counts of Sodomy Upon a Child,
first degree felonies, and one (1) count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a first degree
felony. R.001-02.
After several continuances due to the State’s failure to disclose discovery evidence
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and new evidence coming to light, a jury trial was set for February 2016.5 On January 8, 2016
(32 days before trial) the State filed notice of intent to present expert testimony through
Chelsea Smith. R.282-83. The State intended to present evidence of the “methodology and
science related to forensic interviewing of suspected child sex abuse victims; science and
research regarding child disclosures of sex abuse including identified factors related to
delayed, partial and gradual disclosures and recantation.” R.283. At the January 25, 2016
pretrial conference, Peraza informed the court that the State had “filed a notice of expert,
and we filed an objection…” R.520. After clarifying that the filed objection had originally
The State’s petition points to a number of continuances that eventually led to trial. State’s
Petition, 6-7. Undoubted, the State intends to persuade this Court that the case was drawn
out unnecessarily by Peraza’s repeated requests for continuances. But the State’s recitation of
this procedural history is misleading at best. For example, the State claims “defense counsel
requested eleven continuances” before the preliminary hearing. But review of the record
easily refutes the State’s claim. For example at the waiver hearing on February 24, 2014 the
case minutes reflect that the continuance was by “stipulation of counsel”, and that in fact a
preliminary hearing was requested and scheduled. R.031-32. To characterize the setting of a
preliminary hearing as a “continuance” is inaccurate. Setting of a preliminary hearing is exact
opposite of a continuance or a delay, it moves the case from one stage to the next. Another
example is at the hearing on May 5, 2014 where the parties addressed a motion to appoint a
Guardian Ad Litem to represent the victim. The parties addressed the court and the court
denied the motion. The case was then set for the next hearing. To characterize this as a
continuance in the guise of showing the defense as repeatedly delaying the case is a false
characterization refuted by the record. At the August 4, 2014 hearing there was a stipulated
motion to continue the preliminary hearing because “counsel needs to figure out how to play
the interview for the Court prior to the hearing.” R.077. The prosecutor was having trouble
providing the court with an exhibit that could be viewed and needed the continuance “to
allow [him] time to try to figure something out on that”. R.440. To blame that continuance
on the defense is an unfair reading of the record. The State then cites R.422 which
corresponds with a transcript of a hearing on May 5, 2014 at which defense counsel, the
public defender, does ask for a continuance after being re-appointed to the case. But what
the State either ignores or hopes the Court won’t notice is that this is a duplicate of the
continuance it cited at R.044. The same is true when the State cites R.439 which is the
August 4, 2014 hearing at which the prosecutor asks for two weeks to resolve the problem
with the video cited by the State at R.077. So while the State’s assertion that defense counsel
requested eleven continuances is designed to show a pattern of repeated delay, a review of
the record refutes that inference entirely.
5
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been directed at another expert witness that the State was no longer going to call, the State
said it had no objection to using the prior motion in limine with regard to the State’s new
expert and to address the expert witness issue “next week.” R.520-21.
On January 28, 2016 at the hearing on Peraza’s motion to exclude the State’s expert,
defense counsel claimed the expert’s testimony wasn’t needed and was redundant and
cumulative. R.533-34. Peraza claimed the science and research regarding child disclosures of
sex abuse, including identified factors related to delay, partial and gradual disclosures and
recantations” had not been supported by a report and that “I don’t really know what this
expert would be testifying to.” R.534. Counsel complained that the expert may intend to
present “statistical analysis” which isn’t supported by an “actual statistical basis”. R.534-35.
He challenged the “scientific basis” for an expert to testify to the different reasons for a
child to recant and that such testimony would not “meet[] the threshold.” “[T]o have an
expert testify about them without a scientific basis, is concerning because it give more weight
to the State’s argument than maybe it should…” R.535. Defense counsel also argued that the
State’s notice was inadequate because it did not provide “a thorough enough written
explanation of the expert’s proposed testimony” such that the defense did not “know which
[studies] she’s specifically relying on” and would “have no ability to cross examine her
without having more information”. R.548-49.
The State did not put the expert witness on or present any foundational evidence to
meet the threshold showing of reliability. After hearing the parties’ arguments the trial court
stated, “according to the rules of evidence, this person would meet the criteria for being an
expert…” R.548. After further discussion, the court denied Peraza’s objection to the State’s
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expert witness noting she “qualified as an expert, looking at skill, experience, education, and
those kinds of things.” R.550.
Later that same day, January 28, 2015, the court held a phone conference with the
parties. R.589. Defense counsel informed the court that, after that morning’s rulings when
Smith was allowed to testify he consulted with a mental health, social work, and mitigation
director for the Salt Lake Legal Defenders, to get “advice on how to prepare a cross
examination of Mr. Smith” and the controversial therapy K.C. was engaged in. R.589-90.
Defense counsel decided he needed “an expert of [his] own.” R.590-91. Counsel, after
acknowledging the age of the case and denying any intent to delay, requested a continuance
of the trial to secure an expert. R.591. The State was “unhappy” with the prospect of a
continuance “but at the same time, I understand the basis of what they’re asking for.” R.59192. The court decided it had “to draw the line somewhere” and, because “can't be something
that could come up on the eve of trial”, it denied the motion. R.592. The court “recognize[d]
that this might be something that could be used later, but [felt] like this is too late in the
game, especially this being the third time that we’ve set a trial. We have an obligation as well
to this victim -- alleged victim, that I have to consider. And so, weighing all things and
hearing what I’m hearing today, I see no reason why this trial should not go here in 10 days,
whatever it might be.” R.592.
The case proceeded to trial on February 9, 2016 and Peraza was convicted on four
counts of Sodomy on a Child. R.1292, 367-68. At sentencing the court ordered Peraza to
serve 25 years-to-life on each of the four counts, each to run concurrent. R.1318. Peraza
timely appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed his convictions finding two separate and
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independent prejudicial errors. The State of Utah now seeks certiorari review of the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
C. Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, Peraza claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in two ways. The
questions presented where: 1) “Whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to present
opinion testimony of Chelsea Smith”; and 2) “Whether the trial court erred when it denied
Peraza’s request to continue the trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 2.6 The Court of Appeals found
that the court abused its discretion in both instances.
ARGUMENT
This Court reviews decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals “only for special and
important reasons.” UTAH R. APP. PRO. 46(a). The State argues Peraza warrants review
because the Court of Appeals conflates the standards and remedies applicable under rule 702
and the expert-notice statute. But this claim is misdirection and ignores the language or
reasoning used by the Court of Appeals. Nothing about Peraza’s claims, or a careful reading
of the Court of Appeals’ agreement with those claims, suggest that this case is about excluding
evidence based on a lack of notice. Peraza’s arguments in the first claim to the Court of
Appeals repeatedly and consistently focused on the trial court’s abuse of discretion when it

Peraza made a third claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel which depended upon
a pending 23B, motion which the Court of Appeals did not address. Peraza, fn.1.
Conceivably, if this Court grants the State’s petition, and ultimately reverses the Court of
Appeals on both independent grounds, the case must be remanded to the Court of Appeals
to rule on the pending rule 23B motion and to address the ineffectiveness claim.
Peraza made a fourth argument claiming the trial court erred in sending a copy of the
recorded interview with the victim into jury deliberations after he objected but the Court of
Appeals ruled this claim was not preserved, while acknowledging that such evidence should
not be sent to the jury. Peraza, fn.6.
6
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denied Peraza’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude the State’s proposed expert concluding
that the expert could testify after “looking at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of
things.” R.550. Peraza challenged the trial court’s conclusion that the State had satisfied the
requirements of Rule 702 to admit expert testimony and the Court of Appeals agreed. The
State’s current attempt to re-frame that challenge, to put words in the Court of Appeals’
mouth, cannot manufacture a special and important reason. This Court should not grant the
State’s petition because there is nothing to review.
I.

The Court of Appeals’ decision did not decide an issue of first
impression, nor does it conflate rule 702 and the notice statute
The issue before the Court of Appeals was simple, the trial court abused its discretion

when it did not require the State to meet the threshold for admitting expert testimony. As
the Court of Appeals stated, “Peraza argues the district court had no basis for determining
that rule 702 was satisfied because ‘the court had no idea what Expert’s testimony was going
to be… what her opinions or conclusions were based upon… or whether her methods and
principles had been reliably applied to the facts in this case.” Peraza, ¶30. When the court
concluded “the district court exceeded its discretion when it admitted Expert’s testimony at
trial without complying with the requirements of rule 702”, it was doing so because the trial
court had no “idea what Expert’s testimony would be or what scientific basis it was based
upon.” Peraza, ¶¶31-32. This is not an issue of first impression. The application of the 702
analysis in this case is neither novel, or particularly interesting.
The State seems to direct its complaint at the expert notice discussion in paragraph
28, without acknowledging the existence of paragraphs 26-27, and without acknowledging
that the holding in paragraphs 31-32 do not reference or depend upon the notice language at
10

all. The Court of Appeals does mention the items contained within the State’s notice,
including Expert’s “curriculum vitae [and] the list of article citations” but not as criticism of
the notice itself. Instead, it seems clear the court references these items in the notice to rebut
any claim that the evidence needed to satisfy 702 could be found in the notice.
The State’s argument is that the Court of Appeals erred on the 702 question because
the State actually satisfied the requirements of 702 when its expert testified at trial. The State
continues, because 702 does not require “pre-trial notice” there was no need for the trial
court to exclude its expert at the January 28, 2016 hearing on Peraza’s objection to the
State’s proposed expert. The State acts as though the admissibility of the State’s expert was
an open question up until trial and the judge acted within its discretion because the expert
eventually testified “that the studies on which she relied were ‘generally accepted’ within her
field ‘as being sources that were reliable.’” State’s Petition, page 13.
But this argument is based on a fantasy about “what happened here.” State’s Petition,
page 13. Smith only testified at trial because the trial court denied Peraza’s motion in limine
to exclude her testimony. When a party makes a pretrial objection to proposed evidence and
the trial court denies that objection, the party is “not required to object during trial to
evidence offered in accordance with the court’s pretrial ruling.” State v. Domiguez, 2003 UT
App 158, ¶18, 72 P.3d 127. Peraza filed a pretrial objection to the proposed expert based on
702. This objection obligated the court to perform its gatekeeping function. At the January
28 pre-trial hearing the court specifically addressed Peraza’s objection to the expert. The
court heard the parties’ positions, considered the State’s notice which included the expert’s
CV, and ruled on the objection concluding that “according to the rules of evidence, this
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person would meet the criteria for being an expert...” R.548. The court denied Peraza’s
objection to the State’s proposed expert witness finding she “qualified as an expert, looking
at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things.” R.550.
The court did all this without receiving evidence from the witness or reviewing a
report or documentation about what expert’s testimony would be. The court utterly failed to
perform any of the gatekeeping function required by 702. The court made no mention of
reliability of the testimony, nor of the methods or principles, or of the application to the
facts. This is what the Court of Appeals saw as the abuse of discretion.
Nothing in the reasoning of the opinion suggests that the district court should have
excluded the expert’s testimony because of a problem in the notice.7 Nothing suggests the
Court of Appeals was reversing because the notice did not include sufficient information. It
is true that the Court of Appeals does repeatedly refer to the notice requirement in §77-1713, but those references are relevant only insofar as they reflect an absence of any evidence
demonstrating the reliability of the science underlying the proposed expert testimony.
The opinion clearly concludes that because “[t]here was no information from which
to determine the principles or methods that would form the basis of Expert’s testimony, or
whether her opinions were based upon sufficient facts or data. See Utah R. Evid. 702(b).”

Nor was the Court asked to do this. Peraza’s initial brief to the Court of Appeals did not
even reference §77-17-13, and his reply brief did mention it, but only to reference the
language used in the objection filed by trial counsel. The entirety of the expert witness
argument was that the trial court abused its discretion in admitted expert testimony because
it failed to apply the 702 gatekeeper test. Peraza asserted that when the trial court erred in
interpreting and applying rule 702 because it “completely failed to examine whether
[Expert’s] testimony and opinions were based upon principles and methods that were
reliable, that they were based upon sufficient facts or data, and had been reliably applied to
the facts.”
7
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Peraza, ¶31. That the State now complains the ruling was based on a notice problem is
refuted by the straightforward language of the analysis in the opinion. While the court did
refer to §77-17-13 in describing the trial court’s failure, the actual justification for the holding
is that without “detailed information with respect to Expert’s testimony or the scientific
basis on which she would rely… the requirements under rule 702 were not met…” Peraza,
¶37.
Peraza based his 702 argument to the Court of Appeals on Eskelson v. Davis Hosp.,
2010 UT 59, ¶11, wherein rule 702 “requires a determination to determine whether a party
has met its threshold burden to show the reliability of the principles that form the basis for
the expert’s testimony and the reliability of applying those principles to the facts of the
case.” See Appellant’s Brief at 27-30, Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6. The argument made to the
Court of Appeals was that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Smith’s
testimony was admissible when the State had failed to meet this threshold, even within the
proffer of the expert notice. See Appellant’s Brief at 30-32, Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10-11.8
Following the plain language of Rule 702 the Court of Appeals agreed with Peraza
that the trial court had no “idea what Expert’s testimony would be or what scientific basis it
was based upon.” Peraza, ¶31. The rule puts an obligation on trial courts to act as
gatekeepers and require the proponent of expert evidence to make a threshold showing of
reliability. Because the gatekeeper in this case didn’t make any inspection whatsoever of what
the State wanted to bring into trial, the court abused its discretion. There is nothing
The State did not oppose these arguments directly. Instead, the State only argued
preservation, Peraza’s failure to argue plain error, and that any error was harmless. See
Appellee’s Brief. At no point did the State contend that the State met its burden under 702
when Peraza objected to it.
8
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controversial, novel, or even interesting here. There is certainly no special or important reason to
review the Court of Appeals’ decision and the petition should be denied.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT REVERSE ON AN ISSUE
“NEVER RAISED ON APPEAL”, IF ANYTHING THE STATE’S
ARGUMENTS INVITED IT THE NOTICE ISSUE
The State’s second argument is that the Court of Appeals reversed Peraza’s

conviction based on an issue that was preserved in the trial court, but then waived on appeal,
in violation of the direction this Court gave in State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76. See State’s
Petition, pages 15-18. According to its petition, the State believes this Court should grant
certiorari review because the “Court of Appeals violated Johnson by addressing a waived issue
sua sponte where that issue was not ‘astonishingly erroneous.’” State’s Petition, page 15
(citing Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶49). This argument incorrectly reads the holding below and
ignores the appellate record, including the State’s own arguments to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals did not reverse on the basis of inadequate notice, and even if it did,
the State invited the Court of Appeals to address the notice issue in it written and oral
arguments.
As explained in the first section, the Court of Appeals did not reverse on Peraza’s
notice objection or on the question of adequate notice. The Court of Appeals reversed on
Peraza’s preserved-and unwaived on appeal-objection to the rule 702 admissibility of the
State’s expert witness evidence.
Secondly, to the extent that the Court of Appeals addressed the notice requirement it
did so based upon the State’s arguments. For example, in its brief to the Court of Appeals,
the State claimed that Peraza’s pretrial objection was only about notice, not about 702. See
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Appellee’s Brief at 24 (“Peraza never objected based on rule 702.”), 29 (“Peraza never made
a rule 702 objection. Rather, he objected pre-trial on the basis of inadequate notice”), 30
(“When Peraza objected to Smith’s testimony before trial, he did so on the basis of
inadequate notice”). Peraza’s first claim to the Court of Appeals focused on rule 702.9 The
State countered, as is their standard response, that the argument was not preserved and that
Peraza had only objected to notice, which the State claimed was proper. In considering the
preservation question the Court of Appeals necessarily
III.

THE TRIAL COURT RULED THE EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS
ADMISSIBLE LONG BEFORE ANY FOUNDATION WAS
OFFERED AND THE STATE FAILED TO PRESERVE THE
TIMING ARGUMENT IT NOW SEEKS TO MAKE ON
CERTIORARI

The State now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis regarding the rule
702 requirements because rule 702 has no timing requirement and that the expert’s trial
testimony laid sufficient foundation for admission of expert testimony. See State’s Petition,
pages 12-13. The State contends that while some “evidentiary rules expressly incorporate
pre-trial notice requirements, into the rule… 702 does not” and therefore Smith’s trial
testimony “satisfied the requirements for admissibility”. State’s Petition, page 13. Not only
does this argument ignore the record, it is an unpreserved argument the State never
presented to the Court of Appeals.
First, the State’s contention that the 702 requirements were met when Smith testified

The second claim, the denial of the continuance was based at least in part on the fact that
the notice did not provide sufficient information from which Peraza could prepare his
defense. See Appellant’s Brief at 40 (Peraza had no reason to suspect the court would allow
Smith to testify, since the State had not produced anything which could allow the court to
find her testimony was admissible).
9
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at trial “that the studies on which she relied were ‘generally accepted’ within her field ‘as
being sources that were reliable’” acts as though the trial court’s 702 ruling occurred at trial.
But the State knows that isn’t true and only hopes this Court will overlook the actual
sequence of events. As was made plain to the Court of Appeals, when the trial court denied
Peraza’s motion to exclude the State expert it said:
I know you want to know whether or not this lady’s going to be allowed to
testify. For purposes of today, she meets the criteria. It is late, but it’s within
the timeframe allowed to provide an expert under 702, and all I can do is look
at her criteria, figure out for myself whether or not she’s qualified as an expert,
looking at skill, experience, education, and those kinds of things. And it
appears to me that she does meet those qualifications, so I’ll go ahead and
deny a motion to exclude this particular witness at this point.
R.550. The trial judge made it clear, he was allowing the State’s expert to testify at trial, he
was denying Peraza’s pretrial motion. Peraza was not obliged to raise his 702 objection again
at trial, nor was he obligated to challenge Smith on the 702 factors in front of the jury.
And Smith’s trial testimony that the studies she relied upon are generally accepted as
reliable does not meet the 702 test. The State was required to prove her opinion was
necessary to assist the jury, that Smith had the necessary knowledge, and that the science is
reliable, based upon sufficient facts or data, and reliably applied to the facts. Eskelson, ¶9,
UTAH R. EVID. 702.
Second, even if the State’s new timing argument had a leg to stand on, it could not be
made now because it is new. The State never argued that rule 702 has no timing requirement
or that Smith’s testimony at trial satisfied Peraza’s pretrial objection. To the Court of
Appeals the State argued that Peraza abandoned his objection “when the evidentiary picture
changed at trial” because the trial court had not ruled definitively. See Appellee’s Brief, 30-
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32. The State’s argument to the Court of Appeals was that the trial court’s pretrial ruling was
“a tentative ruling – not a definitive one” and therefore when Peraza was obligated to object
again at trial, but did not. Of course the record made that position difficult to support. As
explained above, at the hearing where Peraza’s 702 objection was addressed, following
argument and without taking any evidence, the trial court definitively denied the motion and
ordered that Smith could testify as an expert.
But now the State contends that it doesn’t matter whether it was tentative and Peraza
didn’t re-raise the objection, it only matters that eventually at trial Smith did meet the 702
requirements. For this new argument, because 702 does not have a timing requirement, it
doesn’t matter that the State completely failed to satisfy 702 at the time of the objection and
hearing. The State never argued that before and cannot now ask this Court to reverse the
Court of Appeals on a new theory.
IV.

THE BURDEN OF DISPROVING PREJUDICE WAS PROPERLY
PLACED ON THE STATE WHERE ITS EXPERT NOTICE WAS
INSUFFICIENT

The State’s claims that because “Peraza’s appeal was never about the expert-notice
statute” the precedent which clearly places the burden to disprove prejudice on the State
does not apply. State’s Petition, pages 18-19. According to the petition, this Court’s holding
regarding the burden for prejudice from discovery violations in State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913
(Utah 1987), should not apply to expert-notice violations because it “conflicts with the
expert-notice statute.” State’s Petition, 19. For the State, the “statute implicitly places the
burden on the movant to show that he is entitled to a continuance” because the word
“entitled” requires the moving party “to prove that he is ‘entitled’ to it.” State’s Petition, 19.
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But this assertion is not based on precedent, not based on the explicit language of the
statute, and ignores the reasoning this Court laid out in Knight to begin with. That reasoning
is solid, and the Court of Appeals’ application of that holding to expert-notice violations
does not give rise to a special and important reason to review it.
Furthermore, this appeal was “about” expert notice, just not in the way State wants
this Court to think about it. Peraza’s motion in limine cited both §77-17-13 and Rule 702,
claiming the notice didn’t give adequate notice about what the testimony would be, and that
it was unreliable and unfairly prejudicial. R.190-94.10 On appeal Peraza separated these two
interrelated claims. First, he claimed error when the court denied his objection to the State’s
expert, which at trial had been based both on notice and on reliability. On appeal this first
claim focused exclusively on rule 702 and the required gatekeeping function, which the trial
court completely failed to perform. Second, he claimed that after the motion in limine had
been erroneously denied, his motion for continuance should have been granted because he
needed time to secure an expert witness to respond to Smith’s opinions.
Peraza’s second claim undoubtedly had to do with expert notice and his ability to
adequately respond to the State’s evidence. While Peraza’s second claim was not directed at
the timing of the State’s expert notice (because the notice was filed 32 days before trial) it
was directed at his ability to respond to the State’s proposed use of Smith’s expert testimony.
Given the lack of specificity and the fact that no report had been included, the inadequacy of
the State’s notice was, in fact, part of Peraza’s appeal, even though the timing of the notice
“Defendant… moves this Court to exclude the State’s expert… from testifying at trial…
This motion is based on Utah Code of Criminal Procedure § 77-17-13 and Utah Rules of
Evidence 702 and 403.” R.190. Remember, this motion written specifically for another
proposed expert was “incorporate[d]” into Peraza’s objection to Smith. R.536.
10
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was not necessarily challenged.
The State also claims that the Court of Appeals was wrong to use the burden
described in Knight because it “conflicts with the expert-notice statute.” State’s Petition, 18.
But as the State recognizes, this Court directed placing the burden on the State when “the
defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor’s errors have impaired the
defense.” State’s Petition, 18-19 (citing Knight, 921). The only reason the State gives for this
Court to overrule its precedent is that it supposedly conflicts with §77-17-13(4)(a), which the
State asserts implies places the burden on the party that requested the continuance. But the
State’s assertion is just that, a bare assertion without any explanation why the term “entitled”
would create a burden to prove prejudice on the party who requested it. It seems even more
likely that the party that failed “substantially comply with the requirements” would be forced
to disprove any prejudice associated with their refusal to comply with the statute.
CONCLUSION
There is not any special or important reason for this Court to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the trial court
denied Peraza’s objection to the State’s expert witness without any evidence which could
have satisfied the requirement of rule 702. The Court of Appeals did not reverse on a waived
issue or violate Johnson. The trial court admitted the expert testimony long before any hint of
foundation was laid and the State failed to make a timing argument to the Court of Appeals.
And finally, the State did bear, and rightly so, the burden of disproving prejudice because the
expert notice actually was insufficient.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 15th day of July, 2018.
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/s/ Douglas J. Thompson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I emailed a copy of the foregoing Response to Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to the Utah Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division,
criminalappeals@agutah.gov, on this 15st day of July.

/s/ Douglas J. Thompson
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Case No. 20180487-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

ROBERT ALONZO PERAZA,
Defendant/Respondent.

Reply to Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Pursuant to rule 50(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits
this reply to arguments raised in Robert Alonzo Peraza’s Brief in Opposition to the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

ARGUMENT
Peraza appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, when it admitted an expert’s testimony.
Br.Aplt.27–32. As Peraza concedes, Opp.12 n.7, on appeal he did not challenge the
adequacy of the State’s pre-trial notice under the notice statute. Br.Aplt.27–32. Yet
the Court of Appeals reversed on that basis. State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App 68,
¶¶2,28,31,37.1

1

Peraza labels this characterization of the Court of Appeals’ opinion as
“misdirection.” Opp.9. The Court of Appeals opinion speaks for itself.

In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the State argued that this Court should
grant review to determine whether the Court of Appeals violated this Court’s opinion
in State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443, when it reversed based in part on an
issue that Peraza waived on appeal and that the State did not have the opportunity to
brief or argue. Pet.3. Peraza argues that review is inappropriate because the State’s
arguments before the Court of Appeals “invited” the court to address the notice issue
when the State claimed that the notice “was proper.” Opp.14–15.
Whether the State presented the issue to the Court of Appeals for decision
simply begs the question presented to this Court: Did the Court of Appeals violate
Johnson? But Peraza is wrong in any event. Aside from mentioning that the notice
was timely, the State never argued that the notice was proper, see Br.Aple.28–40; Oral
Argument at 16:00–31:45 (February 21, 2018), and Peraza does not cite anything to
support his contrary assertion, see Opp.15. Nor did the State concede that notice was
improper. In fact, the State said nothing about the substantive propriety of the notice
because Peraza never raised the issue on appeal. Simply pointing out that Peraza
made a notice challenge below, but that he “disclaims any formal notice challenge”
on appeal, did not invite the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of the abandoned
notice challenge. See Br.Aple.29 n.3. Cf. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶21, 6 P.3d
1116 (holding that appellee does not open door for appellant to address issue in reply
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brief when appellee simply points out that appellant did not raise issue in opening
brief).2

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
this Court should grant certiorari review.
Respectfully submitted on September 14, 2018.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General
/s/ William M. Hains
WILLIAM M. HAINS
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Petitioner

2

On an unrelated note, the State mentioned in its petition that “defense counsel
requested eleven continuances” before a trial date was set. Pet.6. Peraza claims that
this statement is “inaccurate,” “false,” “unfair,” and “misleading at best.” Opp.6. The
State provided citations to each continuance, and the record speaks for itself.
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